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A PROPOSAL TO THE HANODAGANYAS TO
DECOLONIZE FEDERAL INDIAN CONTROL LAWt
Robert B. Porter*
In this Article, cast in the form of a letter to President William
Jefferson Clinton, Professor Porter argues for the decolonization of
federal Indian control law. After detailing the religious and
colonialist roots of early Supreme Court decisions dealing with the
Indian nations and giving an overview of the evolution of federal
Indian policy, Professor Porter argues for the decolonization of
federal Indian control law on several grounds: 1. the world
community has rejected colonialism policies; 2. federal Indian
control law denies basic human rights of self-determination; 3.
colonization has partially succeeded in destroying the Indian
nations; and 4. decolonization is an efficient use of federal
resources. Professor Porter then describes recent reform efforts in
this field of law and explains why they have not been as successful
as their proponents might have hoped. He concludes by outlining a
proposal to decolonize federal Indian control law through several
means: 1. defining all aspects of the federal-tribal relationship by
agreement; 2. implementing Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) reform;
3. repealing colonial federal Indian control law; and 4. abandoning
the colonial foundation of federal Indian control doctrine.
Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.
t Copyright © 1998 by Robert B. Porter.
* Associate.Professor of Law and Director of the Tribal Law and Government
Center, University of Kansas; Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Sac & Fox Nation of
Kansas and Missouri; Member (Heron Clan) and former Attorney General of the Se-
neca Nation of Indians (1991-1995). A.B. 1986, Syracuse University; J.D. 1989,
Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Curtis Berkey, Richard E. Levy, Sidney A.
Shapiro, Ross 0. Swimmer, and my students at the University of Kansas School of
Law for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this proposal. I would also like to
thank Virginia Murray and the Journal staff for their research and editorial assis-
tance. Finally, this work could not have been completed without the support of the
General Research Fund of the University of Kansas. Despite the considerable help
that I have received in developing this proposal, however, I alone am responsible for
its content.
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GREETINGS HANODAGANYAS:'
For over 200 years, the Seneca Nation2 has maintained a
peaceful relationship with the United States in accordance
with the Treaty of Canandaigua. While it is true that both of
our nations have benefited from this Treaty, mine has sacri-
ficed greatly: because of the American people's colonization, we
have lost almost all of our aboriginal lands and much of our
traditional way of life.4 These losses resulted from federal and
state governmental actions over the generations5 that violated
1. Hanodaganyas means "Town destroyer" or "He who raids villages" in the Se-
neca language. See TITLE VII EDUC. BILINGUAL PROGRAM, GOWANDA CENT. SCH. DIST.,
SENECA LANGUAGE TOPIC REFERENCE GUIDE (1987). This name for the American
president derives from George Washington's 1779 order to General John Sullivan and
his army to engage the Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, or Haudenosaunee,
and, despite the absence of significant military conflict, to burn Seneca villages and
the winter food stores. See DONALD A. GRINDE, JR., IROQUOIS AND FOUNDING OF
AMERICAN NATION 111-13 (1977); LEwIS H. MORGAN, LEAGUE OF THE HO-DE-No SAU-
NEE OR IROQUOIS 27 (1954); GREGORY SCHAAF, WAMPUM BELTS AND PEACE TREES 202
(1990); EDMUND WILSON, APOLOGIES TO THE IROQUOIS 83-84 (1959). Since then, Ha-
nodaganyas has been the name used by Senecas to refer to all subsequent American
presidents. See SCHAAF, supra, at 202; WILSON, supra, at 84.
2. Originally a member of the Haudenosaunee, the Seneca Nation of Indians is
a representative democracy that was formed in 1848 and is now a nation politically
separate from the Iroquois Confederacy, recognized as such by the United States. See
Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services From the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 60 Fed. Reg. 9249, 9253 (1995) [hereinafter Indian Entities
Recognized]. See generally SHARON O'BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS
97-118 (1989). The Seneca Nation is comprised of approximately 5,400 members, ap-
proximately half of whom live on the Allegany, Cattaraugus, and Oil Springs
Reservations in western New York State (together constituting approximately 52,000
acres). See O'BRIEN, supra, at 97. See generally Thomas S. Abler & Elisabeth Tooker,
Seneca, in HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 505, 505-17 (William C. Sturte-
vant ed., 1978) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. Seneca People who did not pursue the
constitutional form of government in 1848 remain part of the Confederacy and are
known as the "Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians of New York." See Indian Entities
Recognized, supra, at 9254. See generally Abler & Tooker, supra, at 511-12. Other
Senecas who moved from aboriginal Seneca territory to the Indian territory in the
nineteenth century are known as the "Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma." See Indian
Entities Recognized, supra, at 9253. See generally William C. Sturtevant, Oklahoma
Seneca-Cayuga, in HANDBOOK, supra, at 537-43. There are also Senecas residing on
the Grand River Reserve in Ontario, Canada. See Sally M. Weaver, Six Nations of the
Grand River Ontario, in HANDBOOK, supra, at 525.
3. See Treaty with the Six Nations, Nov. 11, 1794, U.S.-Six Nations, in 2 INDIAN
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 34, 34-37 (Charles J. Kappler ed.,. 1904).
4. See discussion infra Parts II.A.2-3, 5, 7; III.C.
5. See id.
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the letter and spirit of our Treaty and that interfered with our
sovereign right of self-determination.6
While I realize that you are not directly responsible for this
state of affairs, you are the head of the government that made
solemn promises of noninterference and respect to my Nation7
and to the other Indigenous nations located within the United
States.8 The effect of these violations on our ability to survive
as distinct peoples has been dramatic. Indeed, because of what
America and its colonizing predecessors have done to deny us
the opportunity to choose our own future, it is my belief that
Indigenous people are in grave danger of becoming extinct.
Despite this history and the effect that it has had on us, I
remain committed to the belief that we can revitalize our sov-
ereignty and thus ensure the survival of our future
generations. In order to do so, we must find ways to generate
economic opportunity for all of our people, to preserve our
unique languages and cultures, and to develop vibrant tribal
governments. Perhaps as never before, some of us currently
have resources that might allow us to accomplish these goals
and to cast off the hardship associated with the last few hun-
dred years. While we know that much of the blame for our
condition can be placed at the feet of your Nation, we fully ac-
cept that the burden of safeguarding our future rests on our
own shoulders.
Nevertheless, no matter how much responsibility we assume
for the redevelopment of our sovereignty, the United States
remains a barrier to our forward progress. America, because of
its geography, its people, its culture, and its media, is an over-
whelming influence on the Indigenous nations located within
its borders.9 As a result, tremendous forces inhibit the preser-
vation and strengthening of the unique fabric of our nations
and thus form considerable obstacles to our redevelopment.10
One of the most significant barriers to our redevelopment
lies in the body of American law. Since its founding, the United
States has developed an extensive body of law-so-called
6. The Treaty with the Six Nations promises that the United States, in order to
remove "all causes of complaint" from the Six Nations, establishes perpetual "[pleace
and friendship" with them, and promises that the United States will never claim their
lands or "disturb them... in the free use and enjoyment thereof." Treaty with the Six
Nations, supra note 3, at 34-35.
7. Id.
8. See generally 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note 3 (providing
the texts of dozens of US.-Indian treaties).
9. See discussion infra Part III.C.
10. See infra Part II.B.
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"federal Indian law"-to define and regulate its relationship
with the Indian nations remaining within its borders." While
this law may seem to have a neutral purpose, it would be more
accurate to say that "federal Indian law" is really "federal In-
dian control law" because it has the twofold mission of
establishing the legal bases for American colonization of the
continent"2 and perpetuating American power and control over
the Indian nations. 3 Unfortunately, in addition to this founda-
tional problem, the law itself is not simple or uniform. Federal
Indian control law is a hodgepodge of statutes, cases, executive
orders, and administrative regulations that embody a wide va-
riety of divergent policies towards the Indian nations since the
time the United States was established.' Because old laws re-
flecting these old policies have rarely been repealed when new
ones reflecting new policies have been adopted," any efforts
that might be taken by the Indian nations and the federal gov-
ernment to strengthen Indian self-determination must first
cut through the legal muck created by over 200 years of prior
federal efforts to accomplish precisely the opposite result.
As I see it, this legal minefield profoundly effects tribal sov-
ereignty. For example, conflicting federal laws-such as those
that provide for the federal government's protective trust re-
sponsibility over Indian affairs 6 and those that allow federal,
11. See generally 25 U.S.C. (1994) (the title of the United States Code devoted to
federal Indian law); ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW (3d ed. 1991);
FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.,
1982).
12. See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
13. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 326 (1990) [hereinafter WILLIAMS,
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT].
14. See Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Con-
ciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1754 (1997). Frickey notes:
More than any other field of public law, federal Indian law is characterized by
doctrinal incoherence and doleful incidents. Its principles aggregate into com-
peting clusters of inconsistent norms, and its practical effect has been to
legitimate the colonization of this continent-the displacement of its native
peoples-by the descendants of Europeans.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the leading treatise on federal Indian
control law fundamentally ignores this illicit purpose and marginalizes the signifi-
cance of "real" Indian law-the law of the Indians-in the conceptualization of this
area of law. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11,
at 1 ("Although tribal laws and state laws sometimes play important roles, Indian law
is primarily a body of federal law.").
15. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 1-2 (3d ed. 1993).
16. See discussion infra Parts I.B, III.B.3.
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state, and private interests to interfere with tribal self-
government 7 -make it impossible for the Indian nations to
exercise fully their sovereign right of self-determination. As
past efforts to destroy our sovereign existence continue to have
their corrosive effect, so too, in my view, does the natural re-
sult of those efforts: the destruction of Indigenous culture and
the eventual assimilation of Indian people into American soci-
ety.18 Inevitably, in the absence of any affirmative efforts to
decolonize both the Indian nations and federal Indian control
law, I believe that our distinct native identity will continue to
erode, and with it, the existence of our nations.
I am writing to you to request your assistance in decoloniz-
ing federal Indian control law in order to ensure the
preservation and strengthening of the Seneca Nation and all of
the other Indian nations located within the United States.1s
Have no doubt that I believe that the primary responsibility
for the protection and strengthening of our nations rests with
our people and our leaders. Unfortunately, however, American
colonization has inflicted a heavy toll on our capacity for self-
determination."0 We are weak from the efforts taken by Ameri-
cans before you to transform our tribal societies and way of life
by force.2 Accordingly, your help is needed to make changes
over those matters that are within your control.22
I realize that the challenge of revitalizing tribal sovereignty
is a difficult one and that this problem is unlikely to be re-
solved quickly. Even if desired, several hundred years' worth of
colonizing influence will never be totally undone; to the extent
that it can be undone, it will not be undone easily. The most
reasonable and prudent course for our Indigenous nations to
pursue is to attempt to harmonize the good things that have
been forced upon us by others with the good things that are
17. See discussion infra Parts ILA, III.B.4-5, IV.B.2.
18. See discussion infra Part II.A.7.
19. This proposal is sent to you solely in my capacity as a member of an Indian
nation located within the United States; I have no official authority to speak on behalf
of any nation with regard to these matters.
20. See discussion infra Part II.A.
21. See id.
22. My request is consistent with my belief that the spirit of our treaties with the
United States requires that we first approach the problem of your government's his-
toric disregard for our right of self-determination through diplomacy, the tool of
government-to-government relations, and that we simply request your help in making
changes within your own law and government. If you do what is requested, the most
that could be accomplished would be to lift your government's restrictions on our self-
determination. We would then be able to continue more freely the difficult work of
redeveloping our nations on our own.
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unique to and traditional within our own societies. Our com-
mon problem, however-the interference and restrictions
associated with federal Indian control law-must be mini-
mized in our lives if this process is to take place.
This proposal contains several parts. Part I highlights the
colonial foundation of modern federal Indian control law and
policy. Part II is a brief history of federal Indian control law
and policy since the establishment of the United States, in-
cluding a discussion of the difficulties associated with
developing a coherent federal policy towards the Indian na-
tions. Part III sets forth in greater detail the argument for
decolonizing federal Indian control law. Part IV analyzes re-
cent policy efforts by Congress and your Administration to
reform federal Indian control law by providing greater support
for tribal sovereignty ;and explains why such policies are not
likely to succeed. Finally, Part V sets forth my proposal for you
to adopt a federal Indian decolonization policy consistent with
the vision of federal-tribal relations defined by the treaties be-
tween our nations made over 200 years ago23 and to lead the
effort to repeal much of America's Indian control law.
I. THE COLONIAL FOUNDATION OF
FEDERAL INDIAN CONTROL LAW
[Clolonialism can be understood to consist of the involun-
tary exploitation of or annexation of lands and resources
previously belonging to another people, often of a different
race or ethnicity, or the involuntary expansion of political
hegemony over them, often displacing, partially or com-
pletely, their prior political organization. 24
The primary reason why federal Indian control law is a sig-
nificant barrier to the greater assertion of tribal sovereignty is
because the United States originally approached relations
with the Indian nations from a singular, self-interested per-
spective-how to achieve the complete colonization of the
American continent and the "civilization" of the Indigenous
23. See discussion infra Part II.A.1; supra note 3 and accompanying text.
24. Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 86 (1993).
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peoples.25 The colonization of the "New World" raised the pos-
sibility that at some point the colonists would have to generate
a legal basis for taking lands that were already occupied. The
failure of disease to exterminate the Indigenous population by
the time of the American Revolution" ensured that the United
States would be required to develop a body of law to rational-
ize its continued expansion and assertion of hegemony over
those lands and peoples.
The architect of modern federal Indian control law was U.S.
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall.' In a series of
opinions that he wrote during the early nineteenth century,
Johnson v. M'Intosh,' Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,29 and
Worcester v. Georgia,30 Marshall laid out the analytical frame-
work for how American law would address the quandary of the
Indian nations.
A. Johnson v. M'Intosh, the "Doctrine of Discovery," and
the "Heathen Subjugation" Theory
In Johnson v. M'Intosh, the Supreme Court was called upon
to decide whether the Piankesahaw Indians could pass land
title to private individual colonists, and thus to address the
fundamental question of how the United States originally
gained legal title to the land upon which it rested. 1 Writing for
the court, Marshall concluded that America, as a colonizing
nation, had the superior right over other nations to extinguish
Indian titles "either by purchase or by conquest."32 This princi-
ple-which is called the "doctrine of discovery"-meant that
under federal Indian control law, the Indian nations "had no
theoretical, independent right to sovereignty that a European
discoverer might be required to recognize under Europe's Law
25. See BERNARD W. SHEEHAN, SEEDS OF EXTINCTION: JEFFERSONIAN PHI-
LANTHROPY AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 4 (1973).
26. See THOMAS A. BAILEY, THE AMERICAN PAGEANT: A HISTORY OF THE RE-
PUBLIC 70 (1956) (noting that "[pilagues were a constant nightmare" in pre-Revolution
America).
27. See infra notes 28-115 and accompanying text.
28. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
29. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
30. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
31. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572.
32. Id. at 587.
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of Nations."33 Marshall further reasoned that because the In-
dian nations did not possess the full panoply of inherent
sovereign powers vis-A-vis the colonizing nation, they were
thus only vested with a permanent "right of occupancy" to
their aboriginal lands.34 Therefore, the Indians could not pass
good title to non-Indians because they had no title to pass in
the first place.
3 5
Since he was writing without the benefit of much domestic
precedent on this issue,36 one might wonder where Marshall
got the idea that the Indians should be divested of legal title to
their lands solely by virtue of being "discovered" by the Anglo-
European colonists. Steven Paul McSloy writes that Marshall's
adoption of the Discovery Doctrine "was merely the latest in-
vocation of a concept that had been born at the very beginning
of the Judeo-Christian tradition, on the first page of the Bible,
in the Book of Genesis. 37 In explaining how this might be true,
McSloy recounts the travails of Abraham, who, at the begin-
ning of "the long march of civilization," left Ur of the Chaldees
33. Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L.
REV. 219, 254-55 [hereinafter Williams, Algebra].
34. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
35. See id. at 573-74.
36. Marshall cites his earlier opinion in the case of Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 142-43 (1810), for the limited proposition that the nature of Indian title to
land, which Marshall admitted existed until it was "legitimately extinguished," is
paradoxically not "absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee" being held in the very same
land at the very same time by a state. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 592 (citing
Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 142-43). Marshall's colleague, Justice William Johnson,
dissented in Fletcher on this issue, arguing that the state of Georgia could not hold
seisin to a fee simple in land held by the Indians. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at
146-47 (Johnson, J., dissenting). What makes this briefly-stated disagreement signifi-
cant is that the pleadings, if not the opinions, in Fletcher directly promote the "right of
occupancy" theory at length: "What is the Indian title? It is a mere occupancy for the
purpose of hunting. It is not like our tenures; they have no idea of a title to the soil
itself. It is overrun by them, rather than inhabited. It is not a true and legal posses-
sion." Id. at 121 (citations omitted). Marshall had also briefly considered issues
touching on Indian title to land in New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164, 165-
68 (1812) (concerning whether land that the state had purchased for Indians pursuant
to an agreement and to which it had given tax-free status would necessarily keep that
tax-free status when sold by the Indians in the face of legislative enactments to the
contrary).
37. Steven Paul McSloy, "Because the Bible Tells Me So":. Manifest Destiny and
American Indians, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 38 (1996); see also Steven T. Newcomb, The
Evidence of Christian Nationalism in Federal Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery,
Johnson v. McIntosh, and Plenary Power, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 303, 309
(1993) ("Indian nations have been denied their most basic rights to sovereignty and
territorial integrity simply because, at the time of Christendom's arrival in the Ameri-
cas, they did not believe in the God of the Bible, and did not believe that Jesus Christ
was the true Messiah.").
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and proceeded west across the River Jordan to Canaan."8
Abraham had a problem, however: like Marshall, he had to
figure out a way to dispossess the native inhabitants, the Ca-
naanites 9 His justification, somewhat like Marshall's, was
that "God had given the land to Abraham's people."H McSloy
asserts that the Bible sanctioned "wars of extermination ...
against local inhabitants who stood in the way of the 'chosen
people. ' These wars, McSloy writes, "were justified on the
grounds that the indigenous inhabitants were idolaters, canni-
bals, and human sacrificers, neither civilized nor of the true
faith.'
2
Several biblical passages cited by McSloy lend themselves to
appropriation by those seeking a biblical justification for colo-
nization. Genesis 17:8 details God's promise to Abraham: "And
I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land
wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an ev-
erlasting possession; and I will be their God."43 Other biblical
passages treat similar themes. To the first humans created,
God's charge is to have power and dominion over the earth and
every living thing upon it."' Even before creating humans, God
envisions them as dominant.45 One of the Psalms has God say:
"Ask of me, and I will make the nations your heritage, and the
ends of the earth your possession."46 These biblical passages
have the ring of what much later in the American context
would be called "manifest destiny"-the belief that the United
States was destined by God to overrun its continent.47
To understand how the colonizing implications of these bib-
lical passages were disseminated over the generations down to
the time of John Marshall, it is important to realize that all
38. See McSloy, supra note 37, at 39.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 40.
42. Id. McSloy also states: "Some ancient Hebrew apologists also advanced terra
nullius arguments, claiming that Canaan was uninhabited; that is, that the land of
Canaan had no Canaanites. Others claimed that the Canaanites had stolen the land
from ancestors of the Hebrews, and thus that the Hebrews were the original occu-
pants." Id. (citing ROBERT L. WILKEN, THE LAND CALLED HOLY: PALESTINE IN
CHRIsTIAN HISTORY AND THOUGHT 5, 31-32 (1992)).
43. Genesis 17:8.
44. See McSloy, supra note 37, at 40 (citing Genesis 1:28 ("Be fruitful and multi-
ply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion... over every living thing.")).
45. See McSloy, supra note 37, at 40 (citing Genesis 1:26 ("Let us make man ...
and let them have dominion over... all the earth.")).
46. Psalms 2:8.
47. See BAILEY, supra note 26, at 280, 289 (noting the earliest known use of the
phrase "manifest destiny" in 1845).
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three of the Old World religions that engaged in colonizing be-
havior-Judaism, Christianity, and Islam-linked themselves
to this colonizing tradition through religious genealogies that
connected them to Abraham." With respect to Christianity,
Robert A. Williams, Jr. has traced what might be called a
"heathen subjugation" theory from its biblical origins to the
medieval roots of the Anglo-American legal tradition."9 In so
doing, he exposes the fundamental justifications for the mar-
ginalization of Indian people under American law and,
ultimately, why modern federal Indian control law is funda-
mentally a tool for rationalizing American colonization.0
Williams writes that the central premise of modern federal
Indian control law has its roots in the thousand-year-old legal
tradition defining the relationship between the Christian
Europeans and the various "divergent" peoples with whom
they had from time to time come into contact.5 This tradition
was based upon two ethnocentric assumptions: first, that the
European world view was preeminent; second, that it was
therefore right and necessary to subjugate and assimilate
other peoples to that world view.5" As I have discussed above,
these beliefs are derived from the basic teachings of the Judeo-
Christian tradition, particularly as refined and applied by the
Roman Catholic Church.53
Williams recounts the efforts of the leading Christian law-
yer-theologian of the thirteenth century, Pope Innocent IV, who
engaged in a serious effort to convert the Mongols to Christi-
anity in an attempt to avoid the inevitable Mongol raid on the
Christian empire.54 It was through Pope Innocent's writings to
the Great Khan of the Mongols that the Christian foundation
of the "heathen subjugation" theory was developed, which later
served as the basis for the Crusades and all subsequent rela-
tions with non-Christian peoples.55 Williams states:
48. See McSloy, supra note 37, at 41.
49. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 13-50; Rob-
ert A- Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the
American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11-99 (1983).
50. See infra notes 53-89 and accompanying text.
51. See Williams, Algebra, supra note 33, at 229.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 231. Williams concludes that by the time the Middle Ages passed,
there developed a "hierarchical universalized mythology of the papacy's divine origin
and unquestionable mandate," which encouraged the natural development of legal
principles to justify "broad papal jurisdictional powers.' Id.
54. See id. at 226-29, 236-39.
55. See id. at 232. In a later commentary, Innocent asked: "[Ius it licit to invade a
land that infidels possess, or which belongs to them?" Id. at 233 (quoting INNOCENT IV,
[VOL. 31:4
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According to Innocent his office required him to call upon
Christian princes to raise armies to punish serious viola-
tions of natural law, and to order those armies to
accompany missionaries to heathen lands for purposes of
conversion. "[Ihf the infidels do not obey, they ought to be
compelled by the secular arm and war may be declared
against them by the Pope and not by anybody else." e
This "heathen subjugation" theory was later incorporated
and reiterated in papal bulls issued during the fifteenth cen-
tury to rationalize colonial expansion in the "New World."5 7 In
1455, Pope Nicholas V authorized the Portuguese King Alfonso
V "to invade, search out, capture, vanquish, and subdue all
Saracens and pagans whatsoever, and other enemies,"58 to put
them in perpetual slavery, and to take all their possessions
and property.59 Later, in 1493, Pope Alexander VI granted
Spain any lands that Christopher Columbus had discovered,
and any that the Spanish might discover in the future, pro-
vided they were "not previously possessed by any Christian
owner."' These papal bulls provided the moral and legal sanc-
tion for the subjugation of any non-Christian peoples.
This theory was eventually adopted by the English and in-
corporated into the common law.6 The earliest references to
COMMENT[A]RIA DOCTRISSIMA IN QUINQUE LIBROS DECRETALIUM, reprinted in part in
translation in THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE: THE FIRST PHASE 191-92 (J. Muldoon ed.,
1977)). Williams notes:
As vicar of Christ's universal commonwealth, the Pope had been entrusted by
Christ through Peter with the care of the spiritual well-being of these nations.
Therefore, Innocent reasoned, the papal office necessarily reserved an indirect
right of intervention in the secular affairs of all the Church's subjects, actual
and potential. Christ's command to Peter to "feed my sheep' was obvious proof
that the Pope's Petrine mandate necessarily included non-believers. According
to Innocent, these people "belong to Christ's flock by virtue of their creation, al-
though the infidels do not belong to the sheepfold of the flock of [the] Church.'
Therefore, "the Pope has jurisdiction over all men and power over them in law
but not in fact.'
Id. (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 235 (quoting INNOCENT IV, supra note 55, at 192 (emphasis added)).
57. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
58. EUROPEAN TREATIES BEARING ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND
ITS DEPENDENCIES TO 1648, at 23 (Frances Gardiner Davenport ed., 1917) [hereinafter
EUROPEAN TREATIES].
59. See Newcomb, supra note 37, at 310.
60. EUROPEAN TREATIES, supra note 58, at 56.
61. See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
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the theory in English law relate to the charter granted to John
Cabot. Steven Newcomb writes:
The Cabot charter, issued to John Cabot and his sons in
March of 1493 by King Henry VII of England, imitated
the language of papal bulls, and gave Cabot the authori-
zation to "seek out, discover, and find whatsoever islands,
countries, regions[,] or provinces of the heathens and infi-
dels, whatsoever they be, and in what part of the world
soever they be, which before this time have been unknown
to all Christians." Cabot was also instructed to "subdue,
occupy[,] and possess" the discovered lands "as our vas-
sals and lieutenants, getting unto us the rule, title, and
jurisdiction of the same." Cabot was given this authority
because it was "at that time accepted as a fundamental
law of Christendom that all Christians were in a state of
war with all infidels."62
Williams writes that the "heathen subjugation" theory was
incorporated into seventeenth-century English law through
the adoption of laws preventing "aliens," or non-citizens, from
maintaining actions in the English courts.' The primary spon-
sor of the theory during this era was Lord Chief Justice
Edward Coke.64 In his analytical works, Coke concluded that
non-Christian "infidels" must be denied the rights and status
of an "alien friend," such as "a German, a Frenchman, a
Spaniard," because they were subjects of "the devils" in
"perpetual hostility" with Christians. 5
To Coke, not only were "aliens" to be denied certain rights in
the English legal system, but they were also to be subject to
even greater deprivations of liberty and territory because of
their non-Christian status.' Coke theorized:
But if a Christian King should conquer a kingdom of an
infidel, and bring them [sic] under his subjection, there
62. Newcomb, supra note 37, at 311 (noting that the Cabot charter "imitated the
language of [the] papal bulls").
63. See Williams, Algebra, supra note 33, at 239-40.
64. See id. at 240.
65. See id. (quoting Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 397 (KB. 1608) ("All infidels
are in law perpetui inimici, perpetual enemies (for the law presumes not that they will
be converted, that being remota potentia, a remote possibility) for between them, as
with the devils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there is perpetual hostility,
and can be no peace.")).
66. See id.
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ipso facto the laws of the infidel are abrogated, for that
they be not only against Christianity, but against the law
of God and of nature, contained in the decalogue; and in
that case, until certain laws be established amongst them,
the King by himself, and such Judges as he shall appoint,
shall judge them and their causes according to natural
equity, in such sort as Kinds in ancient time did with
their kingdoms, before any certain municipal laws were
given, as before hath been said.67
Lord Coke was a central figure in English jurisprudence,"
and he influenced the process by which the "infidels" of the
American continent-the Indians-were too to be deprived of
their liberty and territory.9 As Williams recounts, "Coke as at-
torney general to James I, applied his jurisprudential views on
infidel status and rights to England's colonial enterprise in the
New World. In 1609, Coke drew up the Second Charter of Vir-
ginia."7 This charter, which confirmed the rights of the
colonizers of Jamestown,7 recited the terms of the First Char-
ter of Virginia, a document which set forth in the most explicit
terms the legal mechanism for the colonization of the entire
American continent:
We, greatly commending, and graciously accepting of,
their Desires for the Furtherance of so noble a Work,
which may, by the Providence of Almighty God, hereafter
tend to the Glory of his Divine Majesty, in propagating of
Christian Religion to such People, as yet live in Darkness
and miserable Ignorance of the true Knowledge and Wor-
ship of God, and may in time bring the Infidels and
Savages, living in those Parts, to human Civility, and to a
settled and quiet Government; Do, by these our Letters
67. Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398 (KB. 1608); see also Williams, Algebra,
supra note 33, at 239-40.
68. See EDWARD FOSS, A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND
FROM THE CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT TIME: 1066-1870, at 178 (London, John Murray
1870) ("[Dluring the twelve years that he held [the office of Attorney General] he
raised it to an importance it had never before acquired, and which it has ever since
preserved.").
69. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
70. Williams, Algebra, supra note 33, at 245 (mis-citing Frederic William Mait-
land, English Law and the Renaissance, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 203 (1907)). Williams is correct, however, that the second charter
dates from 1609. See HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY
10 (1949).
71. See Williams, Algebra, supra note 33, at 245.
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Patents, graciously accept of, and agree to, their humble
and well-intended Desires.72
While the need for land and resources makes it clear that
the colonists were not interested in the "New World" merely to
"save" the Indians, the "heathen subjugation" theory suggests
that there was a constant ideological strain supporting the
colonization of "other" non-Christian peoples and their lands.
Even those heretic scholars who rejected notions that there
was a divine right to claim lands in the Western Hemisphere
nonetheless concluded that the failure of the Indians to allow
foreigners to "preach the gospel" was a sufficient basis for
waging a "just" war to effectuate their conquest.73 As a result,
by the time John Marshall was called upon to address ques-
tions relating to the legal status of Indigenous peoples under
American law, he had the benefit of several centuries of juris-
prudence supporting the suppression of their inherent rights
72. Id. at 246 (emphasis added) (quoting First Charter of Virginia (April 10,
1606), reprinted in COMMAGER, supra note 70, at 8). The Second Charter of Virginia,
"after reciting the grant of 1606," COMMAGER, supra note 70, at 10, continues in a
similar vein: "[B]ecause the principal Effect which we can desire or expect of this Ac-
tion, is the Conversion and Reduction of the People in those Parts unto the true
Worship of God and Christian Religion, we do hereby [require voyagers to the colony
to swear allegiance to the Church of England.]" Second Charter of Virginia (May 23,
1609), reprinted in id. at 12.
73. See S. James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Law
in Historical and Contemporary Perspective, in 1989 HARVARD INDIAN LAW SYMPOSIUM
191, 193-95 (1990) (discussing the work of Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546)). De Vito-
ria adopted the radical assumption that the Indians possessed the rationality
necessary to possess and exercise "dominion." See FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA [sic], DE
INDIS ET DE I[u]RE BELLI RELECTIONES 127-28 (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate
trans., Classics of Int'l Law ed. 1906) (1565) (based on lectures given in 1532), cited in
Anaya, supra, at 194. De Vitoria said:
[The Indians] are not of unsound mind, but have, according to their kind, the
use of reason. This is clear, because there is a certain method in their affairs,
for they have polities which are orderly arranged and they have definite mar-
riage and magistrates, overlords, laws, and workshops, and a system of
exchange, all of which call for the use of reason; they also have a kind of relig-
ion.
DE VICTORIA, supra, at 127, quoted in Anaya, supra, at 194-95 n.15.
De Vitoria concluded, however, that the Indians were obligated to follow the Roman
jus gentium (Law of Nations), and thus "were bound to allow foreigners to travel to
their lands, trade among them, and preach the gospel." Anaya, supra, at 195 (citing DE
VICTORIA, supra, at 151-59). Failure to allow the Spaniards to carry out these activi-
ties could lead to a "just" war and conquest by the Spaniards. See id. (citing DE
VICTORIA, supra, at 155, 158).
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to life, liberty, and property simply by virtue of their status as
"uncivilized" non-Christian peoples.74
Marshall's opinion in Johnson v. M'Intosh, then, represents
the American incorporation of the medievally-derived "heathen
subjugation" theory.75 This was a view shared commonly by the
Founding Fathers.6 Thus, in accordance with his perspective,
Marshall had little choice but to vanquish the Indian nations
under American law--either they owned the land or the
United States did. This was truly a monumental problem;
ruling that the Indians actually owned their own land would
have up-ended the entire American land tenure system7 and
might have bankrupted the new nation's already weakened
federal treasury8 if compensation had to be paid for the illegal
takings accomplished to date. Viewed this way, the Johnson
decision might simply be understood as nothing more than the
perfect political compromise. Affording the Indians a perma-
nent "right of occupancy" under federal law eliminated the
difficult problem associated with actually having to remove
them.
But Marshall, in concluding that the Indian nations had
been "conquered" and thus divested of title to the land,79 went
beyond mere political compromise and incorporated fully the
"heathen subjugation" theory that had been used for centuries
to justify the domination of non-Christian peoples and their
lands. In describing the manner in which American coloniza-
tion had occurred, Marshall observed:
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great na-
tions of Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves
so much of it as they could respectively acquire. Its vast
extent offered an ample field to the ambition and enter-
prise of all; and the character and religion of its
inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a
people over whom the superior genius of Europe might
74. See supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
75. See WILLIAMS, WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 13, at 231.
76. At the turn of the century, the Jeffersonian-inspired "philanthropic plan" for
the Indians "required that [they] abandon the hunter-warrior culture, the tribal order,
and the communal ownership of land. It commanded him to become civilized by
adopting a variety of manners and artifacts and, most important, by choosing to live
according to the white man's individualist ideology." SHEEHAN, supra note 25, at 10.
77. See Newcomb, supra note 37, at 320-21.
78. See BAILEY, supra note 26, at 223, 227-28 (noting the treasury's weakness af-
ter the War of 1812 and the Panic of 1819).
79. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 589.
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claim an ascendancy. The potentates of the old world
found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they
made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new,
by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in ex-
change for unlimited independence."0
As a result, Great Britain's successor, the United States, as a
nation of "civilized inhabitants," acceded to its land title pur-
suant to the rule that "discovery gave an exclusive right to
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy."8
In some respects, Marshall suggested that he might not agree
with the conclusion that he "must" draw: that "[cionquest gives
a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny."82 None-
theless, while he professed not "to engage in the defence of
those principles which Europeans have applied to Indian title,"
he did find justification "in the character and habits of the
people whose rights have been wrested from them."' In so do-
ing, Marshall accepted the basic tenets of Western colonization
theory, and thus incorporated them into the foundation of fed-
eral law dealing with the Indian nations by describing how
colonization is "supposed" to work. He explained:
The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force.
The conqueror prescribes its limits. Humanity, however,
acting on public opinion, has established, as a general
rule, that the conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed,
and that their condition shall remain as eligible as is
compatible with the objects of the conquest. Most usually,
they are incorporated with the victorious nation, and
become subjects or citizens of the government with which
they are connected. The new and old members of the
80. Id. at 572-73 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 587.
82. Id. at 588. Marshall's "tortured" journey in reaching this conclusion is re-
flected in his assessment that deciding that the Indian nations are 'incapable of
transferring the absolute title to others... may be opposed to natural right, and to
the usages of civilized nations.' Id. at 591. Nonetheless, he believed that this conclu-
sion is defensible if it is "indispensable to that system under which the country has
been settled, and [is] adapted to the actual condition of the two people [sic]." Id. at
591. Then, he concludes, "it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly can-
not be rejected by Courts ofjustice." Id. at 592.
83. Id. at 589.
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society mingle with each other; the distinction between
them is gradually lost, and they make one people."
But Marshall did acknowledge a problem, perhaps unique,
associated with dealing with America's Indigenous people:
[Tihe tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsis-
tence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in
possession of their country, was to leave the country a
wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, was im-
possible, because they were as brave and as high spirited
as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every
attempt on their independence. 5
As a result, Marshall concluded that this "law which regu-
lates, and ought to regulate in general," 8 6 the relationship with
the Indians could not be applied. Thus, Marshall acknowledged
that no "conquest" had actually occurred,87 but concluded that
the United States had no recourse but to leave the Indians in
possession of the land and to preserve the possibility that the
United States' legal claim to the land could be perfected in the
future.8 While this appears to be an honest conclusion, it
nonetheless rests on the weak assumption that the United
States has no legitimate right to its land other than by virtue
of its self-proclaimed status over the Indians. According to
Steven Newcomb, Marshall's belief in the "superiority" of the
United States was rooted in the Christian nationalism that
served as the basis for American colonization.89
-84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 590.
86. Id. at 591.
87. See id. Marshall states:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited
country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first
instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held
under it; if the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it
becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.
Id.
88. See id.
89. See Newcomb, supra note 37, at 325-27. Newcomb observes: "In Marshall's
view, rights of dominion belonged to the first Christian people to discover a region of
heathen lands." Id. at 327.
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In much of the Johnson opinion, as well as in later opinions,
the Court minimized explicit references to Christian national-
ism,' most likely because they were no longer necessary.
Marshall had drawn upon Christianity to subjugate the Indians,
and as a legal matter, after the subjugation had occurred, there
was no further reason to draw upon the source of the subjuga-
tion." As a result of this transition, many scholars and
commentators have viewed American colonization and conse-
quent legal development in secular, rather than religious,
terms by focusing on "European" rather than "Christian" moti-
vations.92 In doing so, however, "the relationship between the
origins of federal Indian law and Christianity is secularized
and obscured."9"
B. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and the
"Domestic Dependent Nation" Theory
Marshall continued to expand upon his overall theory of
colonization in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,' in which the
Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the
Cherokee Nation could invoke the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court on the ground that it was a foreign nation. 5
Marshall concluded that the Court could not exercise original
90. See id. at 332-34.
91. See id. at 333 ("Once the principle of Christian discovery and dominion be-
came United States law as a result of the Johnson decision, the religious aspect of the
original discovery doctrine was no longer needed.").
92. See id. at 307. Newcomb notes:
Many scholars today also characterize dealings between Europeans and indige-
nous peoples during the early colonial period as having been governed by
international law principles existing at the time.... But when the term
"international law" is employed to refer to the discoveries made by the monar-
chies or nations of Western Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, what is actually being referred to is Christian international law.
Id. at 307-08; see also Joyotpaul Chaudhuri, American Indian Policy: An Overview, in
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 15, 25 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed.
1985) (ascribing Marshall's decision to "politics rather than 'reason'"); Robert T. Coul-
ter & Steven M. Tullberg, Indian Land Rights, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF CMILIZATION:
FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880S 185, 190 (Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine
Deloria, Jr. eds. 1984); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE
LAW 39 (1987).
93. Newcomb, supra note 37, at 308.
94. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
95. See id. at 15-17.
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jurisdiction in the case because the Cherokee Nation was not a
foreign nation or state, but only a "domestic dependent
nation." " Simply by declaring this proposition, Marshall
eliminated under American law the independent sovereign
status not only of the Cherokees, but also of all Indian nations.
While this conclusion was based significantly upon a textual
reading of the Constitution,' Marshall expanded his analysis
in dicta to address the precise nature of the federal-tribal rela-
tionship." In so doing, he developed the most important and
longstanding mechanism utilized by the United States for ex-
ercising control over the lives and lands of Indian people: the
federal government's trust responsibility.99
In denying the Cherokee Nation the status of a foreign na-
tion with the right to invoke the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction,' ° Marshall memorialized in federal law the self-
interested determination that the Indians were a subservient
people dependent upon the United States. It is not a far
stretch to conclude from this opinion that Marshall continued
to perceive the aboriginal inhabitants of the continent as un-
civilized heathens. Indians "in a state of pupilage" could never
be thought to appeal to "an American court of justice for an
assertion of right or a redress of wrong"-" [ti heir appeal was
to the tomahawk, or to the government."01 Marshall's opinion
in Cherokee Nation furthered the rationalization of American
colonization by concluding that the Indian nations are merely
"domestic dependent nations""° and thus are barred from ex-
ercising the rights of self-determination inherent in all free
peoples.
96. See id. at 16-17.
97. See id. at 18-19.
98. See id. at 16.
99. See id. at 17. Marshall stated:
[The Indiana] are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States re-
sembles that of a ward to his guardian.
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its
power; appeal to it for relief to [sic] their wants; and address the president as
their great father.
Id.
100. See id. at 16-17, 19-20.
101. Id. at 17-18.
102. Id. at 17.
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C. Worcester v. Georgia and Federal-Indian Relations
The last of the foundational federal Indian control law deci-
sions written by Marshall was Worcester v. Georgia."3 Worcester
addressed whether a state could extend its legislative authority
to regulate the conduct of non-Indians within Indian terri-
tory.104 Marshall concluded that the State of Georgia had no
authority to enforce its laws within Cherokee territory because
relations with Indian nations were an exclusively federal mat-
ter. 1
05
In obvious respects, Marshall's reasoning in Worcester di-
verged significantly from the reasoning contained in Johnson
and Cherokee Nation. He analyzed in great detail the sover-
eign existence of the Cherokee Nation, mainly utilizing the
Treaty of Hopewell between the Cherokees and the United
States as his vehicle.'06 He concluded that while the Treaty
provides that the Cherokees shall be under the protection of
the United States, such a provision should not be construed as
a relinquishment of Cherokee sovereignty: "Protection does not
imply the destruction of the protected.""° Indeed, his reasoning
in this regard seems almost totally at odds with his reasoning
in Cherokee Nation.'0 8
Despite this apparent departure from his prior practice of
suppressing the Indian nations within American law, Mar-
shall's Worcester opinion can easily be read as consistent with
Johnson and Cherokee Nation if it is viewed as another in-
stance in which federal power is deemed paramount in the
face of a competing interest-in this case, the interest of a
State. Thus despite his hearty acknowledgment of Cherokee
103. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
104. See id. at 548-61.
105. See id. at 560.
106. See id. at 540.
107. Id. at 552.
108. In Worcester, Marshall states:
The words "treaty" and "nation" are words of our own language, selected in our
diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and
well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians as we have applied
them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same
sense.
Id. at 559-60; cf Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet). at 18-19 (arguing that the language
of the Commerce Clause mandates distinguishing Indian tribes from foreign nations).
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sovereignty in Worcester, much of Marshall's reasoning de-
fending and rationalizing colonization from his earlier
opinions remained in the decision."9
In many ways, Worcester, through its majority and
concurring opinions, revealed the tension between competing
theories-accommodation versus colonization-of how America
should deal with the Indian nations. Nonetheless, in deciding
Johnson and Cherokee Nation, the Supreme Court was called
upon to address fundamental questions associated with Indian
relations that were tied critically to the future development of
the United States.110 Viewed from this simple perspective, it
can perhaps be rationalized that the actions taken by the
United States to deal with the Indians in the early years of the
Republic-such as warfare, forced removal, and outright
stealing of Indian lands-were simply a matter of perceived
necessity. But the reality is that Indian peoples and lands were
colonized in order to remove a barrier to the pursuit of wealth,
territory, and freedom for the colonizing people. In the course
of Western colonization of "heathen" peoples, demonizing,
devaluing, and degrading those who are to be colonized all
have been tools to facilitate total subjugation.
Marshall drew upon these theories in addressing how the
nascent United States would deal with the aboriginal inhabi-
tants of the American continent: in writing Johnson and
Cherokee Nation, he perpetuated the "just colonization" theory
laid down in the Bible."' Worcester was no exception.' While
109. It would appear that Marshall's earlier decisions were beginning to have an
impact on his colleagues on the Supreme Court. In a concurring opinion, Justice
McLean laid out an alternative rationale for deciding Worcester. See Worcester, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) at 562-95 (McLean, J., concurring). He viewed the displacement of state power
as a temporary condition, only to be restrained so long as the Indians remained a
distinct community. See id. at 592-93 (McLean, J., concurring). McLean noted:
If a tribe of Indians shall become so degraded or reduced in numbers, as to lose
the power of self-government, the protection of the local law, of necessity, must
be extended over them .... The exercise of the power of self-government by the
Indians, within a state, is undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary... [A]
sound national policy does require that the Indian tribes within our states
should exchange their territories, upon equitable principles, or eventually con-
sent to become amalgamated in our political communities.
Id. at 592-93 (McLean, J., concurring).
110. See discussion supra Part I.A-B (discussing the "doctrine of discovery" and
the "domestic dependent nation" theory).
111. See discussion supra Part I.A-B.
112. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543 ("[Plower, war, conquest, give rights,
which, after possession, are conceded by the world; and which can never be contro-
verted by those on whom they descend.").
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Marshall revealed in Worcester that he may have thought his
prior conclusions about federal authority over Indian affairs
overreached, 113 and therefore sought to distance himself from
them, it is significant that only after he had established the
legal justification for American colonial policies designed to
secure wealth, resources, and opportunity for the emerging na-
tion, did he find it comfortable to defend the sovereignty of the
Indian nations.114 Marshall, like all leaders, had choices to
make when he wrote these important cases. Ultimately, he
chose to follow the "underlying medievally-derived ideology-
that normatively divergent 'savage' peoples could be denied
equal rights and status accorded to the civilized nations of
Europe."" 5 In so doing, he embedded this ideology firmly
within the fabric of the American law dealing with the Indian
nations.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY:
THE DIFFERENT FACES OF COLONIZATION
A. A Brief History
Most scholars of federal Indian control law and policy hold
the view that the United States has never successfully devel-
oped and carried out an effective policy for dealing with the
Indian nations located within its borders."' This view holds
that throughout the 222 years of United States history, every
conceivable policy objective has been attempted, ranging
from the pursuit of peaceful coexistence-through the Treaty,
Reorganization, and Self-Determination policies-to outright
113. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 552. Marshall noted:
The Indians perceived in this protection only what was beneficial to them-
selves-an engagement to punish aggressions on them. It involved, practically,
no claim to their lands, no dominion over their persons. It merely bound the na-
tion to the British crown, as a dependent ally, claiming the protection of a
powerful friend and neighbour, and receiving the advantages of that protection,
without involving the surrender of their national character.
Id.
114. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 97.
115. Williams, Algebra, supra note 33, at 256.
116. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 11, at vi-vii; GETCHES ET AL., supra note 15,
at 30; EMMA R. GROSS, CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD AMERICAN INDIANS
11-12 (1989).
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genocide-through the Warfare, Removal, Reservation, Allot-
ment, and Termination policies."1 7 On its face, the historical
record makes it easy to conclude that the United States has
had a cyclical and inconsistent policy in Indian affairs."'
I hold a contrary view. Looking at the same evidence and
apparent policy fluctuations as others, it is clear to me that
American policy toward the Indians has always revolved
around the same central theme: to wit; how can "we," the su-
perior, enlightened, Christian people, help/destroy "them," the
inferior, uncivilized, pagan people; in such a way as to elimi-
nate our/their problem with them/us.' It is obvious that
policies such as Warfare, Allotment, and Termination 20 had
the clear intent of simply eliminating Indian people as mem-
bers of distinct societies. But even the so-called "benevolent"
policies, like Reorganization, 2' ended up achieving the same
objective as the most destructive policies." 2 In their efforts to
help Indian people, the reformers, usually motivated by Chris-
tian and Western values, have supported policies that have
had the direct and indirect effect of assimilating Indian people
into the American way of life.121 Indeed, as Francis Paul
Prucha has observed, every "new" policy initiative dealing with
Indian affairs has been followed by a "newer" initiative that,
ironically, draws upon the same reform rhetoric as the previ-
ous one.12
117. See discussion infra Part II.A.1-8.
118. See generally Vine Deloria, Jr., The Evolution of Federal Indian Policy Mak-
ing, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 239 (Vine Deloria, Jr.
ed., 1985) [hereinafter Deloria, Evolution].
119. Jo Carrillo has echoed this theme:
Scholars often write that federal Indian law is characterized by pendulum-like
shifts in federal policy toward Native American peoples. What is not so often
said is that these swings occur along a single trajectory, one that denies the
value of indigenous ways as well as the possibility of the United States re-
specting tribal societies enough to co-create with them a pluralistic American
government. Each of the major eras in federal Indian law illustrates this point.
They show that at critical moments in history, the United States has consis-
tently chosen oppression and dispossession over embrace or real understanding.
See Jo Carrillo, Tribal Governance/Gender, in READINGS IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW:
RECALLING THE RHYTHM OF SURVIVAL 205 (Jo Carrillo ed. 1998).
120. See discussion infra Part II.A.4-5, 7.
121. See discussion infra Part II.A.6.
122. See, e.g., infra note 180 and accompanying text.
123. See discussion infra Parts II.AL5, III.C.
124. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 36, 36-37
(1981) [hereinafter PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY].
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1. The Treaty Policy-In the early years of the American
Republic, Indian affairs management focused on securing the
neutrality of the Indian nations to allow for stability and
growth in the new nation.125
American officials relied upon negotiation and treaty-
making in dealing with the Indians.126 The primary reason for
relying on these methods was the fact that the Indian nations
were militarily powerful and still a threat to the young United
States."' Moreover, the Articles of Confederation supported a
state role in managing Indian affairs and left the federal gov-
ernment with little power other than the ability to enter into
treaties.128 Given the weakness associated with the federal
government of the new United States, diplomacy and treaty
making were the only viable options for addressing Indian af-
fairs.
129
Upon the Constitution's adoption and ratification, all ques-
tions concerning the states' role in managing Indian affairs
were resolved in favor of the federal government. The Com-
merce Clause vested full and exclusive authority in the United
States to regulate "Commerce ... with the Indian tribes."30
Accordingly, the first Congress asserted this new authority by
enacting the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, which
prohibited any purchase of Indian land by individuals or states
without federal approval. 3' Until the early part of the nine-
125. See KIRKE KICKINGBIRD ET AL., INDIAN TREATIES 1i' (1980).
126. See id. at 10-12.
127. See id. at 10. One of the United States' most aggressive Indian fighters, An-
drew Jackson, thought that it was "absurd" that the Indian nations were sovereigns
with which the United States should enter into treaties. See PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY,
supra note 124, at 144. Prucha states: "That the United States in fact [had entered
into such treaties], Jackson argued, was a historical fact which resulted from the fee-
ble position of the new American government when it first faced the Indians during
and immediately after the Revolution." Id.
128. See ART. OF CONFED. art. 11 (1781); see also Oneida Indian Nation v. New
York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1159 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the Articles of Confederation
preserved a state role over Indian affairs sufficient to extinguish Indian title to land).
129. Cf KIRKE KICKINGBIRD ET AL., supra note 125, at 10 (noting the early United
States government's weakness, "both politically and militarily," and noting the found-
ing fathers' concern "for maintaining peace and friendly relations with the Indian
nations").
130. US. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also CLINTON ETAL., supra note 11, at 142.
131. See Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 137 (effectively repealed by
Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 729, 730-31 (effectively designating the
Department of Indian Affairs as the federal approval authority)); see also FRANCIS
PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATWE YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE
AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834, at 264 (Bison Book 1970) (1962) [hereinafter
PRUCHA, TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS].
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teenth century, federal Indian policy and legislation was
mostly limited to managing Indian trade relations.
1
32
2. The Removal Policy-After the turn of the nineteenth
century, as the United States established its military superi-
ority over the Indian nations, it developed an alternative to
diplomacy for dealing with Indian affairs-physical removal of
the Indians to western lands.13 3 American colonization through
settlement and economic development generated tremendous
conflict between the Indian nations and the states: the most
famous of these disputes involved the State of Georgia's efforts
to eradicate Cherokee sovereignty through its own legisla-
tion,13' precipitating a constitutional crisis in 1832 due to
President Jackson's refusal to enforce the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Worcester v. Georgia.3 5
The conflict between the Indian nations and the nascent
United States presented a policy quandary that allowed for
several possibilities. Prucha, in his apology for Jackson's
aggressive Indian policies, writes that Removal was the only
viable policy option for a man who "was genuinely concerned for
the well-being of the Indians and for their civilization."36 Other
policy options available to Jackson at the time included simply
killing the Indians off, assimilating them rapidly, or "protecting"
them on their "ancestral lands in the East."3 7 All were
rejected. 38 Outright killing of the Indians was not seriously
considered (although it was the policy of "aggressive
frontiersmen"), most likely because it was thought too
inhumane and not politically salable.9 Rapid assimilation was
rejected as unworkable, despite the Jeffersonian-inspired belief
that the Indians could be absorbed into American society within
a generation."' The retention of aboriginal reservations-the
132. See PRUCHA, TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, supra note 131, at 50.
133. See KICKINGBIRDETAL., supra note 125, at 13-14.
134. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831).
135. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515. In a letter to a Georgia state congressman offering sup-
port for Georgia's illegal actions described in the Worcester opinion, President-elect
Jackson counseled, "Build a fire under them. When it gets hot enough, they'll move."
JOHN EHLE, TRAIL OF TEARS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 220
(1988)..
136. PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY, supra note 124, at 146.
137. Id. at 147.
138. See id. at 147-48.
139. See id. at 147.
140. See id. Prucha writes that rapid assimilation "was not a feasible solution. In-
dian culture has a viability that continually impresses anthropologists, and to become
white men was not the goal of the Indians." Id.
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preferred policy of Jackson's critics -'-was rejected because
the United States simply did not have the political or military
ability to defend Indian territory from encroaching white
society."2 Given those options, Jackson chose Removal.14
Having made his choice,'" Jackson initiated a Removal pol-
icy1 45  that confiscated Indian land without adequate
compensation and cost the lives of scores of Indian people.
14 6
Jackson forcibly removed the Cherokees, among others, (such
as in the infamous "Trail of Tears" in which many Cherokee
died) to the so-called "Indian Territory" located west of the
Mississippi.4 While Jackson initiated, in his view, a liberal
policy and entered into treaties with the Cherokees and other
141. See id. at 148. A noted "friend of the Indian," Thomas L. McKenney, the first
head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), see id. at 22, initially engaged in a variety
of private and public efforts "to educate the Indians and to teach them the white
man's social and economic patterns." Id. When assimilation did not quickly occur,
McKenney believed that removal of the Eastern Indians to the West would be the only
way for them to "escape the pressures and the vices of the white society surrounding
them." Id. at 22-23. McKenney wrote:
Seeing as I do the condition of these people, and that they are bordering on de-
struction, I would, were I empowered, take them firmly, but kindly by the hand,
and tell them they must go; and I would do this, on the same principle that I
would take my own children by the hand, firmly, but kindly and lead them from
a district of Country in which the plague was raging.
Id. at 23 (citing Letter from Thomas L. McKenney to Eli Baldwin (Oct. 28, 1829), Rec-
ords of the Office of Indian Affairs, 6 LETTERS SENT 140, available at National
Archives, Record Group 75).
142. See id. at 148.
143. See id. at 149. Prucha notes:
To Jackson, [removal] seemed the only answer. Since neither adequate protec-
tion nor quick assimilation of the Indians was possible, it seemed reasonable
and necessary to move the Indians to some area where they would not be dis-
turbed by federal-state jurisdictional disputes or by encroachments of white
settlers, where they could develop on the road to civilization at their own pace,
or, if they so desired, preserve their own culture.
Id.
144. Prucha notes: "President Jackson, himself a veteran Indian fighter, wasted
little sympathy on the paint-bedaubed 'varmints.' He accepted fully the brutal creed of
his fellow Westerners that 'the only good Indian is a dead Indian.'" Id. at 143, n. 18
(citing THOMAS A. BAILEY, THE AMERICAN PAGEANT: A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC 269
(1956)).
145. See EHLE, supra note 135, at 224.
146. See id. at 390 (estimating the number of Indian deaths to be between 800
and 4,000).
147. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 15, at 152-54 (quoting D'ARcY McNICKEL,
THEY CAME HERE FIRST 199-200 (rev. ed. 1975); RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE
SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT 65-67 (1975)).
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Indian nations to secure them new lands in the west, 148 the
forced nature of the removal process"4 9 was physically and
emotionally destructive and weakened the Indian nations
dramatically.' Nonetheless, throughout this period, the fed-
eral Indian control law reflected in the opinions of Jackson's
ideological opponent, John Marshall, continued to recognize
that the Indian nations had a measure of inherent sovereignty
over their members and their remaining territory. 5'
3. The Reservation Policy-Inevitably, the pace of American
colonization and expansion made the Removal Policy unwork-
able by itself. By the mid-nineteenth century, an alternative
plan to establish formal reservations for the Indians within
the various states and territories had evolved.1 52 Using trea-
ties,' 53 statutes,'" and executive orders15 supported by force,'
starvation, 7 and disease, 8 the United States secured peace
with and obtained land title from the Indian nations, reserving
significantly reduced tracts for Indian occupation and use. Ac-
cordingly, states were required to relinquish all claims to
authority over Indian territories located within their bor-
ders.
59
The policies formulated during the middle and late nine-
teenth century were heavily influenced by the Christian
nationalism that had rationalized American colonization in the
148. See PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY, supra note 124, at 149.
149. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at
91-92.
150. See EHLE, supra note 135, at 389.
151. See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 756 (1866).
152. See KICKINGBIRD ET AL., supra note 125, at 14-15.
153. See, e.g., Treaty with the Winnebago, April 5, 1859, U.S.-Winnebago, 12 Stat.
1101 reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note 3, at 790; Treaty
with the Menominee, May 12, 1854, US.-Menominee, 10 Stat. 1064, reprinted in 2
INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note 3, at 626.
154. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 29, 1861, ch. 20, § 1, 12 Stat. 126, 126-27 (1861)
(admitting Kansas as a state, while excluding Indian territory from US. jurisdiction).
155. Presidents established Indian reservations through executive orders during
the period from 1855 to 1919. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 15, at 179, 299. See gen-
erally id. at 295-300.
156. See id. at 170 (stating that the U.S. military was employed to drive out Indi-
ans who would not voluntarily go to the reservations).
157. See id. at 171 (stating that buffalo, which were the mainstay of the Plains
Indians' diet, disappeared from the region when railroad builders began killing them
for meat and for their hides, and when wealthy Europeans began killing them for
sport).
158. See, e.g., EHLE, supra note 135, at 389-90; Scott Morrison & LeAnn Howe,
The Sewage of Foreigners, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 370, 371-73 (1992).
159. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 29, 1861, ch. 20, § 1, 12 Stat. 126, 126-27 (1861).
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first place."6 Although federal Indian policy during most of this
period was still affected by the sentiment that the Indian na-
tions were the "enemy,"161 the social reformers and "friends of
the Indian" were singularly focused on resolving the "Indian
problem" by converting the Indians to Christianity and as-
similating them into the American way of life.'62
4. The Peace Policy-With the end of the Civil War, Presi-
dent Ulysses S. Grant initiated what became known as the
"Peace Policy," which funded missionary expeditions among the
Indians and used religious groups to nominate government
agents to deal with federal Indian affairs.6 3 Although Con-
gress had appropriated funds to establish missions among the
Indians as early as 1776, the Peace Policy represented a for-
mal adoption of government funding and support for religious
groups to deal with the "problem" of the Indian nations.'6 Alli-
160. See discussion supra Part I.A.
161. Management of Indian affairs was vested in the War Department in 1834.
See Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 162, § 7, 4 Stat. 735, 736-37 (providing for the organiza-
tion of the Department of Indian Affairs) (repealed in part). Management of Indian
affairs was transferred to the Interior Department in 1849. See Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch.
108, § 5, 9 Stat. 395, 395 (repealed in part 1953, superseded in part 1966) (formerly
codified at 19 U.S.C. § 42 (1952) and scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (1964)) (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 31, 43 U.S.C.); Clinton, supra note 24, at 135.
162. See AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE FRIENDS OF
THE INDIAN 1880-1900, at 1 (Francis Paul Prucha, ed. 1973)[hereinafter PRUCHA,
FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN]; PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY, supra note 124, at 20-35. Prucha
writes that in 1849, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Orlando Brown, reported to
Congress:
"The dark clouds of ignorance and superstition in which these people have so
long been enveloped ... seem at length in the case of many of them to be
breaking away, and the light of Christianity and general knowledge to be
dawning upon their moral and intellectual darkness." [Brown] gave credit for
the change to the government's policy of directing the Indians toward an agri-
cultural existence, the introduction of the manual labor schools, and instruction
by the missionaries in "the best of all knowledge, religious truth-their duty
towards God and their fellow beings." The result was "a great moral and social
revolution" among some of the tribes, which he predicted would be spread to
others by adoption of the same measures.... In the end he expected a large
measure of success to "crown the philanthropic efforts of the government and of
individuals to civilize and to christianize the Indian tribes."
PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY, supra note 124, at 25-26 (citing ORLANDO BROWN, H.R.
EXEC. DOC. No. 31-5, ser. 570, at 956-57 (1849)).
163. See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nine-
teenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free
Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 778 (1997). Dussias notes: "Grant committed his
administration to 'any course ... which tends to [Indian] civilization and ultimate
citizenship.'" Id. (quoting ROBERT H. KELLER, JR., AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM AND
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, 1869-82, at 16 (1983)).
164. See id. at 776-77.
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son Dussias concludes: "In short, under the Peace Policy, the
federal government turned to religious groups and religious
men to formulate and administer Indian policy, in effect abdi-
cating much of its responsibility in Indian affairs.""
Ironically, the Peace Policy was implemented concurrently
with the United States' heavy involvement in warfare with the
Plains Indians.' 66 Indeed, the violent conflicts between the
military, the settlers, and the Indians, especially after Custer's
defeat at Little Big Horn, precipitated the demise of the Peace
Policy in favor of a more aggressive military approach.17 Even-
tually, however, the United States succeeded in eliminating
any Indian military threat to further American colonization,
and Congress formally ended Indian treaty-making in 1871.168
5. The Allotment Policy-Federal Indian policy between
1871 and 1934 reflected America's continuing belief that it had
an "Indian problem" and that efforts should be focused on as-
similating the Indians into American life by destroying their
tribal identity.169 Reflecting the still-dominant American view
that American society and culture were superior to Indian so-
ciety and culture, the social reformers acted in concert with
the speculators, who were eager to appropriate the remaining
Indian land base by urging Congress to privatize Indian lands
and eradicate the traditional tribal lifestyle. 70 Indeed, the
"Americanization" of the Indians "became the all-embracing
goal of the reformers in the last two decades of the century." 7
These reformers, led by groups like the Indian Rights Asso-
ciation and the Women's National Indian Association, drew
upon the common refrain that the Indians should be converted
to Christianity,7 2 but added a twist by focusing on the destruc-
tion of tribal Indian life:
165. Id. at 779. Dussias explains that "[tihe most important structural compo-
nents of the policy were the creation of a Board of Indian Commissioners and the
allotment of Indian agencies to religious groups. In addition, federal aid to Indian
schools and missions was greatly expanded." Id.
166. See KELLER, supra note 163, at 188-89.
167. See Dussias, supra note 163, at 782.
168. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994)); see also GETCHES ET AL., supra note 15, at 179 (detailing the
power struggle between the House of Representatives and the Senate over the control
of Indian affairs that led to the end of Indian treaty-making).
169. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 147-52.
170. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at
128.
171. PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY, supra note 124, at 29.
172. See id. at 26-27.
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[I]f civilization, education and Christianity are to do their
work, they must get at the individual. They must lay hold
of men and women and children, one by one. The dead-
ening sway of tribal custom must be interfered with. The
sad uniformity of savage tribal life must be broken up!
Individuality must be cultivated.... At last, as a nation,
we are coming to recognize the great truth that if we
would do justice to the Indians, we must get at them, one
by one, with American ideals, American schools, American
laws, the privileges and the pressure of American rights
and duties. 173
The means for facilitating this transformation was the al-
lotment of the remaining tribal land base to individual Indian
ownership. 174 With support from the speculators and settlers
eager for new lands to colonize, the government focused on
"educating" the Indians.175 In 1887, Congress passed the Indian
General Allotment Act,76 which established a mechanism for
converting tribal land to private Indian ownership.177 The re-
formers were no doubt elated because they believed that:
173. Merrill E. Gates, Opening Address, 18 PROC. ANN. MEETING LAKE MOHONK
CONF. FRIENDS INDIAN 14 (1900).
174. See infra notes 176-78.
175. The federal government continued to fund religious groups to operate schools
for Indians until the 1890s. After questions were raised about the constitutionality of
government funding of religious groups, the government's solution was not to ban
such funding thereafter, but to provide religious instruction in the government's In-
dian schools on a non-denominational basis. See Dussias, supra note 163, at 784-87.
In addition to funding religious education, the government also banned traditional
Indian ceremonial dances-such as the Ghost Dance of the Lakota Sioux and the
Pueblo dances-that officials believed inhibited the acceptance of Christianity and a
civilized lifestyle. See id. at 787-805.
176. Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994)).
177. See Judith V Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10 (1995).
Royster notes:
The central feature of the General Allotment Act was the allotment of the res-
ervations in severalty. Under the Act, individual Indians received a certain
number of acres of reservation land. In recognition of prior failed attempts to
allot Indian lands in fee, however, Congress provided that allotted lands would
be held in trust for the individual allottee for a period of twenty-five years.
During that time, the allottee was expected to assimilate to agriculture, to
Christianity, and to citizenship. At the end of the twenty-five year transition
period, the individual would receive a patent in fee, free of encumbrance and
fully alienable. With the acquisition of a fee patent, the allottee would also be
subject to the civil and criminal laws of the state.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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[land allotment] is a mighty pulverizing engine for break-
ing up the tribal mass. It has nothing to say to the tribe,
nothing to do with the tribe. It breaks up that vast "bulk of
things" which the tribal life sought to keep unchanged. It
finds its way straight to the family and to the individual.
17 8
Over the next fifty years, the Allotment-Act had just such an
effect on many reservation Indians.'79 The fee patent program
and the surplus lands program served as the vehicles for
transferring eighty-seven million acres-approximately 65% of
all Indian land-to white owners. 8
At the same time that the Allotment Act was being
implemented, Congress and the Supreme Court were involved
in other efforts to further solidify legal and political hegemony
over the Indian nations. 8' Much of this development came
after 1883, when the Court held in Ex parte Crow Dog that
federal criminal jurisdiction did not extend to the murder of
one Indian by another in Indian territory.8 2 This decision was
reluctantly given effect by officials in the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA), who thought that this recognition of tribal
sovereignty only frustrated their assimilation policies.' As a
result, they initiated a campaign to have Congress grant such
jurisdiction to the federal courts.' In 1885, Congress acceded
to this request and enacted the Indian Major Crimes Act, 185
one of the most important federal laws granting federal
authority to interfere with internal Indian affairs.8 6  In
178. Gates, supra note 173, at 16.
179. See Royster, supra note 177, at 6 (discussing the goals and effects of the Gen-
eral Allotment Act).
180. See id. at 13. Royster notes:
Despite the devastating effect of fee patents, the 27 million patented acres lost
to non-Indians represented only about one-third of the tribal losses during the
allotment era. More than twice as much land-some 60 million acres-was lost
under the surplus lands program ... [which provided that] "surplus" lands
could, at the discretion of the President, be opened to non-Indian settlement.
Id.
181. See infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
182. See Exparte Crow Dog, 109 US. 556, 571-72 (1883).
183. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY,
TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 133-34 (1994).
184. See id. at 134-41.
185. Ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 US.C.
§ 1153) (1988).
186. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at
290 n.73. See generally id. at 282-86 (on the application of general federal laws to
Indians); HARRING, supra note 183, at 134-41 (on the genesis of the Act).
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addition, Congress granted the Secretary of the Interior
sweeping administrative authority to establish a wide variety
of assimilating institutions within Indian reservation
communities, such as Western judicial and law enforcement
systems, boarding schools, and mission schools.
8 7
As Congress was asserting federal law and power over the
internal affairs of the Indian nations, the Supreme Court was
providing the legal rationale for doing so. In US. v. Kagama,l8s
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Indian Major
Crimes Act merely upon the grounds that the United States
had a "duty of protection" of the Indians and that the "Indian
tribes are the wards of the nation.""9 And in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, s° the Court upheld the abrogation of Indian treaties
on the grounds that the courts did not have any power to in-
terfere with Congress' "plenary authority" over Indian
affairs.' Thus, by the early twentieth century, John Marshall's
early understanding of federal-tribal relations-that the
United States had "conquered" the Indian nations'S-had be-
come a reality under American law.'93
Efforts to appropriate Indian land"M and otherwise destroy
Indian tribal life were extremely successful.'95 The Indian
187. See Henry M. Teller, Courts of Indian Offenses, in PRUCHA, FRIENDS OF THE
INDIAN, supra note 162, at 295-99 (stating that Henry M. Teller, Secretary of the Inte-
rior, established Courts of Indian Offenses for the specific purpose of destroying
Indian customs and traditions). For a description of the establishment of early Indian
schools, see SAMUEL CARTER III, CHEROKEE SUNsET: A NATION BETRAYED 41-52
(1976).
188. 118 US. 375 (1886).
189. Id. at 383.
190. 187 US. 553 (1903).
191. See id. at 565-68.
192. See discussion supra Part I.A.
193. Despite the constancy of federal legal and judicial efforts to subjugate the In-
dian nations and acquire Indian lands, the Supreme Court periodically would remain
true to the other competing doctrinal formulation that had been laid down by John
Marshall-that the Indian nations were "domestic dependent nations." Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1831). In instances where there was no clear
federal interest or concern, the Court did continue to recognize that the Indian na-
tions were possessed of an inherent sovereignty not derived from federal sources.
Thus, in Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), the Court refused to vacate a Cherokee
murder conviction on the ground that Cherokee authority "existed prior to the Consti-
tution" and thus operated independently of it. Id. at 384-85.
194. See Arrell M. Gibson, Indian Land Transfers, in 4 HANDBOOK, supra note 2,
at 211, 227 ("27,000 acres were passed from Indian allottees by sale and an additional
60,000 acres were ceded outright to non-Indians as 'surplus' lands."); see also FELIX S.
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at 138 (describing reduc-
tion in Indian land holdings from 138,000,000 acres in 1887 to 48,000,000 in 1934).
195. Prucha writes of the devastating effect of the Allotment Act:
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nations had been stripped of most of their aboriginal lands and
deprived of their traditional governmental, social, and cultural
institutions.9 As a result, Indian economies were destroyed
and many Indian people were thrown into poverty, which, in
some cases, made them heavily dependent upon the federal
government and its distributions for survival." The failure of
the Allotment Policy was documented in the tremendously
influential Meriam Report, which was issued in 1928.198 Given
their obvious effects, it was generally accepted that the
Allotment and Assimilation Policies had failed and that a new
approach toward Indian affairs should be taken.1 9
6. The Reorganization Policy-In 1933, a new Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, John Collier, was appointed, and the United
States initiated changes in its Indian policy."° At Collier's
The allotment of land in severalty under the Dawes Act and the subsequent
loss of many of these lands by the Indians eliminated the economic base upon
which viable Indian societies depended. The educational and Americanization
programs destroyed the Indians' pride and their cultural heritage without com-
pletely substituting anything in their place, until the Indians became, in large
part, a demoralized people with economic, educational, and health problems
that seemed to grow steadily worse instead of better.
PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY, supra note 124, at 43.
196. See supra note 195 and accompanying text; infra Part III.C.
197. See Laurence M. Hauptman, The Indian Reorganization Act, in THE AG-
GRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880S, supra note 92,
at 131, 135 (describing the Meriam Report's assessment of the Allotment Act's effect
on Indian Society).
198. See INSTITUTE FOR Gov'T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINI-
STRATION (Lewis Meriam et al. eds., 1928). See generally GETCHES ET AL., supra note
15, at 217-18; Clinton, supra note 24, at 104.
199. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 152.
200. See PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY, supra note 124, at 33. Prior to his appointment,
Collier was the spokesman for the American Indian Defense Association. See id. He
had seven basic principles that shaped his approach to Indian affairs:
1. Indian societies must and can be discovered in their continuing
existence, or regenerated, or set into being de novo and made use
of
2. The Indian societies, whether ancient, regenerated or created
anew, must be given status, responsibility and power.
3. The land, held, used and cherished in the way the particular In-
dian group desires, is fundamental in any lifesaving program.
4. Each and all of the freedoms should be extended to Indians, and in
the most convincing and dramatic manner possible. [There must
be] proclamation and enforcement of cultural liberty, religious lib-
erty, and unimpeded relationships of the generations.
5. Positive means must be used to ensure freedom--credit, education
(of a broad and technical sort), and grants of responsibility.
932 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 31:4
urging," Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)
in 1934.2" The IRA ended allotment and provided a
mechanism for tribes to revitalize themselves by adopting
written tribal constitutions and business charters.2" In doing
so, Congress had apparently reversed its Indian policy from
one intent on destroying tribal sovereignty and self-
government to one in favor of supporting both of these ideals.
While some have heralded the IRA as a good thing for the
Indian nations,204 it is easy to see that even this "beneficial" °5
initiative could not be totally divorced from the colonial foun-
dations common to all of the previous federal Indian policies.
While the IRA did acknowledge that the Indian nations were
separate sovereigns, ° it nonetheless provided that their gov-
ernmental reorganization could only occur pursuant to federal
law and only in accordance with a written constitution and/or
a business corporation.207 As a result, the IRA heavily
6. The experience of responsible democracy, is, of all experience, the
most therapeutic, the most disciplinary, the most dynamogenic and
the most productive of efficiency. In this one affirmation we, the
workers who knew so well the diversity of the Indian situation and
its recalcitrancy toward monistic programs, were prepared to be
unreserved, absolute, even at the risk of blunders and of turmoil.
We tried to extend to the tribes a self-governing self-determination
without any limit beyond the need to advance by stages to the
goal.
7. That research and then more research is essential to the program,
that in the ethnic field research can be made a tool of action essen-
tial to all the other tools, indeed, that it ought to be the master
tool.
Id. at 33-34 (paraphrasing JOHN COLLIER, INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS: THE LONG HOPE
261-64 (1947)).
201. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 104, 136.
202. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, §§ 1-19, 48 Stat. 984, 984-88 (codified as
amended at 25 US.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
203. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-478 (1994).
204. See, e.g., PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY, supra note 124, at 44; Paul H. Stuart, Or-
ganizing for Self-Determination: Federal and Tribal Bureaucracies in an Era of Social
and Policy Change, in AMERICAN INDIANS: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 83, 88
(Donald E. Green & Thomas V Tonnesen eds. 1991) (calling the IRA's system of indi-
rect administration "more beneficial than not for American Indians," while
acknowledging the failings of the Indian New Deal); Comment, Tribal Self-
Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 955, 979
(1972).
205. Stuart, supra note 204, at 88.
206. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-478 (1998).
207. See id.
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"embodied elements of the very colonialism it sought to end,"208
and thus has only received qualified praise from historians." 9
Furthermore, the colonizing foundation of the IRA can be
seen in the effort made by BIA officials to preserve federal
power over tribal lawmaking:
Tribal constitutions were often drafted from models pro-
vided by a BIA whose bureaucratic hold on the governance
of Indian country was directly threatened by the emer-
gence of strong, autonomous Indian tribal governments.
As much as [Commissioner of Indian Affairs] Collier
wanted to do away with the BIA, the BIA bureaucrats
were determined to keep their jobs and their power. Thus,
they drafted into many tribal constitutions provisions re-
quiring most or all tribal law making or resource
management decisions to be directly approved by the Sec-
retary of the Interior (through the BIA, of course).
210
Despite these flaws, which ensured that the federal govern-
ment would perpetuate its colonial authority, some measure of
the IRA's detrimental effect was offset by the fact that it was
the first federal Indian policy in over 100 years that did not
have the explicit purpose of undermining the status of the In-
dian nations.211
7. The Termination Policy-The Reorganization Policy,
however, was short-lived. In the 1940s, likely as a result of the
nationalism associated with America's successful participation
in World War II, Congress responded to the deficiency in In-
dian "Americanization"2 '2 by abandoning its effort to protect
and strengthen tribal self-government.213 In a dramatic and
208. Clinton, supra note 24, at 104.
209. See Hauptman, supra note 197, at 132 ("Recent assessments condemn more
than they praise the IRA and the Indian New Deal.").
210. Clinton, supra note 24, at 104-05.
211. See Hauptman, supra note 197, at 133 ("Much of the commentary on the IRA
has ignored a central fact: that it was largely an administrative reorganization fol-
lowing a century of mismanagement and mistaken policies that had seriously
depleted Indian resources and reduced the Indian population to subsistence.").
212. While various allotment-era acts had provided for the granting of citizenship
to most Indians by this time, all Indians were granted American citizenship in 1924.
See Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233,43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1994));
GETCHES ETAL., supra note 15, at 738.
213. See Wheeler-Howard Act-Exempt Certain Indians: Hearings on S. 2103 Be-
fore the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 76th Cong. (1940) (proposing the repeal of
parts of the Wheeler-Howard Act). Attached to the Senate Bill was a Senate Report,
which concluded:
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direct assault on the Indian nations, Congress began to im-
plement a policy of relinquishing federal "supervision" over
certain aspects of Indian relations to the states.1 Thus, in the
1940s, Congress acted initially to vest certain states with
criminal and civil jurisdiction over the Indian territories lo-
cated within their boundaries.215 Eventually, it authorized a
standing mechanism for any state to do so when it enacted
Public Law 280.16
The Termination Policy was formally conceived in 1953
when Congress adopted House Concurrent Resolution 108.217
Eventually, 109 tribes and bands were terminated, that is, de-
nied recognition as separate political entities, in furtherance of
this policy. 218 Tribal lands were allotted, tribal funds were dis-
tributed, and tribal governments were effectively disbanded.219
Fundamentally the so-called Wheeler-Howard Act attempts to set up a state or
a nation within a nation[,] which is contrary to the intents and purposes of the
American Republic. No doubt but that the Indians should be helped and given
every assistance possible[,] but in no way should they be set up as a governing
power within the United States of America.
Id. at 7 (quoting S. REP. No. 76-1047, at 4 (1939)).
214. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at
152-53.
215. See, e.g., Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 276, § 1, 54 Stat. 249, 249 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (1985)) (Kansas); Act of Sept. 13, 1950, ch. 947, § 1, 64
Stat. 845, 845 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 233 (1994)) (New York).
216. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, §§ 2, 4, 67 Stat. 588, 588-89 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)).
217. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953) (enacted). The resolution reads, in part:
[Ilt is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible to make the Indians within
the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled
to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of
the United States, and to grant them all the rights and prerogatives pertaining
to American citizenship.
Id., quoted in Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination
Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 150 (1977).
218. See Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 217, at 151.
219. See id. at 152-54. Wilkinson and Biggs write that the administrative plans
associated with the Termination Policy had the following effects on tribes and their
members:
1. Fundamental changes in land ownership patterns were made....
2. The trust relationship was ended....
3. State legislative jurisdiction was imposed....
4. State judicial authority was imposed....
5. All exemptions from state taxing authority were ended ....
6. All special federal programs to tribes were discontinued ....
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Consistent with its radical assimilationist purposes, the BIA
even set up a relocation program to move Indians to the cities,
which significantly increased the urban Indian population.2 °
As the Reorganization Era faded and the most dramatic
colonization policy of all, Termination, began to take effect, the
father of modern federal Indian control law, Felix S. Cohen,
was moved to write in 1951:
Having started our national existence as a nation by re-
pudiating colonial status, and having repudiated the role
of empire with equal vigor, at least during the first 122
years of our national existence, we are not accustomed to
the high moral talk by which great empires "aid" and
"protect" backward peoples out of their independence, and
impose a dependent status and a dependent psychology
upon people who once managed their own affairs in a self-
reliant way. Only in obscure places in the Indian country
... can we see what happens to our own Government ex-
perts when they are not responsible to the people they are
governing or aiding.
221
Fortunately, like all previous federal Indian policies, the
Termination Policy failed, 2 because separating Indian people
from their tribal lands and tribal way of life did not dramati-
cally improve their condition, as had been predicted.223 Many
Indian nations, like the Menominee of Wisconsin, never gave up
the fight for recognition of their sovereignty and eventually
were "restored" to federal recognition. 24 Moreover, many states
began to feel the brunt of assuming social service responsibility
7. All special federal programs to individuals were discontinued....
Tribal sovereignty was effectively ended....
Id. (emphasis removed).
220. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 11, at 15; JOANE NAGEL, AMERICAN INDIAN
ETHNIC RENEWAL 120 (1996).
221. Felix S. Cohen, Colonialism: US. Style, THE PROGRESSIVE, Feb. 1951, at 16,
17.
222. See GROSS, supra note 116, at xv; discussion supra Part II.A.1-6.
223. See TASK FORCE ON CONSOLIDATION, REVISION, AND CODIFICATION OF FED.
INDIAN LAW, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 93D CONG., FINAL REPORT 29
(1976) (proposing congressional findings that "the policy of withdrawal of federal
services and termination of federal recognition reflected in H.C.R. 108 of 1953 and the
various termination Acts enacted pursuant to that policy was an ill conceived policy
which has caused irreparable harm to those affected by its application").
224. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 22, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-197, §§ 1-8, 87 Stat. 770, 770-73
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 903 (1994)) (granting federal recognition to the Menominee
Tribe of Wisconsin).
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for former reservation communities.22 These factors, combined
with criticism of the federal government's haste and a lack of
Indian input in implementing the policy, led to the abandon-
ment in practice of the Termination Policy in the early
1960s.226
In 1968, Congress again focused on the Indian nations and,
as was the national tenor at the time, on the treatment of mi-
norities by the federal government. Acting on the basis of
information alleging rights abuses by tribal governments,227
Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),28 which
was designed to apply most of -the provisions of the Bill of
Rights to the actions of tribal government.2 '9 Here again, Con-
gress professed to support tribal government. But the ICRA,
by imposing on tribal governments external standards of ap-
propriate governmental conduct, was clearly more federal
intrusion into tribal government affairs.230 In its effort to
"help" the situation, Congress again undermined tribal sover-
eignty because it could only see a solution to the problem of
individual Indian rights abuses in terms that it could under-
stand and with which it was familiar-a declaration of
individual rights through law.231
8. The Self-Determination Policy-It is generally believed
that the Termination Era formally ended and the Self-
Determination Era began when President Nixon notified
Congress that he intended to help the Indian nations achieve
self-sufficiency.232 Nixon's policy statement marked the formal
end of the Termination Policy and was the most significant
improvement in the revitalization of tribal self-government in
225. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 15, at 252 (citing STEPHEN CORNELL, THE
RETURN OF THE NATIVE 123-24 (1988)).
226. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at
180-86.
227. See id.
228. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1303 (1994)).
229. Other than the right to bear arms, the prohibitions against the establishment
of religion, the quartering of soldiers, and the right to counsel at the state's expense,
the ICRA copied all other provisions of the Bill of Rights. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1302
(1994) with U.S. CONST. amend. I-X (showing that the ICRA copies most, but not all,
of the provisions in the Bill of Rights.).
230. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 123-24.
231. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978) (analyzing Con-
gress's two "distinct and competing" objectives in the IRCA-tribal self-determination
and the protection of individual rights).
232. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564, 567
(July 8, 1970) (President Richard M. Nixon) [hereinafter Nixon Message to Congress];
see, e.g., GROSS, supra note 116, at 34.
[VOL. 31:4
A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas
American history.23 Nixon's message to Congress showed that
the change in policy was unmistakable:
For years we have talked about encouraging Indians to
exercise greater self-determination, but our progress has
never been commensurate with our promises. Part of the
reason for this situation has been the threat of termina-
tion. But another reason is the fact that when a decision
is made as to whether a Federal program will be turned
over to Indian administration, it is the Federal authorities
and not the Indian people who finally make that decision.
This situation should be reversed. In my judgment, it
should be up to the Indian tribe to determine whether it
is willing to assume administrative responsibility for a
service program which is presently administered by a
Federal agency.m3
In 1975, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act,235 which provided a mechanism to as-
sist the Indian nations financially in their revitalization
efforts.236 In 1976, the American Indian Policy Review Commis-
sion issued its report supporting greater federal support for
tribal sovereignty and self-government. 237 And in 1978, Con-
gress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act, 238 which protected
Indian children against removal from Indian homes by state
and county social services for culturally-biased reasons.23'
Various acts were also passed to restore the federally-
recognized status of Indian nations that had earlier been ter-
minated. 4°
233. See GROSS, supra note 116, at 34-38; see also Tadd M. Johnson & James
Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27
CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1261-62 (1995).
234. Nixon Message to Congress, supra note 232, at 567.
235. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638,
§§ 1-209, 88 Stat. 2203, 2203-17 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a-
450n (1994) and elsewhere in scattered sections of titles 5, 25, 42, and 50)).
236. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a to 450i.
237. TASK FORCE ON CONSOLIDATION, REVISION, AND CODIFICATION OF FED. INDIAN
LAW, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REvIEW COMM'N, 93D CONG., FINAL REPORT (1976); see
also GROSS, supra note 116, at 40-44.
238. Pub. L. No. 95-608, §§ 1-403, 92 Stat. 3069, 3069-78 (1978) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994)).
239. See 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
240. See, e.g., Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 93-197, §§ 1-8, 87 Stat. 770,
770-73 (1973) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (1994)); Siletz Indian
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Throughout this period, the Supreme Court began to ad-
dress Indian issues in earnest. The "modern" era in federal
Indian control law generally is thought to have begun in 1959
when the Court decided the case of Williams v. Lee.2" Williams
reaffirmed the residual doctrinal foundations of Worcester,
holding that the state courts did not have jurisdiction over a
case arising out of an on-reservation transaction involving an
Indian and a non-Indian.2 2 Since 1959, the Supreme Court has
continued to address Indian law cases in disproportionate sig-
nificance."' It has not, however, retreated from the
fundamental covenants that affirm federal power and control
over the Indian nations.2"
9. Federal Indian Policy as Colonization-Because of its
deep foundation, colonization remains firmly embedded in the
body of modern federal Indian control law and policy. This ob-
servation should be of little surprise, because all federal
policies for dealing with the Indian nations-the Removal
Policy, the Reservation Policy, the Peace Policy, the Allotment
Policy, the Reorganization Policy, the Termination Policy-and
the "archaic, European-derived law" supporting them have
been "ultimately genocidal in both practice and intent."2 5 Only
since the ushering in of the Self-Determination Policy in the
early 1970s, has the United States avoided using the language
of subjugation and assimilation in creating and carrying out
its policy toward the Indian nations.
This state of affairs has led Robert Clinton to write that
"[ciolonialist roots ... are entrenched deeply in the body of
Tribe Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 95-195, §§ 1-8, 91 Stat. 1415, 1415-19 (1977)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 711-711f (1994)).
241. 358 US. 217 (1959); see Fred L. Ragsdale, Jr., The Deception of Geography, in
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 118, at 63, 63 ("To a
great degree, contemporary federal Indian law is modem law beginning in 1959.");
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN
A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1-3 (1987).
242. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 223.
243. See WILKINSON, supra note 241, at 2.
244. See infra note 277 (listing recent Supreme Court cases that still rely on doc-
trine laid down in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1
(1831)). The Court has, however, taken some steps to make assertions of federal power
subject to judicial review. See Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84
(1977) (overruling the part of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903), holding
that Congressional action involving Indian affairs was unreviewable). The Court has
also allowed tribes to sue the United States for breach of trust. See United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538-39
(1980).
245. Williams, Algebra, supra note 33, at 265.
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modern federal Indian law. Vestiges of the law's historic colo-
nial role in legitimating conquest and expropriation remain
imbedded in the doctrines employed today[,] allegedly to pro-
tect Indian interests."4 ' So long as the United States preserves
the colonial foundation of its Indian law, it will be unable to
formulate an effective and mutually beneficial policy for deal-
ing with the Indian nations.
B. The Challenges in Developing a
Successful Federal Indian Policy
Scholars generally concur with the assessment that federal
Indian policy has been a failure."7 Why has it been so difficult
for the United States to achieve a successful policy for dealing
with the Indians?
Foremost are the obstacles associated with the illegitimate
premises on which all but the most recent federal Indian poli-
cies are based. With the exception of the Reorganization and
Self-Determination policies, federal Indian policy has always
been driven by greed, avarice, and the pursuit of manifest des-
tiny." Taking and exploiting Indian lands and resources is a
paradigm requirement for America's economic system-
capitalism-and the Indian nations have been powerless to
defend themselves against it." 9 This thirst has destabilized
federal-Indian relations in the way that a fox eating chickens
destabilizes henhouse relations.
Moreover, federal Indian policy has been based upon a pa-
ternalistic ethnocentrism that has never viewed Indigenous
people as capable of determining our own future. American
policymakers have assumed that their way of life was superior
and worth emulating, that their society was in a superior posi-
tion to safeguard Indian interests, and that their opinions
246. Clinton, supra note 24, at 109.
247. See GROSS, supra note 116, at xv ("Scholars have long been of the opinion
that American Indian-federal relations are a study in the failure of democratic proc-
esses to protect and enhance the interests and well-being of American Indian tribes
and communities.").
248. See id. at 11 (noting scholars' assessments of federal Indian policy as par-
tially rooted in the goal of manifest destiny). But see PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY, supra
note 124, at 146-47 (flatly denying such ignoble motives in the case of Andrew Jack-
son).
249. See GROSS, supra note 116 at 2 (describing how "colonial dependency theory
... explains Indian policy in Marxist or neo-Marxist terms...").
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about the future of Indian people were the correct ones. These
faulty assumptions have been a constant throughout America's
dealings with the Indian nations.20 Indeed, the degree to
which this paternalistic ethnocentrism has infiltrated even the
most "beneficial" federal Indian policies raises the possibility
that these beliefs are defining characteristics of what it means
to be an American.25' This imbalance of perspectives has un-
dermined the development of stable relations between the
Indian nations and the United States.
Aside from these fundamental flaws in federal Indian poli-
cymaking, other defects are related to the unique nature of
Indian affairs within the American policymaking arena. Fed-
eral Indian control law incorporates a unique tension between
satisfying federal interests, as reflected by the Plenary Power
Doctrine, 2 and accommodating tribal interests, as reflected by
the trust responsibility. 3 These concepts, especially the trust
responsibility, are difficult concepts to define and reflect in
legislation. Federal Indian policymaking is, therefore, a man-
dated exercise that "is as much a state of mind or moral
attitude as it is a complex body of Indian law stemming from
Congress' constitutional authority to regulate Indian af-
fairs.24
As a result, ideology plays an important and unpredictable
role in how federal Indian policy is developed. Regardless of
the time period, "the question of how the Indians' political
status will be defined is, implicitly or explicitly, a part of In-
dian policy discussions. Whether Indians are to be more or less
250. See discussion supra Part II.A.
251. Prucha explores this fundamental flaw in light of Collier's unsuccessful ef-
forts at Indian reorganization:
The tragedy is that white Americans-whether their philanthropic impulse
came from Christian sentiment or from social science commitments--have
never really been willing to accept a pluralistic society. For nearly two centuries
of United States history the dream of the reformers has been to bring the Indi-
ans into conformity with the prevailing moods-religious and intellectual-of
white society. The dominant sentiments of an age could not make room for al-
ternative or divergent patterns of life. The formulators of Indian policy, in all
the periods we have looked at today, with typical reformers' zeal swept criticism
and opposition aside, for they believed that they and the nation they repre-
sented were supremely right. The Indian has been asked to march to all kinds
of drummers--except his own.
PRUCHA, INDIAN POLICY, supra note 124, at 35.
252. See infra Part III.B.2.
253. See supra Part I.B.
254. GROSS, supra note 116, at 15.
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sovereign is thus a permanent consideration when legislating
Indian affairs."' These are inherently matters of judgment
and opinion, and their resolution is quintessentially political
in nature. Whether Congress decides to support and advocate
Indian concerns or to undermine and suppress them, govern-
ment policy will be significantly affected. Emma R. Gross has
concluded that "[gliven the existence of these tensions in In-
dian policy development, and the fact that they have defied
attempts to definitely resolve the underlying questions at
stake, Indian legislation is often contradictory or seems to re-
verse itself."2 6
In addition to its conceptual difficulty, the challenge of de-
veloping a successful federal Indian policy is compounded by a
number of structural factors associated with the task: First,
the sheer number of distinct Indian nations and tribes makes
the development of any workable policy a considerable chal-
lenge. Today, as always, each of the 560 different Indian
nations 7 has unique attributes that make the application of
any general policy fraught with difficulty.258 All were dealt with
differently by the United States during different historical pe-
riods.259 Moreover, the nations vary in their form of
government and tribal organization, abundance of land and
natural resources, degree of assimilation, and strength of tra-
ditional customs and beliefs. 2' These characteristics contrib-
uted strongly to the difficulty of crafting a workable federal
Indian policy during the last two hundred years.
Second, structural conflicts within the governmental organi-
zation of the United States have made uniformity in federal
Indian policymaking problematic.2 1 While federalism and the
separation of powers may have been useful devices in devel-
oping and sustaining a vibrant American democracy, they have
contributed to the generation of failed federal Indian policies
and to a hodgepodge of federal law, executive orders, and
regulations dealing with Indian affairs.
255. Id. at 18.
256. Id.
257. See Indian Entities Recognized, supra note 2, at 9251-55.
258. See GETcHEs ET AL., supra note 15, at 7-8.
259. For an example of the inconsistencies in the United States' dealings with
various tribes at different times, see the great variety of treaties in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS:
LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note 3.
260. See NAGEL, supra note 220, at 236.
261. See generally GROSS, supra note 116, at 61-92.
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Congress, which is now established by the Constitution262
and federal common law2' as having plenary power over In-
dian affairs, has historically had difficulty determining how to
address relations with the Indians procedurally. It was not un-
til 1871, when Congress ended Indian treaty making,2 that it
was finally implied that the House, as well as the Senate,
might have a role in managing this responsibility. Even after
Congress became established as the primary authority over
Indian affairs, the political and ideological questions associ-
ated with how to deal with the Indian nations have made
consistent policy elusive.
The executive branch, primarily through the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs (BIA), has a long and undistinguished record in
managing the federal government's relationship with the Indi-
ans.2' Fraught with the inherent conflict of interest of serving
both as the trustee of the tribes 26 and as the defenders of fed-
eral interests generally,2 7 the executive branch has had the
difficult task of trying to implement the conflicting policies de-
veloped by Congress over the years.2' By virtue of its
unenviable task as "overseer," the BIA has been unable to par-
ticipate meaningfully in policy debate and has, too often,
become the object of ridicule rather than the recipient of re-
spect in the dialogue over the federal-tribal relationship.6 9
Furthermore, the BIA may well be more concerned about its
own bureaucratic self-interest than about the concerns of the
Indian people it is supposed to be serving as trustee.270
262. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
263. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567-68 (1903).
264. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994)).
265. See SPECIAL COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN
AFFAIRS, FINAL REPORT AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, S. REP. No. 101-216, pt.
2, at 27-52 (1989).
266. See Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Re-
sponsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1230-34 (1975) (on the history and
scope of the executive branch's trust responsibility).
267. See id. at 1236 (noting that the availability of equitable relief for Indian na-
tions harmed by the federal government is "vital to accommodate the conflicts
between Indian trustee responsibilities and competing government projects that affect
countless federal agencies"); see also id. at 1233-34, 1236 n.105.
268. See Nixon Message to Congress, supra note 232, at 573.
269. See SPECIAL COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN
AFFAIRS, FINAL REPORT AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, S. REP. No. 101-216, pt.
1, at 5 (describing the BIA as a "federal bureaucracy ensnarled in red tape and riddled
with fraud, mismanagement, and waste").
270. See id. at 22.
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The problems afflicting the legislative and executive
branches have not affected the judiciary. The Supreme Court
has always played a central role in the development of federal
Indian control law.271' Although the court has not always been
especially active in Indian cases, its pronouncements have
served as the cornerstones for American law and policy to-
wards the Indian nations.272 Unlike its relationship to other
bodies of law, the Court has written virtually the entire body of
federal law applicable to the Indian nations. The Court has
defined the scope of federal power over tribes,2 73 limited the
tribal sovereignty recognized by the United States,274 and
fleshed out the responsibilities of the United States as trustee
for the Indians.275 While it has, in recent years, become less
hospitable to claims favoring Indian interests,276 it nonetheless
has consistently built upon its established precedents-the
Marshall trilogy-that suppress tribal autonomy in the face of
federal power.277
In addition to the challenges associated with the separation
of powers, federalism has also affected management of Indian
affairs. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states claimed
271. See WILKINSON, supra note 241, at 13-14.
272. See id. at 4, 135-37 n.11 (listing specific principles of federal Indian control
law outlined by the Court).
273. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566-67 (1903).
274. See McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (referring
to tribal sovereignty doctrine as a "backdrop" in the Court's analysis).
275. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983) (holding that, while the
federal government has a general trust responsibility vis-&-vis the Native American
nations, it must also represent other, possibly conflicting interests); United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 219-28 (1983) (holding that comprehensive scheme of federal
statutes and regulations governing management of tribal timber imposes specific
trust obligations on the federal government); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535,
540-46 (1980) (holding that while the General Allotment Act of 1887 established a
trust relationship, the scope of the relationship was limited to the provisions of the
Act).
276. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-76 (1996) (weakening the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515
U.S. 450, 462-67 (1995) (construing a treaty); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 733-35
(1983) (upholding state imposition of liquor license requirement); Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154-59 (1980) and
Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S.
463, 481-83 (1976) (both validating imposition of state taxing schemes).
277. See, e.g., National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
845, 853 n.12 (1985) (citing Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823),
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832), and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831) in support of the proposition that Indian nations have
been divested with respect to their relations with non-tribal members); Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206, 209 (1978) (citing all three decisions in
support of the proposition that Indian sovereignty is limited).
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that their authority to manage Indian affairs co-existed with
that of the federal government." While the replacement of the
Articles by the Constitution clarified that the federal govern-
ment would have primary authority over managing Indian
affairs,29 the states continued to challenge this federal consti-
tutional authority for years thereafter.2 ' Despite the clarity of
pronouncements such as those in Worcester v. Georgia"' and
Williams v. Lee,' the states have continued to press for con-
trol over the Indian territory within their borders.2  The
recent trend, in fact, has been for the Supreme Court to grant
the states an even greater role in the administration of Indian
affairs.2
While considerable, the institutional reasons why the
United States is unable to formulate rational Indian policy are
overshadowed by the fundamental reality of federal Indian
policymaking: the United States has, and has always had, a
tremendous appetite for Indian land, Indian resources, and
Indian subjugation. Greed and ethnocentrism have interfered
with the United States' ability to achieve harmony between its
own long-term interests and those of the Indian nations lo-
cated within its borders.2
Because of this fundamental reality, even the most altruistic
and noble attempts to address the problems of Indian country
have failed.' From the beginning, when treaties were the pre-
dominant method of handling Indian affairs, the pressure to
develop and expand has been so great that the solemn prom-
ises made by the United States in those agreements to secure
278. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1156 (2d Cir. 1988).
279. See id. at 1159.
280. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985)
(granting jurisdiction to the Oneida land sale to state of New York allegedly in viola-
tion of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793).
281. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-62 (1832); see also id. at 590-92, 95 (McLean, J., con-
curring).
282. 358 U.S. 217, 221 (1959).
283. See, e.g., Alaska v. Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948, 951-52 (1998); Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida, 517 US. 44,55-64 (1996).
284. See, e.g., Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 731-35 (1983) (allowing California to
regulate liquor licensing on the Pala Reservation); Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 159-61 (1980) (allowing Washington
to impose a cigarette tax on tribal smokeshops selling cigarettes to non-tribe mem-
bers).
285. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 11, at 193 (describing the Plenary Power Doc-
trine as "rooted in [pirejudice" and commenting on the "openly ethnocentric tone of
the opinions of the Plenary Power Era" (citations omitted)).
286. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.AL6.
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Indian land and peace have all been broken. 87 Even the Self-
Determination Policy,"' the most successful federal Indian
policy to date, has been hampered by the inability of the
United States to let the Indian nations actually administer
their own affairs in the face of their apparent willingness to do
so." While this policy has encouraged tribes to assume greater
control over their own affairs, there remains a huge bureauc-
racy, the BIA, which continues to micro-manage tribal affairs,
destroy tribal initiative, and resist any meaningful reform ef-
forts.
2s °
As recently as in the 1980s, the United States and the In-
dian nations dependent upon the federal trust responsibility
faced a difficult fiscal crisis.29' Accordingly, the federal govern-
ment made items of discretionary spending subject to
cutbacks.92 Even as the American economy has grown
stronger, the Indians, one of the poorest and weakest voices
within the United States, stand to lose, as we always have.293
Even worse, the policies that might be developed to help guide
future conduct may be too heavily influenced by this competi-
tion for scarce resources. Unless deliberate action is taken to
resist this pressure, Congress may be tempted at some time in
the future to once again resolve America's troubles on the
backs of the Indigenous peoples located within its borders."
287. See discussion supra Part II.A_ 1.
288. See discussion supra Part II.A.8; discussion infra Part IVA.
289. See discussion infra Part VA.2.
290. See id. (both the Demonstration Project and Self-Governance Act allow for
the continued functioning of the BIA, and with regard to the Self-Governance Act, the
Secretary of the Interior is given final control in choosing participating Indian Na-
tions).
291. See Stuart, supra note 204, at 96 (detailing the effects of the overall budget
cuts in domestic programs in the 1980s on Indian tribes).
292. See id.
293. Recently, the Chairman of the Ways & Means Committee of the House of
Representatives, Bill Archer, has proposed a tax on Indian gaming revenues generated
by tribal governments. See, e.g., Clay Chandler & Eric Pianin, Hill Republicans Offer
Plan to Cut Taxes: Proposal Authored by Rep. Archer Would Trim $85 Billion over 5
Years, WASH. POST, June 10, 1997, at A4; Patrick Wilson, Legislator Seeks Tax on
Tribes, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 10, 1997, at 2A, available in 1997 WL 4546085. No
commensurate proposal has been generated to tax state lottery and other state gam-
ing revenues. In addition, Senator Slade Gorton has proposed that tribal sovereign
immunity from lawsuits should be waived, further exposing tribal governments to
potential financial devastation. See S. 1691, 105th Cong. § 3(3)(b)(3) (1998) (proposing
an American Indian Equal Justice Act).
294. See Stuart, supra note 204, at 96 (noting the Reagan administration's at-
tempts to relinquish federal responsibility for Indian programs).
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III. WHY FEDERAL INDIAN CONTROL LAW
MUST BE DECOLONIZED
There are at least four reasons why federal Indian control
law must be decolonized: (1) the world community has rejected
colonialism and supports the right of self-determination for all
peoples; (2) federal Indian control law rationalizes American
colonization and thus denies Indigenous people in the United
States basic human rights of self-determination; (3) American
colonization has been partially successful in destroying the In-
dian nations; and (4) decolonization and the commensurate
redevelopment of the Indian nations will encourage a more
cost-effective use of federal financial resources.
A. The World Community Has
Rejected Colonialism
The nations of the world have rejected colonialism and sup-
port the right of all peoples to self-determination." 5 After the
horrors of Nazi atrocities, the United Nations has made con-
siderable progress during the last 50 years toward the
protection of basic human rights for all peoples under interna-
tional law.296 This movement has been especially strong with
respect to decolonization and the elimination of first world na-
tion hegemony over third world nations.297  A similar
development must occur with respect to the elimination of
American hegemony over the Indigenous nations that exist
within its boundaries.
Worldwide efforts to eliminate colonization have been
affirmed and incorporated within the body of international
law: for example, article I of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights, both adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1966, guarantees that
"[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination" and that
295. For an excellent survey of the international law on the right of self-
determination, see John W Head, Selling Hong Kong to China: What Happened to the
Right of Self-Determination, 46 KAN. L. REV. 283, 283-91 (1998).
296. See id.
297. See infra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
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"[b]y virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."98 In adopting this treaty, the world's nations
have committed to eliminating colonial aggression against
and hostility toward all peoples of the world.
Despite this general affirmation of the right of self-
determination of all peoples, international law has yet to
specifically acknowledge this right with respect to Indige-
nous peoples. Nonetheless, there has been forward movement
in developing international law norms to recognize and pro-
tect the rights of Indigenous peoples. For example, article 8 of
proposed International Labor Organization Convention 169
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries299 requires that nations "have due regard for the
customs or customary laws of indigenous and tribal peoples
and to permit them to retain their own customs and institu-
tions where not incompatible '[w]ith fundamental rights
defined by the national legal system and with internationally
recognised human rights.' "300
In addition, considerable progress has been made on devel-
oping a Declaration of Indigenous Rights. 30 1 The draft
Declaration anticipates that international law will protect
the right of self-determination of all of the world's Indigenous
peoples. 2 Its fundamental provisions include the following
articles:
Article 3-Indigenous peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely
298. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
art. 1, SENATE EXEC. DOC. D, 95-2, at 23, 999 U.N.T.S. 172, 173 [hereinafter Interna-
tional Covenant]; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, SENATE EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 13 (signed Oct. 5, 1977,
but not yet in force), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5.
299. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Coun-
tries 25-33, International Labour Organization (June 7, 1989), reprinted in CLINTON
ETAL., supra note 11, at 165-75 [hereinafter Indigenous Peoples Convention]. As Clin-
ton notes, this Convention revised the International Labor Organization Convention
107 of 1957. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 11, at 175; Indigenous Peoples Conven-
tion, supra, art. 36.
300. Clinton, supra note 24, at 115-16 (quoting Indigenous Peoples Convention,
supra note 299, art. 8).
301. See id. at 116.
302. See Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Working Group
on Indigenous Populations on Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess.,
at 50-60, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (1993).
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determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development.
Article 4-Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain
and strengthen their distinct political, economic, social
and cultural characteristics, as well as their legal sys-
tems, while retaining their rights to participate fully, if
they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cul-
tural life of the State.03
Although these efforts to develop affirmative protective
norms have yet to be fully achieved, the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights3' 4 demonstrates that
colonialism has been rejected as a matter of international
law. Perhaps most importantly, the United States, as a signa-
tory to this Covenant, has accepted that colonization is an
unacceptable policy for dealing with other peoples. 3 1 In an
obvious respect, then, the adoption of the Self-Determination
Policy in the early 1970s manifests America's commitment to
acknowledging the self-determination rights of the Indige-
nous people within its borders °.3 ' This acknowledgment would
be more effective, however, if it were backed up by an effort
to eliminate the colonial foundations of federal Indian control
law.
Inevitably, it would appear, the next millennium will con-
tinue to bring pressure on the nations of the world to protect
the rights of Indigenous people against the colonizing and
genocidal policies that both developed and developing nations
continue to implement. Because it is a leading member of the
international community, the United States should expunge
the colonizing and genocidal aspects of its law dealing with
the Indigenous people located within its boundaries.
B. Federal Indian Control Law Denies Basic
Human Rights of Self-Determination
By definition, colonization suppresses the basic human
rights of the people being colonized.307 Federal Indian control
303. Id. at 52.
304. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
305. See International Covenant, supra note 298, at 173.
306. See 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994); discussion supra Part II.A.8.
307. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 86.
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law, because it has been developed to rationalize and justify
the colonization of Indigenous peoples and lands within the
United States, s 8 suppresses basic human rights of self-
determination." This suppression is evidenced by the funda-
mental doctrines that comprise this body of law.
1. The "Doctrine of Discovery" and the "Right of Occu-
pancy"--Both the "doctrine of discovery" and the "right of
occupancy" doctrine suppress Indigenous tribal sovereignty as
a matter of federal law solely by virtue of the Supreme Court's
declaration of their existence in Johnson v. M'Intosh.1 ° To-
gether, they have the practical effect of divesting the Indian
nations of their prior legal claim to the entire land mass of the
United States and of subverting tribal self-government. While
the Indian nations did enter into treaties that called for the
"protection" of the United States, none of these treaties ceded
or relinquished total self-governing authority or the entire
tribal land base to the United States.311 Respect for tribal sov-
ereignty and the right of self-determination dictates that the
United States limit its authority over the Indian nations to the
degree bargained for in the original treaties. Because the
"doctrine of discovery" overreaches and unilaterally divests the
Indian nations of the right to control their aboriginal lands,
this doctrine denies fundamental human rights of self-
determination.1 2
2. The Plenary Power Doctrine-The United States Consti-
tution provides that Congress shall have power "[tio regulate
commerce ... with the Indian tribes."313 Neither the Constitu-
tion nor any Indian treaty provides that the federal
government shall have absolute power over the Indian nations
or have the absolute ability to control any aspect of internal
tribal relations."" Nonetheless, "[a]lthough not well-grounded
in the nation's Constitution or its early history, federal Indian
control law continues to assert total political hegemony of the
United States government over the existence and sovereignty
308. See id. at 76 passim.
309. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 86, 115.
310. See discussion supra Part I.A.
311. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Aug. 7, 1790, US.-Creek Nation,
art. II, 7 Stat. 35, 35; Treaty, Nov. 28, 1785, U.S.-Cherokee, art. III, 7 Stat. 18, 19;
Treaty, Jan. 21, 1785, US.-Wiandot-Delaware-Chippawa-Ottawa, art. II, 7 Stat. 16, 16.
312. See Williams, Algebra, supra note 33, at 290.
313. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
314. See generally U.S. CONST.; 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note
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of the Indian nations."315 For this reason alone, the Plenary
Power doctrine subordinates tribal sovereignty and prevents
the Indian nations from being recognized as fully self-
determining peoples within federal law.316 Indeed, its existence
wholly undermines the notion that the Indian nations have
any legal sovereignty at all. Robert Clinton suggests that the
Plenary Power doctrine has much more to do with power than
with law:
As an assertion of naked political power, the plenary
power doctrine accurately may describe the current bal-
ance of raw military force between the federal
government and the much smaller Indian tribes. As a
proposition of legal authority, however, it is certainly in-
consistent with the approach of both international and
domestic constitutional law toward national power over
domestic and foreign sovereigns other than Indian
tribes.
3. The Federal Thust Responsibility-Tribal self-
determination is denied whenever the United States asserts
its trust responsibility and imposes its view of ensuring the
well-being of the Indian nations. While treaty provisions ac-
knowledged that the United States would provide "protection"
to the Indian nations,318 the Supreme Court expanded this
limited and negotiated protection into a full-blown "guardian-
ward" relationship that has justified the suppression of tribal
self-determination.39 To be sure, the federal trust responsibil-
ity does have two faces, the protection of Indian nations from
external threats and the regulation of internal affairs. To the
extent that the trust responsibility is exercised to safeguard
tribal interests against the states and other external threats,
it may be fully consistent with the treaty-based conceptions of
protection. But to the extent that the trust responsibility is
exercised to interfere with internal tribal affairs such as land
315. Clinton, supra note 24, at 110.
316. See generally id. at 110-25.
317. Id. at 115.
318. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
319. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886); Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 US. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
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allotment, 2 ' native religious practices, 2' and the "approval" of
tribal laws, 2' because the federal government "knows best," it
violates fundamental rights of Indigenous self-determination.23
4. The Autocracy of the BIA-Title 25, section 2 of the
United States Code provides that "[t]he Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs, shall under the direction of the Secretary of the
Interior ... have the management of all Indian affairs."24 Al-
though vague, this statutory provision has served as the basis
for the expansion of the federal government's role in Indian
affairs from that of mere "protector" to that of direct manager
and service provider.25 For over one hundred years, federal
administrative authority has expanded to envelop nearly all
aspects of native life on the ground that "Indians, like minors
or incompetents, are incapable of managing their own re-
sources and business affairs."328 Over the years, the BIA has
engaged in a vride variety of activities to control and manage
native life, e.g., establishing laws and police forces to keep the
peace and achieve assimilation,327 developing courts to resolve
tribal disputes and impart the dominant society's conceptions
of law and justice,2 s constructing and operating boarding
schools to convert Indian children to Christianity and to
"educate" them in the "civilized" ways of the dominant soci-
ety,2' and requiring that tribal government actions be
approved by the Secretary.' The overreaching and domination
320. See Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, §§ 1-4, 24 Stat. 388, 388-89
(1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334 (1994)).
321. See Dussias, supra note 163, at 774-75.
322. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 125-29; see also 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1994).
323. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 134.
324. 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). This section is derived from Act of July 9, 1832, ch. 174,
§ 1, 4 Stat. 564, 564 (providing for the appointment of a commissioner of Indian af-
fairs).
325. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at
117 (noting that the section of the original 1832 Act codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 "is
still invoked as a basis for the administrative authority of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs").
326. Clinton, supra note 24, at 125.
327. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.100-11.450 (1998) (enacting regulations for Court of In-
dian Offenses). See generally WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 154-68
(1966).
328. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.100-11.209 (1998). See generally HAGAN, supra note 327,
at 104-25.
329. See Dussias, supra note 163, at 783-88.
330. There is no specific federal statutory or case law requiring tribal laws to be
approved by the federal government, although such is the case as a matter of tribal
law for Indian nations adopting BIA-drafted constitutions under the IRA. See Kerr-
McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 US. 195, 198-99 (1985). In certain specific areas,
however, federal approval of tribal action is required. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 81 (tribal
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of the BIA is well-documented.13 ' As long as the federal gov-
ernment, through the BIA, continues to provide direct services
and manage tribal affairs as it sees fit, basic human rights of
Indigenous self-determination will continue to be denied.
3 2
5. Denial of Territorial-Based Conceptions of Tribal
Authority-In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
colonial treaties implicitly accepted the territorial integrity of
the Indian nations by treating them as sovereign nations.33 In
significant part, this was necessary because the Indian
nations, during most of this period, were a formidable military
power."4 Nonetheless, even when the balance of military power
changed, the United States still acknowledged the territorial
component of tribal sovereignty3 5 Since the early nineteenth
century, however, there has been an increasing tendency
within federal Indian control law to view tribal power as
limited to tribal membership and by the consent of outsiders
rather than acknowledging tribal sovereignty over territory s 6
Examples of this development include the allotment and sale
of Indian lands to non-Indians, 7 the refusal to recognize the
criminal jurisdiction of Indian nations over non-Indians338 and
non-member Indians,3 9  the refusal to recognize civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-Indians,' 0 and the ability of
states to tax non-Indians who do business within the Indian
contracts), 82a (attorney contracts), 177 (land sales and leases), 196, 197, 406, 407,
407d (timber sales), 396-396g, 398-401 (surface and mineral leases), 476-478 (tribal
constitutions and by-laws), 503-505 (Oklahoma tribal constitutions and by-laws)
(1994).
331. See SPECIAL COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN
AFFAIRS, FINAL REPORT AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, S. REP. NO. 101-216, at
49-56 (1989).
332. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 136.
333. See KICKINGBIRD ET AL., supra note 125, at 9-10 (noting that the Europeans
initially dealt with the Indians as sovereign nations); discussion supra Part II.A.1.
334. See KICKINGBIRD ET AL., supra note 125, at 9-10; discussion supra Part II.A.1.
335. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 US. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-61 (1832).
336. See L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millen-
nium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809,837-38 (1996).
337. See Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 422-23 (1989) (holding
that Indian lands alienated under the General Allotment Act were not restored by the
Indian Reorganization Act).
338. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
339. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684-85 (1990). But see Act of Oct. 28, 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301) (legislatively reversing
Duro by recognizing power of tribal governments to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
non-member Indians).
340. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1410 (1997).
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territory located within their borders.3" Federal Indian control
law that allows encroachments by the states and non-members
into internal tribal affairs interferes with the inherent right of
self-determination.3
2
C. Colonization Has Partially Succeeded in
Destroying the Indian Nations
After 500 years of colonization of what Haudenosaunee peo-
ple believe to be a great turtle island,'3 even a casual observer
can see that the process has been at least partially successful.
Originally an undeveloped land inhabited only by Indigenous
peoples, what is now known as the American continent has
been almost completely transformed by its immigrant popula-
tion. Given the extent to which peoples from all over the world
have imported their way of life to this continent, it is not sur-
prising that American colonization has been partially
successful in destroying the Indian nations.3u
I do not mean to suggest that Indigenous people would not
have changed in the absence of colonization. Inevitably, any
society that does not evolve naturally by adapting to change
will be unable to sustain itself and will run the risk of extinc-
tion. Indigenous societies, of course, are subject to these same
fundamental rules, and even had there not been colonization of
our lands, there likely would have been some form of change in
our way of life.
Nonetheless, this otherwise natural process was dramati-
cally altered by colonization. These colonizing efforts were
accomplished by force and often with great speed, producing
dramatic changes within Indigenous societies and interfering
with the natural process of adaptation and change.34' This dis-
ruption has had a genocidal effect;34 6 groups of Indigenous
341. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186-87 (1989);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
162 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reserva-
tion, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976).
342. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 142.
343. See ARTHUR C. PARKER, SENECA MYrHS AND FOLK TALEs 62 (Buffalo Histori-
cal Soc'y Publication No. 27, 1923).
344. See infra notes 361-69 and accompanying text.
345. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1-7.
346. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 78.
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peoples that existed 500 yeari ago no longer exist.147 There
should be no doubt that their extinction was not an accident-
it was the product of a concerted effort to subjugate and elimi-
nate the native human population in order to allow for the
pursuit of wealth and manifest destiny.348 As a result, extinction
is the most dramatic effect of colonization. Allowed to run its
full course, colonization will disrupt and destroy the natural
evolutionary process of the people being colonized to the point
of extinction.
While it is difficult to measure precisely the success of the
colonization process,"5 I believe that American colonization,
while an incomplete process, has fundamentally been success-
ful. My concern is that, eventually, all of the remaining Indian
nations may lose their desire for and ability to achieve self-
determination. Indeed, I believe that this problem is so signifi-
cant and irreversible that the extinction of some Indian
nations is simply a matter of time.35 °
This conclusion might seem provocative, but to suggest that
the Indian nations are threatened with extinction is not a new
idea. Scholars, federal officials, and Indians themselves have
decried the inevitable destruction of the Indian nations from
the time of first contact with the White Man.35' I agree with
this conclusion primarily because extinction seems the inevi-
table outgrowth both of the federal government's concerted
actions to destroy the Indian nations, and of the naturally
caustic effect of American culture and society on cultural and
347. See NAGEL, supra note 220, at 4.
348. See discussion supra Part II.A.3, 5, 7.
349. Measuring the cumulative destructive effect of colonization on a still surviv-
ing people may be impossible. The precise degree to which colonization affects the
natural evolutionary process of a people, to the extent such an answer could be found,
may be measured only by an empirical analysis that cannot be conducted against any
objective standard. Nonetheless, I believe that parameters can be drawn around the
inquiry and general trends about its effect can be deduced by observing a variety of
phenomena. Thus, as the question relates to the effect of federal colonization policies
on the Indian nations, I believe that it is possible to approach the inquiry with some
confidence.
350. I note that this type of inquiry and analysis is fraught with the possibility
that those who seek to continue the colonization of the Indian nations may be fueled
by this declaration of their partial success. Nonetheless, the degree to which coloniza-
tion has had an effect to date, in my view, is so obvious that it is ridiculous not to call
it what it is. In so doing, my intention is to raise the possibility that Indian nations
that are concerned about extinction will more clearly realize their predicament and
will initiate remedial action without further delay.
351. See 1 ALEXiS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 354-55 (Phillips
Bradley ed., 1945) (1835); see also BRIAN W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE
ATTITUDES AND U.S. INDIAN POLICY 1-11 (1982).
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social difference. While there is a tremendous resiliency of In-
dian people,352 the forces of American acculturation are
overwhelming and make this conclusion for many Indian na-
tions even more probable.
Intuitively, one might logically conclude that many Indian
nations are bound for extinction, given the very real effects of
colonization on a colonized people. Forcing Indigenous people
to convert to the colonizing nations' religion,353 taking Indige-
nous common lands 35 and imposing the colonizing nation's
form of individual land ownership,355 and transforming Indige-
nous government and law into a form similar to those of the
colonizing nations 356 simply must have some effect over time. If
one wishes to assume that these and similar actions taken by
American colonists from the time of first contact have had no
meaningful effect on the identity and way of life of native peo-
ple and pose no threat to their future existence, then
colonization obviously has been a meaningless endeavor and
there is no legitimate reason to complain about the current
state of the Indian nations, United States-Indian relations, or
federal Indian control law and policy
357
As I see it, the complete destruction of the Indian nations
will occur when the Indian people who comprise those nations
have become indistinguishable from the rest of American soci-
ety. Viewed this way, when all of the people comprising an
Indian nation have become so assimilated into the dominant
society as to be indistinguishable from the society at large,
then they will have, by definition, become members of the
colonizing society. Regardless of whether Indian people them-
352. Cf Clinton, supra note 24, at 122-23 (asserting that "the Indian sense of
peoplehood and sovereignty arises from within the community and cannot be easily
extinguished" and that "Indian resistance ... to ... federal colonialist practices
tend[s] to strengthen, rather than diminish, Indian peoplehood and their own sense of
political autonomy").
353. See supra Parts L.A, IIA.3-5.
354. See supra Part II.A.2-3, 5.
355. See supra Part II.A.5, 7.
356. See supra Part II.A.5-7.
357. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this conceptualization is the fact that
most of the combatants in the modern Indian war-the tribal leadership and the fed-
eral, state, local, and private interests against which they battle-seem to have so
little conception of the effect that colonization has had on the Indian nations to date.
This short-sightedness makes it especially difficult to effectuate any long-term change
in behavior. See generally Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through
Government Reform: What Are the Issues?, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 72 (1997)
[hereinafter Porter, Issues] (arguing that much of the conflict and dysfunction occur-
ring in Indigenous societies is the result of governmental disruption induced by
colonization).
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selves perceive this transformation, their assimilation is surely
relevant to an American society called upon to make a policy
decision concerning whom to recognize as members of separate
sovereign nations. It is hard to defend the position that a people
who are no longer distinct from American society should none-
theless be afforded recognition as such. This is especially true
when this recognition may translate into a sovereign status
that denies the application of the laws of the recognizing
people. If there is absolutely no way to distinguish a group of
so-called Indigenous people from a group not claiming to be
Indigenous, on what basis does one deny that the same social
contract should apply? It is wholly illegitimate to deny equal
treatment on the sole basis that one's ancestors, but not one-
self, at some time in the past had a distinct Indigenous
existence.
Colonization has had a dramatic effect on Indian nations
solely by virtue of the many generations of Indian people who
have been forced to abandon their tribal way of life and who
have otherwise assimilated into the cultural and social fabric
of the United States.358 While there is some evidence that the
number of people in the United States self-identifying as
"Indian" has increased, " this may simply be the result of a
broadening of the definition of Indian to include people of In-
dian ancestry who are not tribal members, i.e., who are
"Native American." Indeed, this phenomenon may be further
evidence of a breakdown of Indian identity where ethnicity
and race, and not political and cultural affiliation, have be-
come the defining criteria. 360
358. See supra Part II.A.7; infra text accompanying notes 361-369.
359. See NAGEL, supra note 220, at 83-105 (on American Indian population
growth). Compare BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF
POPULATION: 1950 at vol. II, pt. 1, tbl. 36 (1953) (listing the number of self-identifying
American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons at 343,410), with BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960 at vol. I, pt. 1, tbl. 56 (1961)
(listing the number of self-identifying American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons at
529,591), and BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF
POPULATION at vol. I, pt. 1, tbl. 190 (1973) (listing the number of self-identifying
American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons at 760,572), and BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEPt OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION at vol. I, ch. C, pt. 1, tbl. 7A
(1983) (listing the number of self-identifying American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut per-
sons at 1,478,523), and BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990
CENSUS OF POPULATION 3 (1992) (listing the number of self-identifying American In-
dian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons at 1,959,234).
360. See Deloria, Evolution, supra note 118, at 255. Deloria states:
Subsequent events have demonstrated that both Indian successes and failures
have been connected to the Indian status as an identifiable racial minority
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While there can be some debate as to whether natural proc-
esses of development or colonization are responsible for this
state of affairs, I suggest that the following questions further
lead to the conclusion that the colonization policies of the
United States have had their intended effect:
" What does it mean that the Indian nations no
longer have exclusive control over their own
people and territories?""
* What does it mean that most Indian nations no
longer formally govern themselves in a tradi-
tional manner and have written constitutional
forms of government modeled after that of the
United States?
362
What does it mean that most Indian nations no
longer rely upon traditional dispute resolution
and now resolve disputes through court systems
modeled after the American legal system?
3 3
" What does it mean that many Indian nations no
longer use a traditional economic system and
are increasingly reliant upon capitalist enter-
prises as their primary economic system?6'
* What does it mean that most Indians speak
English instead of their own tribal language,
and that most Indian nations no longer teach
their own language to their children?3
within American society, not to the status of Indian tribes as domestic depend-
ent nations.... [Tihe practical fact appears to be that Indians have forsaken
their traditional special status for that of a needy minority...
Id.
361. See supra Part III.B.
362. See Porter, Issues, supra note 357, at 94-96.
363. See Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemak-
ing: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 235, 238 (1997) [hereinafter Porter, Indigenous Societies].
364. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 15, at 24-26. See generally STEPHEN CORNELL
& JOSEPH P. KALT, PATHWAYS FROM POVERTY: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND IN-
STITION-BUILDING ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS (Harv. Project on American
Indian Economic Development, 1989).
365. See JAMES S. OLSON & RAYMOND WILSON, NATIVE AMERICANS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 210 (1984) ("English continues to gain ground as the primary
language of most Native Americans. Indeed, in 1978, 65 percent of Native Americans
spoke English as their primary language."); Ives Goddard, Introduction to Languages,
17 HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 1, 3 ([N]early 80 percent of the extant native lan-
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* What does it mean that there is widespread in-
termarriage between Indians and non-Indians?""
* What does it mean that all Indians are recog-
nized as citizens of the United States367 and that
many Indians do not even think of themselves as
citizens of their own tribal nations?
368
" What does it mean that many people who think
of themselves as "Native Americans" are not tri-
bally affiliated?
39
* What does it mean that some Indian nations
may choose to exercise their sovereignty to rec-
reate for themselves a way of life that is
indistinguishable from American society?
I don't mean to suggest that there are not some Indian na-
tions that are trying to reverse the effects of colonization and
to revitalize their unique sovereign existence by redeveloping
their language, culture, government, laws, economies, and so
on. 370 My point is that by envisioning the chasm that exists be-
tween modern Indigenous existence and the point from
whence we started, it is hard to ignore the degree to which we
have all been assimilated to some degree, or to ignore the im-
pact that this assimilation might have on our desire and
ability to self-determine in the future.
Regardless of how one evaluates the degree to which the In-
dian people have been colonized and assimilated into
guages of North America were no longer spoken by children and were facing effective
extinction within a single lifetime, or in most cases, much sooner").
366. See NAGEL, supra note 220, at 114.
367. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
368. See NAGEL, supra note 220, at 202 (discussing Pan-Indian culture and the
blurring of tribal distinctions among some Indians).
369. See NAGEL, supra note 220, at 246-47.
370. In fact numerous Indian nations have initiated efforts to revitalize tribal cul-
tures, languages, and economies. See generally, e.g., NAGEL, supra note 220; Bruce L.
Smith & M.L. Cornette, Electronic Smoke Signals: Native American Radio in the
United States, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., July 31, 1998, at 28, available in 1998 WL
11300543; Cherokee Cultural Center Preserving Past for Future Generations,
CHEROKEE ADVOC., Jan. 31, 1996, at 20, available in 1996 WL 15749517; Trace A.
DeMeyer, First Nations Sustainable Enterprises: Integrating Native Tradition with
Emerging Technologies, NEWS FROM INDIAN COUNTRY, Feb. 15, 1998, at 12A, available
in 1998 WL 11438049; Dale Lezon, Where Past and Future Coexist, ALBUQUERQUE J.,
Jan. 10, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 11562232; Ronnie Lupe, Chairman's Corner:
Our Casino and All Our Enterprises Pour Money into Our Region, State, and Nation,
FORT APACHE SCOUT, Oct. 13, 1995, at 2, available in 1995 WL 15333105; SKC Pro-
gram Immerses Students into Indian Culture, CHAR-KOOSTA NEWS, Aug. 29, 1997, at
5, available in 1997 WL 11664459.
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American society, the fact that assimilation and colonization
are still occurring at all is strong evidence that the Indian na-
tions may be less able than they once were, or may even be
unwilling, to sustain a distinct existence. While it is surely the
case that some incorporation of the dominant society's culture
and identity may be both natural and necessary, colonization
may induce some Indigenous people to take this process to the
extreme. If one can imagine an Indian nation that seeks to ex-
ercise its sovereignty solely for the purpose of replicating itself
in the image of the dominant society, then it is possible to see
that colonization has achieved the ultimate success-the self-
colonization of the colonized people.37'
When Indian nations make conscious choices to pay the
colonizing nation's taxes, live by its laws, and actively seek to
replicate its way of life, there is little distinct tribal existence
left around which to wrap the cloak of tribal sovereignty. Sov-
ereignty can include the choice to recreate yourself in the
image of the colonizing society; but once that point is achieved,
I do not believe that there remains any legitimate basis upon
which to distinguish yourself as a separate sovereign nation.
371. For example, assume an Indian nation, while holding its land in common, has
nonetheless decided to establish a system of private land ownership under tribal law.
It has a capitalist economy in which the tribal government has so successfully devel-
oped business ventures by marketing its sovereignty-based, federally-supported
regulatory advantages that it distributes thousands of dollars to its members every
month. Its members are quite well-off, but the tribal language has totally died out,
and most of the members belong to some kind of Christian church. Imagine further
that the federal government seeks to impose taxes on the Indian nation because it has
been so financially successful and threatens to strip its recognition of the lucrative
regulatory advantages if the taxes are not paid. If the Indian nation is unable to
thwart this effort, does it really seem likely that these people will say no to the taxes
if it means jeopardizing their standard of living? One need only see the number of
Indian nations currently paying the federal and state "regulatory fees," local govern-
ment "payments in lieu of taxes," and outright cash payments to the states for the
opportunity to engage in Class II and Class III gaming activities to see that this is not
an unlikely possibility. See generally, e.g., Scott Dyer, Tax on Indian Casinos Consid-
ered, BATON ROUGE ADvoc., Apr. 21, 1998, at 10A, available in 1998 WL 4896099;
Indian Leaders Tell Babbitt That Gaming Compacts Are Flawed, OJIBWE NEWS, June
6, 1997, at 2, available in 1997 WL 11719591; Oneida Agree to Pay State $5 Million
Yearly in Casino Deal, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), May 8, 1998, at 3A, available in
1998 WL 5870417; Amy Rinard & Gary Spivak, Tax Winnings at Casinos, Senator
Says: Welch Suggests Way to Cut Enthusiasm if Tribal Compact Talks Fail, MIL-
WAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 2, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 12761440; Rick Romell,
Oneida Compact Gives State More Power: Money Deal Grants Electronic Monitoring of
Slots: Thompson Calls it Model, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 9, 1998, at 1, available
in 1998 WL 6323328; Gary Spivak, Oneida Seek Gaming Pact Delay: Some Question
State's Negotiating Tactics, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 4, 199, at 1, available in
1998 WL 14018716.
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Whether Indian people want to hear it or not, our flirtation
with American society and culture is more akin to a moth be-
ing drawn to the fire than to a thirsty man being drawn to an
oasis. America is like a cultural Pandora's Box; it is the nature
of American culture both to destroy and to accommodate cul-
tural differences. In some respects, this unique character
makes it hard to define what an "American" is, simply because
America is an immigrant nation filled with pockets of wildly
divergent racial, ethnic, and social groups. It is the ability of
American society-its political, economic, social, and legal in-
stitutions-to find ways to harmonize and assimilate these
divergent backgrounds that is one of its most defining charac-
teristics as a nation. Because Americans are quite used to
differences among the population, many provisions exist
within American law to respect those differences.372 The prob-
lem for a totally assimilated Indian nation, however, is that
the claim for sovereign recognition may ring quite hollow in a
society where powerfully distinct cultural and religious groups
all find ways to exist in America without being recognized as
sovereign nations.
If the United States truly values the existence of distinct
Indigenous societies within its borders, it should remove the
colonizing foundation of its Indian law. Only the Indian na-
tions themselves can choose to retain a distinct existence.
Eliminating the colonizing influence of federal Indian control
law may allow many Indian nations the gasp of fresh air nec-
essary to make it to the next stage of their distinct, sovereign
existence by themselves. Indian people are especially hardy;
given the hundreds of years of effort to wipe us out,3 73 it is
nothing short of amazing that Indian nations still exist. While
time, and the effects of time, cannot be reversed, the United
States can take immediate steps to assist the Indian nations
in their continued quest for survival by decolonizing its federal
Indian control law.
372. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 524, 547 (1993) (voiding, on First Amendment free-exercise grounds, city ordi-
nances prohibiting animal sacrifice), superseded by Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 505; 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1988, 2000bb, 2000bb-1 to -4 (1994)), held unconstitutional by City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US. 205, 224 (1972) ("A
way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of oth-
ers is not to be condemned because it is different.").
373. See supra Part II.A.1-5, 7.
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D. Decolonization Is a More Efficient Use
of Federal Financial Resources
It is extremely expensive and inefficient for the Indian na-
tions to remain dependent upon the United States. Over the
course of its history, the federal government has spent untold
billions of dollars seeking to colonize the Indian nations and to
manage and control what has remained of their otherwise self-
governing existence.374 As a result, what has occurred is the
establishment of an inefficient and ineffective federal bureauc-
racy and the crippling of the self-governing capacity of the
Indian nations. 5 In short, colonization has been an expensive
proposition from the viewpoints of both the federal govern-
ment and the Indian nations.
While decolonizing the federal-tribal relationship may result
in lowering the finances required to manage Indian affairs, it
does not necessarily mean, however, that federal spending on
Indian programs should decrease. A decolonized relationship
does not mean that there will be no relationship at all. The
United States remains committed by treaty and legal obliga-
tions-which have certainly not been fully funded to date-to
make provisions for the Indian nations and to protect them
from external threats376 regardless of whether it adopts a colo-
nizing or decolonizing policy for dealing with them.77 Indeed,
President Nixon, in announcing his Self-Determination Policy,
stated: "There is no reason why Indian communities should be
deprived of the privilege of self-determination merely because
they receive monetary support from the Federal government.
Nor should they lose Federal money because they reject Fed-
eral control."7 ' The only question that remains, then, is
whether or not the federal government will expend these re-
sources efficiently.
The new Self-Governance Policy was driven, in part, by the
desire to achieve more cost effective administration of monies
374. See, e.g., FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO AS-
SIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880-1920 app. 2 (1984) (listing Congressional Proportions for
Indian Schools from 1877-1920).
375. See SPECIAL COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN
AFFAIRS, FINAL REPORT AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, S. REP. NO. 101-216, at
45-56, 60-61 (1989).
376. See Nixon Message to Congress, supra note 232, at 565-66.
377. See infra note 376 and accompanying text.
378. Nixon Message to Congress, supra note 232, at 567.
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spent on behalf of the Indian nations.379 Unfortunately, the
temptation thus far in implementing this Policy has been for
the federal government to absorb any cost savings and not to
pass on to the Indian nations the financial benefits of disman-
tling the BIA's administrative structure. Considerable pressure
has been exerted by some in Congress to transfer these sav-
ings to general budget reduction.3 0 In Congress, Senator Slade
Gorton, Chair of the Interior Appropriations Subcommittee,
has exerted the same pressure. 81 So dramatic has this pres-
sure been that some tribal leaders have described this process
as "termination by appropriation."38 s
The tendency to ignore one of the weakest voices in the fed-
eral political process is inevitable. What must be realized,
however, is that the appropriations to the Indian nations'" are
not simply some kind of special interest "pork barrel" program.
These payments should be regarded as solemn legal obliga-
tions made by the United States. Simply because the Indian
nations no longer wish to be treated as a dependent people
does not mean that the United States should abandon its legal
and fiscal responsibilities to them.
Nonetheless, because dismantling the federal government's
bureaucracy will save money, promote efficiency, and stimulate
the self-sufficiency of the Indian nations, the United States
should complement its existing Self-Governance Policy by de-
colonizing federal Indian control law.
379. See SPECIAL COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN
AFFAIRS, FINAL REPORT AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, S. REP. No. 101-216, pt.
1, at 22-23; Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1268; cf BUREAU OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND ANNUAL PER-
FORMANCE PLAN: FY 1999, at 17 (n.d.) (noting that among the BIA's current goals is
the mission "[tlo reduce long-term costs ... through the use of modern, automated
techniques and processes for management in the arena of administration") (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
380. See The White House: Press Briefing by the Vice President and Secretary of
the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, M2 PRESSWIRE, Sept. 29, 1995, available in LEXIS, Market
Library, IACNWS File (arguing against a Congressional proposal to cut 18% or
$348,000,000 from the President's proposed budget request for the Bureau of Indian
Affairs).
381. See 141 CONG. REC. S11,861 (1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton); see also Re-
ports from the Budget War: Indians are Getting a Fair Shake, DENY. POST, Sept. 21,
1995, at B7, available in LEXIS, News Library, DPOST File.
382. Indians Take Case to Washington: Tribes Feel Benefits Being Eroded During
Government Cutbacks, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 14, 1996, at 6A, available in LEXIS,
News Library, RMTNEW File.
383. See, e.g., Snyder Act, 25 US.C. § 13 (1998).
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IV. RECENT REFORM EFFORTS AND WHY THEY FAIL
TO ENSURE THE SURVIVAL OF THE INDIAN NATIONS
Since the early 1970s, the United States has sought to aban-
don its colonial legacy in Indian affairs by actively supporting
tribal self-determination through the Self-Determination Pol-
icy'" and the Self-Governance Policy.85 Despite their stated
purposes, however, these federal Indian policies will unlikely
achieve their objectives because they fail to address the colo-
nial foundation upon which they rest.
A. The Self-Determination Policy
1. Description-The Self-Determination Policy has gener-
ally been acknowledged as initiated by President Richard
Nixon in his 1970 address on Indian affairs.86 President
Nixon's policy initiative was timely and enlightened from the
perspective of both the United States and the Indian na-
tions.387 In refocusing the federal government's Indian policy
toward supporting tribal self-determination, he repudiated the
most colonizing federal Indian policy of all-Termination. 38 At
the same time, he correctly perceived that the expansion of the
federal government's bureaucracy and increased spending on
Indian programs under the "Great Society" initiatives, while
better than previous affirmative efforts to destroy the Indian
nations,389 would ultimately serve only as another form of sup-
pressing genuine Indian self-governance by imposing a new
layer of federal bureaucratic management and oversight.9 0
The legislation following this policy statement was the In-
dian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
384. See supra Part II.A.8; infra Part IV.A.1.
385. See infra Part IV.B.
386. See Nixon Message to Congress, supra note 232, at 564; GROSS, supra note
116, at 34.
387. See GROSS, supra note 116, at 34-38; Stuart, supra note 204, at 94 ("The In-
dian Self-Determination Act represented a significant conceptual advance in Indian
self-government.").
388. See Nixon Message to Congress, supra note 232, at 565-67; GROSS, supra
note 116, at 35.
389. See discussion supra Part II.A.2-3,5,7.
390. See infra notes 404-08 and accompanying text.
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1975."9' While the concept underlying this legislation now
seems uncontroversial, it was a profound shift in direction,
given that the prior federal Indian policy was Termination. It
seems that no one had actually considered that the Indian na-
tions could handle money and administer programs without
the intervention of federal bureaucrats. Ultimately, the Self-
Determination Act allowed for the Indian nations to assume,
under the terms of a negotiated funding contract with the
federal government, a share of the administrative responsibili-
ties and resources otherwise assumed by the BIA.3
One of the more distinctive features of the Act was that the
federal trust responsibility was explicitly preserved.93 The
program worked by having BIA administrators establish pro-
gram funding priorities for contract allocations which were
based on prioritized lists provided by the tribes themselves.3 '
Thus, while the Act anticipated that the Indian nations were
to assume more responsibility over the administration of the
federal programs that affected them, the fact that the BIA ul-
timately determined which contracts received funding ensured
that the Indian nations would continue to perform the policies
and the responsibilities of the federal government.
Despite this limitation, the Self-Determination Policy was a
significant achievement. It "implicitly recognized the right of
Indian self-determination" and actually "began the process of
capacity rebuilding among [tribal] governments."39 It was the
first time in the forty years since the Indian Reorganization
Act had been adopted that the federal government had pro-
fessed its support for the existence and self-determination of
the Indian nations.3
2. Why the Self-Determination Policy Ultimately Does Not
Work-At the time the Self-Determination Act was passed, the
federal government, primarily through the BIA, remained as
deeply entrenched in the administration and management of
391. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638,
§§ 1-209, 88 Stat. 2203, 2203-17 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458
(1994)) [hereinafter, Self-Determination Act].
392. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1262-66.
393. The Act was intended "to articulate a policy of Indian control and self-
determination consistent with the maintenance of the Federal trust responsibility and
the unique Federal-Indian relationship." H.R. REP. No. 93-1600, at 20 (1974), re-
printed in 1974 US.C.C.A.N. 7775, 7781.
394. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1263.
395. Id. at 1263-64.
396. See discussion supra Parts II.A.6-8.
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day-to-day Indian affairs as it had been for almost 200 years.39,
Policymakers greatly underestimated how difficult it would be
to extricate the BIA from the lives of Indian people. 98
Once the Self-Determination Act was passed, the BIA began
a struggle for its survival and thwarted the effort toward
genuine tribal self-determination.""2 "It" did not like, and still
does not like, the idea that Indian people can take care of
themselves and that they as nations have a sovereign right to
do so."' Having been established upon just the opposite
premise-that it is the federal government's exclusive
prerogative and responsibility to manage Indian affairs-the
BIA resisted the implementation of the Self-Determination Act
and the contracting of funds and programs to the Indian
nations.401 Implementation of the Act was hampered by a large
bureaucracy that had no incentive or desire to facilitate
success when faced with the prospect of losing jobs and
power.
4°2
The Self-Determination Act had other inherent problems as
well. The 638 contracting process, named after Public Law 93-
638,403 "imposed a byzantine bureaucratic burden on contracting
tribes" that was exacerbated by "BIA micromanagement." °'
Much of this bureaucratic burden was due to the fact that the
Indian nations were, in a very real sense, carrying out the ad-
ministrative responsibilities of the federal government.
Accordingly, the 638 contracts required that Indian nations
comply with a multitude of federal laws and regulations, 415 as
well as with the administrative oversight of the BIA at three
different levels (agency, area, and central).4' ° This necessitated
397. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1600, at 19-20, reprinted in 1974 US.C.C.A.N. 7775,
7781.
398. See infra notes 400-02 and accompanying text.
399. See infra notes 400-02 and accompanying text.
400. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1600, at 19-20, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7775,
7780-81.
401. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1265 n.61.
402. See Robert A. Nelson & Joseph F. Shelley, Bureau of Indian Affairs Influence
on Indian Self-determination in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY, supra note 92, at 177. See generally H.R. REP. No. 93-1600 (1974).
403. See 25 U.S.C. § 450f (1994).
404. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1265; see also Clinton, supra note 24,
at 136; Nelson & Shelley, supra note 402, at 182 ("[The BIA has retained its powerful
position through increased bureaucratization, a tactic relatively unnecessary prior to
Public Law 93-638.").
405. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450j(a)-(m), 450j-1 (1994).
406. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1265. Some of these administra-
tive difficulties were alleviated through legislative amendments enacted in 1994. See
Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat.
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the establishment of commensurately well-developed tribal bu-
reaucracies.4"7 As a result of this complex bureaucratic
interconnectedness, the Self-Determination Act actually made
the Indian tribes more dependent on the federal government. 408
The preservation of the fully intact federal trust responsi-
bility also undermined tribal self-determination. Despite being
premised on the eventual self-determination of the Indian na-
tions, the Self-Determination Act explicitly preserved the
federal government's trust responsibility, including continued
responsibility over those governing activities that would no
longer be directly in the hands of the federal government.'°9
Structured this way, the Self-Determination Act established a
kind of legal relationship in which one party, the Indian na-
tion, was serving both as the trustee and beneficiary with
respect to certain tribal governmental activities.
Aside from being a legal anomaly, this construction simply
did not make much sense. The Indian nation, which was pre-
sumably in control of its own affairs, nonetheless was made to
comply with a wide variety of legal and administrative bur-
dens that were only relevant because the federal government
was the trustee. For example, the administrative reporting and
paperwork requirements required federal oversight to ensure
that the Indian nation was properly spending the federal gov-
ernment's money.410 This construct overlooked the fact that the
money, in essence, "belonged" to the Indian nation and, if self-
determination was to have any true meaning, the funds should
have been administered as the Indian nation saw fit.
These policy shortcomings have been critically analyzed by
George Esber, who has concluded that the ultimate objectives
of the Self-Determination Act were "not designed to guarantee
Indian self-determination.""' Esber highlights the fact that the
Act never addressed the issue of power transfer to the tribes, a
key determinant of any policy designed to effectuate genuine
4250, 4250-78. Nonetheless, the 638 contracting process under the Self-Determination
Act remains "cumbersome." See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1266.
407. See Stuart, supra note 204, at 103.
408. See Donald D. Stull, Reservation Economic Development in the Era of Self-
Determination, 92 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 206, 206 (1990). See generally Nelson &
Shelley, supra note 402.
409. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1600, at 20 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7775,
7781.
410. See 25 U.S.C. § 450c (1994).
411. George S. Esber, Jr., Shortcomings of the Indian Self-Determination Policy, in
STATE AND RESERVATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 212, 213
(George Pierce Castile & Robert L. Bee eds., 1992).
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self-determination.412 Instead, he observes that the Act simply
anticipated the "orderly transition from federal domination of
programs... and services [for] Indians to effective and
meaningful participation by the Indian people in the planning,
conduct and administration of those programs and services.,413
Without any serious relinquishment of federal power, any
"'meaningful participation' [of the tribes in providing these
programs and services] is not control but at best a limited
exercise of power, which must be translated as 'relative pow-
erlessness' given the legal definition of the federal-Indian
relationship."4 4
Viewed together, this powerlessness and the continued de-
pendency of the tribes on federal administration ensures that
the Self-Determination Policy, in the long run, only perpetu-
ates America's colonial legacy. This can be seen in several
different ways. First, under this Policy the federal government,
not the tribes, determines which policies and programs are to
be funded.4 5 Second, any contracted activity that involves fed-
eral trust resources-such as timber, fish, or water-requires
412. See id.
413. Id. (quoting Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-638, § 2, 88 Stat. 2203, 2204 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450a
(1994))).
414. Id. Esber explains that the Self-Determination Act was structurally flawed:
The genesis of Public Law 93-638, like all other federal Indian policies, was a
top-down decision from the legislative and executive branches of the govern-
ment. Like other federal policies, the self-determination legislation provides no
guarantee to Indian peoples about the shape that any future policy might take,
when it might be legislated, or to what extent Indian communities might par-
ticipate in its formulation. Indian peoples have never had control over the
policies that affect them, nor can they expect to, given the asymmetrical rela-
tionship that has been defined by the federal government.
Id. at 214.
415. Federal control is furthered as the result of the BIAs administrative self-
interest and manipulation:
The [Indian Priority System] required each tribe to prioritize its projects or
programs to the BIA. Typically, after some budgetary gamesmanship, the
Agency would claim funds to tribes were therefore allocated based on the pri-
orities established by the tribes themselves.
Of course, from the tribes' perspective, this system was rigged. It allowed the
Agency to convey the impression that many tribal programs were of a very
"low" priority. This supplied the bureaucratic justification to cut back programs,
when in reality these programs were highly necessary.
Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1263.
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BIA concurrence in decision-making.41 Finally, the 638 con-
tracts require that the contracting Indian nation comply with
a whole panoply of federal social policies, reflected by provi-
sions in the contracts requiring compliance with various
American civil rights, employment, and labor laws.417 These
activities all undermine tribal self-determination and per-
petuate federal power and hegemony over Indian affairs.
418
Thus, Esber concludes, the Self-Determination Policy ulti-
mately fails for the following reason:
For the government to accept the idea of a perpetual debt
to peoples of prior rights would be to undermine its sense
of power and control-something the United States is
unwilling to forfeit. In lieu of a policy that permits genu-
ine self-determination, the current policy, as it is
implemented through a variety of state and federal pro-
grams, has demanded a certain degree of assimilation
from Indian communities.419
Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings, the Self-
Determination Policy has moved Indian people closer to real
autonomy for the first time since America's founding.42 ° It has
allowed many tribes the first opportunity in generations to
have the financial resources to begin some kind of redevelop-
421ment. While the path that was laid down for them ultimately
416. See id. at 1265.
417. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 450e, 450f(a)(2), 450j(b), 450m (1994).
418. See Esber, supra note 411, at 215 ("In essence, the United States is agreeing
to legal compliance with the self-determination policy by granting Indian participa-
tion in Anglo activities. This is not equivalent to the governance of Indian affairs as
Indian undertakings.").
419. Id.; see also Stuart, supra note 204, at 83 ("It seems likely that current and
proposed federal policy will fall short of achieving the promise of full self-
determination for American Indians.").
420. Esber concludes:
There is no question that Native Americans are closer now to the ideal of self-
determination than at any other time since Anglo domination began. They are
represented by tribal councils that interface with dominant society on a gov-
ernment-to-government basis, by a variety of national organizations, and by
spokespeople whose voices are being heard, though often ignored. Certainly in
the expression of their need for and management of services, they have a much
greater voice than in the past.
Esber, supra note 411, at 221.
421. See, e.g., HIS Implementation of the Self-Governance Demonstration Project:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs of the US. Senate, 104th Cong. 10-11
(1995) (statement of Dale Risling, Chairman, Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe, Hoopa, Cali-
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was consistent with the federal government's long-term preoc-
cupation with its own self-interest, the Policy does not appear
to have been spawned with that intention. Rather, like the Re-
organization Policy from 1934,22 it appears to have been
developed by good-hearted people who simply were unable to
eliminate the residual underpinnings of America's colonial
legacy from their consciousness. In light of the Self-
Governance Policy that has recently been developed, the Self-
Determination Policy appears to be simply a transition period
from an era in which the United States was intent on de-
stroying the Indian nations to one in which it may be fully
willing to participate in a decolonized vision of what is best for
them-which is what they see fit.
B. The Self-Governance Policy
1. Description-Because of the problems with the Self-
Determination Act, the Indian nations "began viewing the 638
process as a behemoth in dire need of trimming."423 The reform
effort that followed eventually led to the implementation of the
Self-Governance Demonstration project in 1988.4
The Self-Governance Policy developed out of efforts by the
Department of Interior and the tribes themselves to amend
the Self-Determination Act.425 After a series of articles in the
Arizona Republic in October 1987 reported widespread mis-
management and waste within the BIA,426 the Interior
fornia) (describing how self-governance "played" a major role "in the development of
the Alternative Rural Community Hospital," which opened in 1996); Tribal Self-
Governance Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 3508/S. 1618 Before the Subcomm. on Na-
tive Am. Affairs of the Comm. on Natural Resources, 103d Cong. 88-91 (1994)
(statement of Christine Collison, duly-elected President of the Ketchikan Indian Corp.
(KIC)). Collison asserts that self-governance "allows Tribes to address issues that
arise at the local level," including, for KIC, education. Id. at 89.
422. See Hauptman, supra note 197, at 133 (discussing how Commissioner John
Collier's "good intentions [in orchestrating the IRA] ... were undermined by his pa-
ternalistic attitude toward Indians, by his naive and often romantic perceptions of
modern Indian life, ... and even by his general lack of understanding of Native
American cultures and diversity").
423. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1266.
424. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, Title III, 102 Stat. 2285, 2296-98; GETCHES ET AL., supra
note 15, at 257-58.
425. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1266-69; Stuart, supra note 204
at 96-97.
426. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1267.
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department proposed that in lieu of 638 contract funding, In-
dian nations should simply receive federal funds to manage
themselves.427 For Indian nations receiving such benefits, Inte-
rior proposed that the federal government be relieved of its
trust responsibility.
428
Indian nations rejected the Interior proposal, and proposed
that an additional title, authorizing the "Tribal Self-
Governance Demonstration Project" be added to Public Law
93-638.429 The primary distinction between this proposal and
the Interior proposal was that the federal government's trust
responsibility would be maintained and that the Indian na-
tions not participating in the Self-Governance Project would
remain eligible for federal services.4 0 Congress responded fa-
vorably and approved the Project under a new Title III of the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act.4 1
The Self-Governance Project was limited to 20 Indian na-
tions.4 2 To qualify for the Project, certain eligibility criteria
had to be satisfied: (1) an Indian nation had to complete a Self-
Governance planning grant; (2) the governing body of the In-
dian nation had to declare its interest in participating in the
Project; (3) the Indian nation had to perform two or more ma-
ture 638 contracts prior to participation in the Project; and (4)
the Indian nation "must have demonstrated sound fiscal man-
agement capabilities for three years prior to [participation in]
the Project."3 3
The Self-Governance Project directed the Secretary "to ne-
gotiate, and to enter into, an annual written funding
agreement with the governing body of a participating tribal
government."4 4 Under the Compacts, Indian nations were
authorized to "plan, conduct, consolidate, and administer pro-
grams, services, and functions" of the Department of the
Interior.435 Compact funding was to be allocated from existing
427. See id.
428. See id.; cf Stuart, supra note 204 at 96-97 (noting that in 1987, Ross Swim-
mer, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, proposed "separating" the
BIAs trust and service responsibilities).
429. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1267 n.71.
430. See S. REP. No. 103-205, at 2 (1993).
431. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, § 209, 102 Stat. 2285, 2296-98 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 450f (1994)).
432. See 25 U.S.C. § 302(a).
433. Id. § 302(a), 102 Stat. 2285, 2296; S. REP. No. 103-205, at 2.
434. 25 U.S.C. § 303(a), 102 Stat. 2285, 2296.
435. Id. § 303(a)(i), 102 Stat. 2285, 2296.
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BIA funds, particularly the agency, area, and central office ac-
counts.46 Allocation was to be made "on the basis of what the
tribe would have received in funds and services in the absence
of the agreement."4 7 Indian nations could decide for them-
selves the degree to which they might "redesign programs,
activities, functions or services and ... reallocate funds" for
such purposes.438 In sum, the Demonstration Project allowed
participating Indian nations
to receive funds in a large block grant from the Secretary
of the Interior[,] ... to move money among programs[,] as
well as [having] the power to actually prioritize spending,
as opposed to the shadow prioritizing process that charac-
terized the IPS ... [and, fundamentally,] to make choices
and be responsible for their choices.439
The Self-Governance Demonstration Project was well-
received in Indian country.440 This may have been due in sig-
nificant part to the explicit prohibition against the waiver,
modification, or diminishment of the federal government's
trust responsibility to the Indian nations and to individual In-
dians in the course of implementing the Project."1 The Indian
nations appreciated the negotiated and respectful manner in
which Congress was withdrawing the BIA from their daily af-
fairs."' While the project preserved the trust responsibility, it
allowed the Indian nations to develop governmental compe-
tence without fear of losing federal funding."3
Historically, despite their considerable misgivings about the
BIA, Indian nations may have been hesitant to call for its de-
mise because of the belief that its non-existence would eliminate
a bureaucratic presence in Washington for the funding and rep-
resentation of Indian interests.' Self-governance provided a
436. See S. REP. No. 103-205, at 2 (1993).
437. Id.
438. 25 U.S.C. § 303(a)(2), 102 Stat. 2285, 2297. Certain funds, including funds
available for tribal community colleges, were restricted from reallocation. See
§ 303(a)(3). Moreover, Indian nations could only reallocate funds to programs that had
been previously authorized by Congress, although they could reallocate funds from
one funded program to another, see S. REP. No. 103-205, at 2, and participate in new
contract programs. See § 303(b)(1).
439. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1268.
440. See id.
441. 25 U.S.C. § 303(a)(7), 102 Stat. 2285, 2296.
442. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1268.
443. See id.
444. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 136-37.
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mechanism in which the Indian nations could shed the BIAs
limiting influence, while maintaining the protective aspects of
the federal trust responsibility. From the perspective of the
Indian nations, this was the best of both worlds.
In 1991, Congress extended the Self-Governance Project for
three additional years."5 The legislation also extended the
maximum number of participants from twenty to thirty Indian
nations."6 Finally, the legislation provided for a feasibility
study to determine whether the Self-Governance Project could
be extended to the Indian Health Service."7 After determining
that the extension was feasible, Self-Governance was extended
to the IHS in 1992.'
By 1993, Congress recognized that the Project was a success
and entertained recommendations that it be established as
federal law and policy on a permanent basis." 9 The following
year, Congress wrote "[a] new chapter in Federal-Indian rela-
tions"'50 when it enacted the Tribal Self-Governance Act of
1994.45' The language used in support of the law was une-
quivocal:
The [Senate Indian Affairs] Committee strongly supports
the concept of Tribal Self-Governance.... Self-
Governance reflects the unique relationship between the
United States Government and the individual Indian
Tribes. Self-Governance recognizes that Tribes are gov-
ernments with the inherent rights to govern themselves.
The Tribal Self-Governance Project was designed to re-
duce Federal control over decision-making, and to
enhance fiscal control, resource allocations, and manage-
ment at the tribal level. 2
445. See Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-184, § 2, 105 Stat. 1278, 1278.
446. See id. § 3 (amending Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-472, § 302(a), 102 Stat. 2285, 2296).
447. See id. § 6(d) (amending Pub. L. No. 100-472 by adding § 308(a)).
448. See S. REP. No. 103-205, at 3 (1993).
449. The Senate Report to the legislation stated: "Because of the Project's success,
many of the participating tribes, including many non-participating tribes who can't
enter into compacts because of the current statutory ceiling on tribal participants,
have expressed a desire to establish the Self Governance Project on a permanent ba-
sis." Id.
450. Id. at 4.
451. Pub. L. No. 103-413, §§ 201-408, 108 Stat. 4270, 4270-78 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450-458hh (1994)).
452. S. REP. No. 103-205, at 3-4.
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On a permanent basis, the Self-Governance Policy is a pro-
gram of "incremental self-governance" and provides for the
participation of only twenty new Indian nations in any given
year.4" The permanent program operates much like the dem-
onstration project, except that the Indian nations now have
the opportunity to assume responsibility over all programs
administered by the BIA4W ' and over non-BIA Interior Depart-
ment programs, such as national parks located on or near
reservations.455 Moreover, the Act authorizes Indian nations to
"redesign or consolidate programs, services, functions and ac-
tivities,"456 allowing each to tailor programs "to suit tribal
tradition, customs, and circumstances best."'57
Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of the new
Self-Governance Policy is that the federal-tribal relationship is
to be defined by mutual consent.458 In this sense, there is an
unmistakable parallel (and some irony) that this "new chapter
in Federal-Indian relations"59 has all the primary attributes of
the very first Indian policy utilized by the United States-
treaty making-a correlation that does not seem lost on Con-
gress: "The negotiated agreements struck between Indian
tribes and the federal agencies are to be solemn agreements-
compacts between governments-that may not be altered
unilaterally by the Department of the Interior."46
Given the depths of the policy chasm from which it was
spawned, the adoption of the Self-Governance Policy within
only 25 years after the end of the Termination Policy era is a
phenomenal achievement-for the Bush Administration that
proposed it, for the Congress that enacted it, and for the In-
dian nations that urged and shaped its development. As it
now stands, Congress has achieved for the United States an
453. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1270 ("However, some flexibility
is provided in that consortia of two or more tribes are eligible to enter the program as
one tribe.").
454. See Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, § 403(b), 108
Stat. 4270, 4272-74 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(b)(1) (1994)). i
455. See 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(b)(2); Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1271-72.
456. 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(b)(3).
457. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1272.
458. So committed does Congress seem towards consensual relations that it even
allowed the Indian nations to shape its policy toward dealing with the United States:
"The Federal policy of Tribal Self-Governance was conceived and nurtured by Indian
Tribes and their able leaders. It is a policy seasoned by experience and matured by
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Indian relations policy consistent with the desires of the In-
dian nations.461
2. Why the Self-Governance Policy Does Not Go Far
Enough-The theory underlying the Self-Governance Policy is
logical and compelling: put Indian nations in control of the re-
sources that they need to revitalize themselves and recognize
their authority to make the decisions on their own behalf.
Even though the Self-Governance Policy is not perfect-federal
oversight continues through audit control 62 -it nonetheless
enhances tribal sovereignty because it generally allows the In-
dian nations to assume responsibility for determining the
course of their development and for administering their own
affairs."' The federal government is better off because the
burden and expense of governmental management of Indian
affairs has been diminished; for the Indian nations, there is a
real possibility that they will achieve greater self-
determination.
Nonetheless, despite its firm theoretical grounding and suc-
cessful implementation thus far, the Self-Governance Policy
has at least four limitations that inhibit its ability to allow the
Indian nations to achieve true self-determination and decolo-
nization in the long run.
a. Limitation to Fiscal Matters Only-First, the Self-
Governance Policy only addresses the fiscal and administra-
tive relationship between the United States and the Indian
nations. Without question, putting more money with fewer bu-
reaucratic restrictions in the hands of tribal governments will
create new opportunities for self-governance and self-
determination. The residual problem, however, is that there is
much more to governmental responsibility than simply having
control over financial resources.
For Indian nations truly to self-determine and assume gov-
ernmental responsibility over their own affairs, they must be
free from the strictures associated with the vast body of fed-
eral Indian control law. Without altering the current legal
scheme of the United States to deny recognition of critical at-
tributes of tribal sovereign authority,46 any self-determination
461. See id. ("Indian Tribes have been and will continue to be permanent govern-
mental bodies exercising basic powers of government, as of Federal and State
governments, to help meet the needs of their citizens.").
462. See 25 U.S.C. § 450c (1994).
463. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
464. I believe that federal Indian control law denies recognition of inherent tribal
sovereignty. But see Stuart, supra note 204, at 85 (noting the view of Congressman
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that the Indian nations might obtain through fiscal responsi-
bility over their own affairs would remain limited by existing
law. Thus, regardless of how successful an Indian nation is at
administering federal financial resources, that nation will
never achieve its full measure of self-determination because
federal Indian control law will not recognize it.
For example, if an Indian nation wanted to commit some of
its federal share of resources to developing an industrial
park to encourage non-Indian business to relocate to the res-
ervation, this venture might fail because the BIA could
interfere with its development plans through the approval
process,4" or the state could tax the non-Indian business
profits.466 Or, if an Indian nation wanted to assume greater
responsibility over domestic violence against its women and
children by subjecting non-Indian spouses to its criminal jus-
tice process, it would not be able to do so because the
Supreme Court does not recognize an Indian nation's sover-
eign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all persons
within its territory.467 These legal restrictions greatly inhibit
the ability of the Indian nations to self-determine. If the fed-
eral government is serious about redressing its colonial
legacy by encouraging tribal self-determination, it must en-
sure that the Indian nations have both the fiscal and legal
means to support their sovereign vision.
b. Preservation of the Federal Trust Responsibility-The
second problem with the Self-Governance Policy is that it pre-
serves without modification the federal trust responsibility
over Indian affairs.468 As a result, while Self-Governance pres-
ents the possibility of greater tribal independence, any
measure of improvement will be offset by one of the most well-
entrenched instruments of colonial oppression-the federal
trust responsibility.
Under the Self-Governance Policy, the trust responsibility
comes into play in two areas: (1) in those instances in which
the federal government has assumed clear trust duties for In-
dian lands and resources, and (2) through the process of
Lloyd Meeds that the United States has plenary power over the Indian nations and
thus, that the Indian nations only have the power that Congress allows).
465. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 81, 415c (1994).
466. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 US. 163, 173-93 (1989).
467. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195-212 (1978).
468. See Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413,
§ 203, 108 Stat. 4250, 4271.
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negotiating and settling upon compact terms.469 If the Indian
nations are going to have true self-determination and sover-
eignty, the federal government cannot maintain full trust
responsibility over their affairs. By definition, these two con-
cepts are irreconcilable.
Congress considered this policy dilemma when it formulated
the Self-Governance Policy: Tadd Johnson, former Staff Direc-
tor and Counsel of the House of Representatives Subcommit-
tee on Native American Affairs,4 0 which had authority over
the legislation, writes with James Hamilton that "[t]he Self-
Governance Demonstration Project was an experiment in the
compatibility of tribal sovereignty and the federal trust re-
sponsibility.... Can Indian Tribes, the 'ward,' do the job of the
'guardian,' and can the guardian accede responsibility within
its legal obligation?""7'
In answering this question, Congress acknowledged that the
Indian nations could "do the guardian's job," but did not agree
that it could relinquish its legal obligations. In doing so, it left
the trust responsibility intact; thus, a considerable measure of
what purportedly was being "given" to the Indian nations in
terms of self-governing capacity was effectively undermined.
Johnson and Hamilton explain this conflict as follows:
The Secretary is not without remedies in the Act. The
Secretary is required to monitor the performance of trust
functions through an annual trust evaluation. If the Sec-
retary finds imminent jeopardy to a physical trust asset,
natural resource, or public health and safety, then he can
unilaterally reassume the program."72
The reassumption provision is the clearest assertion of the
classic trust responsibility long held by the Secretary. Given
this construction, then, how exactly are the Indian nations
supposed to achieve true self-governance if the Secretary con-
tinues to hover over the tribal governing process? At the
outset, Johnson and Hamilton suggest that the quandary is
not quite as dramatic as the statutory text might imply:
It must be noted that the terms of the trust evaluation
will be determined, in part, in the rulemaking process, but
469. See id. §§ 403(a), 403(b)(9), 406(b).
470. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1251.
471. Id. at 1268-69.
472. Id. at 1274 (emphasis added) (discussing 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(d)(2) (1994)).
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primarily in the funding agreements themselves. Hence,
again tribes are given the power to bargain for when and
how the Secretary evaluates trust assets. This is a signifi-
cant shift in policy. The Secretary once acted as the owner
of physical trust assets on reservations; under Self-
Governance he is merely a detached fiduciary. '
While this interpretation of the statute sounds quite rea-
sonable, it is confusing in that it does not comport with the
unequivocal statement in the Self-Governance law that the
Secretary's trust responsibility remains fully intact.474 If the
Indian nations have binding legal authority to control the ex-
ercise of the Secretary's trust responsibilities, then there has
been a clear modification of the federal government's role. If
the Indian nations have the authority to "negotiate away" cer-
tain aspects of the Secretary's trust responsibility, then the
statute should reflect this reality. If this occurs, it will be a
great stride towards maximizing tribal consent in the self-
government process, and thus towards the decolonization of
federal Indian control law. If the beneficiary can control the
trustee, then there is no trust; in terms of basic trust law, the
beneficiary has become emancipated from the trustee because
the beneficiary has control over his own affairs.475
If, on the other hand, the Self-Governance law is to be read
literally and as saying that the Secretary retains the authority
to "unilaterally reassume"4" his trust responsibilities in con-
travention of a bilateral, negotiated funding agreement, then
the Self-Governance Policy could end up being a meaningless
sham. For example, Johnson and Hamilton write that "[a] tribe
in Self-Governance which ... clear cuts its own forest would
be subject to the reassumption of its forestry program by the
Secretary."477 Secretarial actions of this kind would necessarily
undermine Indian self-determination. Actions like these would
suggest that tribal self-government will only be respected if,
according to the Secretary, "correct" or "wise" policy decisions
are implemented. If Indian tribal self-government means any-
thing, it should also mean that Indian nations have the ability
to make policy decisions that turn out to be "wrong," or even
473. Id.
474. See supra note 472 and accompanying text.
475. In such a case, the trustee becomes merely an agent of the beneficiary. See
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 8 (1935).
476. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1274.
477. Id.
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foolish, in the long run. Unless the true ramifications of self-
governing actions are felt by the Indian people involved, then
there can be no true development or participation in the nor-
mal development of the society. Making mistakes and learning
from them is an essential attribute of any self-determining
people.
Thus, from the text of the statute, the legislative history,
and the words of one of its primary architects, the Self-
Governance Policy supports tribal self-government only if the
Indian nations, in the exercise of their inherent sovereign
power, comply with the federal government's vision of how that
power should be exercised. Thus, the potential exists that the
hammer of the federal trust responsibility will drop on any
given tribal initiative. This will, in the long run, chill, and may
even preclude, the development and exercise of genuine In-
digenous self-government.
Johnson and Hamilton give one possible explanation for why
the trust responsibility was continued unmodified. They ex-
plain that the Self-Governance Act focused on whether the
"ward" could do the "guardian" 's job, whether the federal gov-
ernment "trusted Indian Tribes to implement federal duties,"478
and whether "qualified Indian tribes [could] step[] into the
shoes of the United States."479 Viewed in this way, the Self-
Governance Policy seems entirely consistent with all previous
federal Indian policies that furthered American colonization of
the Indian nations. Such an interpretation assumes that the
Indian nations should follow the federal government's policy
priorities. If the objective is to get the Indian nations to carry
out the federal government's "duties" or wear its "shoes," then
the law as drafted may work just fine. If, however, the federal
government's objective is truly to allow the Indian nations to
self-determine, then the federal government's responsibilities
should end where the tribal government's obligations begin.
Because it very much seems the case that Johnson, the other
federal policy makers, and the tribal leadership involved were
trying to do the right thing, the failure to appreciate or respect
self-determination demonstrates how much colonial federal
Indian policies have affected everyone involved in federal In-
dian policy making.
c. Unrealistic Policy Objectives-In addition to its struc-
tural limitations, the Self-Governance Policy appears to be
478. Id. at 1269.
479. Id. at 1278.
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predicated upon the logical flaw that its implementation will
automatically revitalize tribal self-government. It is certainly
true that the Policy initiates a "new chapter in Federal-Indian
relations."4 8' But Johnson and Hamilton suggest that the en-
actment of the Self-Governance Policy began "the process of
retribalization of Indian Government."4 81 Although it remains
482ifihaunclear exactly what this means, if it has anything to do
with the goal of restoring some kind of pre-colonial governing
capacity to the tribes, it is unlikely that the Self-Governance
Act or the federal government will achieve that. The course of
tribal self-determination is a tribal, not a federal, matter. Re-
moving the shackles that restrain tribal self-government is
one thing; decolonizing the Indian nations is something that
only the Indian nations themselves can do if they so choose.
d. Failure to Deal With Colonization's Remnants-Finally,
the Self-Governance Act does not adequately address the real-
ity that not all Indian nations will be able to reassume a full or
significant measure of their former self-governing powers. The
cold, hard truth of the matter is that a significant number of
Indian nations have been so vanquished by colonization that
they are truly "domestic dependent nations."483 The Self-
Governance Policy preserves the possibility that the federal
government will one day again respect the full measure of
tribal sovereignty. But, as Johnson and Hamilton note: "As the
castle walls of paternalism crumble, what should be done
about the tribes left inside?"' ' Although it appears that John-
son and Hamilton were thinking only of those Indian nations
who are inside the "castle walls" for purposes of federal finan-
cial support, the bigger problem lies in dealing with the reality
that some Indian nations will be inside the "castle walls" ei-
ther because they choose to be there, or because they will be
unable to leave.
This is a significant policy quandary with no easy solution.
It is inevitable that the federal trust responsibility must be
preserved in some modified form to respect the underlying
480. S. REP. No. 103-205, at 4 (1993).
481. Johnson and Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1269.
482. Cf id. at 1252 n.2. Johnson and Hamilton suggest that the term "New Tri-
balism' should be used to describe the process of the federal government's
involvement in "capacity building by Indian tribes aimed at empowering tribal gov-
ernments." Id.
483. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831); see discussion supra
Part I.B.
484. Johnson and Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1279.
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treaty obligations and to ensure the survival of the Indian na-
tions. Given the territorial limitation on tribal sovereignty, the
federal government must remain involved to protect Indian
lands, resources, and sovereignty from external threats. But as
the Self-Governance Policy encourages some Indian nations to
self-determine and decolonize, the heretofore unacknowledged
barrier between those Indian nations inside and outside of the
"castle walls" will become more prominent. The Self-
Governance Policy has begun the process of dividing the In-
dian nations into two categories: "domestic autonomous
nations" and "domestic dependent nations." If the United
States is prepared to continue its colonial policies to ensure
some increasingly weak vestige of tribal self-government for
the "domestic dependent nations," then perhaps there is little
to be concerned about. If not, then all of the Indian nations
must be prepared for the possibility that the weaker nations
will be the first ones "terminated" under some future effort to
"ethnically cleanse" the United States of the weakest Indian
nations within its boundaries-that is, those most assimilated
and least equipped to administer their own territory and af-
fairs.
Regardless of these policy flaws, it is clearly the case that
both the Self-Determination and Self-Governance Policies
are significant improvements over their predecessors. As
Johnson and Hamilton suggest, it is anticipated that there
will be "incremental self-governance" over time.4s5 It may
also be true that federal policy-makers have an unwritten
understanding that the Indian nations will make mistakes
in the course of their self-governing redevelopment and
should be given some leeway to make those mistakes. On
the part of the tribal leadership, insisting upon the express
continuation of the trust responsibility may simply have
been an instinctive reaction in the face of the long history of
the federal government's equivocal and self-interested colo-
nial policies regarding Indian affairs. In any event, the
Indian nations and the Congress must revisit the issue of
the continuing validity of the trust responsibility if federal
Indian control law is to be decolonized and the Indian na-
tions allowed true freedom to self-determine.
Only time will tell whether the concerns set forth above
will present themselves. In the interim, however, the Self-
Governance Policy breathes new life into the continuing
485. Id. at 1270.
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effort to ensure native survival because it eliminates many
of the obstacles to Indian self-government. In this sense, the
Self-Governance Policy is the foundation of a future federal
decolonization policy. If the federal government eliminates
the legal strictures it has imposed on the Indian nations, it
can truly begin to shed its colonial legacy once and for all.
C. Administration Reform Initiatives
1. The Nature of the Reform-Consistent with existing
Congressional policy, your Administration has affirmed its
commitment to supporting tribal self-determination. In
April 1994, you issued an executive order to the heads of
the federal agencies to direct them to deal with the Indian
nations on a "government-to-government" basis when tribal
governmental or treaty rights are at issue.4  In May 1998,
you issued an executive order directing that all federal
agencies provide "meaningful consultation and collaboration
with Indian tribal governments in the development of
regulatory practices on Federal matters that significantly or
uniquely affect their communities."47 These actions were
consistent with actions your predecessors took to support
tribal self-determination. 4
Within the various branches of the federal government,
the Department of Justice (DOJ) has shown perhaps the
most noticeable commitment to supporting tribal self-
government.' 9 Led by Attorney General Janet Reno, the
DOJ has undertaken a number of initiatives in support of
Indigenous self-determination, including the issuance of its
own policy on tribal sovereignty4s and initiating
486. See Exec. Memorandum, Government-to-Government Relations with Native
American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,451 (1994).
487. Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (1998).
488. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S15,878 (daily ed. June 21, 1991) (statement of
President George Bush); Statement on Indian Policy, 1983 PUB. PAPERS 90, 90-100
(Jan. 24, 1983) (Ronald Reagan); Nixon Message to Congress, supra note 232, at 564-
76; H.R. DOC. No. 90-272, at 9-11 (1968) (Lyndon B. Johnson).
489. See Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79
JUDICATURE 113, 113-17 (1995) (detailing several Justice Department initiatives that
support tribal justice systems).
490. See Department of Justice Policy on Indian Sovereignty and Government-to-
Government Relations with Indian Tribes III.A (last modified Apr. 9, 1998)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/sovtrb.html> ("The Department recognizes that Indian
tribes as domestic dependent nations retain sovereign powers, except as divested by
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government-to-government relations with the Indian
nations.491
The DOJ has established an Office of Tribal Justice, which
coordinates DOJ relations with the Indian nations.4 In addi-
tion, it has "initiated a Tribal Courts Project to help tribal
governments develop and strengthen their systems of jus-
tice,"49' and has facilitated federal law prosecutions by having
federal courts convened on or near reservations using a magis-
trate judge.4  It has also supported tribal court jurisdiction
over civil litigation by urging through amicus briefs that tribal
remedies be exhausted 495 and that other federal agencies
"respect tribal court jurisdiction and use tribal courts for liti-
gation. 4 96 Finally, the DOJ has acted to ensure that the Indian
nations have access to existing funding which is available for
law enforcement agencies throughout the United States.497
the United States, and further recognizes that the United States has the authority to
restore federal recognition of Indian sovereignty in order to strengthen tribal self-
governance.").
491. The policy provides, in part:
The Department [of Justice] is committed to strengthening and assisting Indian
tribal governments in their development and to promoting Indian self-
governance. Consistent with federal law and Departmental responsibilities, the
Department will consult with tribal governments concerning law enforcement
priorities in Indian country, support duly recognized tribal governments, defend
the lawful exercise of tribal governmental powers in coordination with the De-
partment of the Interior and other federal agencies, investigate government
corruption when necessary, and support and assist Indian tribes in the devel-
opment of their law enforcement systems, tribal courts, and traditional justice
systems.
Id. at III.C.
492. See Reno, supra note 489, at 114.
493. Id. The DOJ's "overall goal" for the Project "is to help tribal justice systems
operate as partners with state and federal judiciaries in the administration of justice."
Id.
494. See id. at 115. The Attorney General contends that federal courts may not be
fully exercising their jurisdiction because of "inconvenience due to distance, lack of
resources, or other reasons." Id. Convening federal court on or near reservations
"involves no expansion of federal jurisdiction. It is merely moving the federal forum
closer to Indian country, thereby focusing attention on previously unredressed mis-
demeanors." Id. (footnote omitted).
495. See id. at 116.
496. Id.
497. This includes establishing an American Indian and Alaska Native Desk in
the DOJ's Office of Justice Programs, see id.; providing funding under the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796gg-3796ii (1994), for the Offices of Vic-
tims of Crime and Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, see id. at 117; and
working with two tribal governments under the Tribal Strategies Against Violence
Program in the Bureau of Justice Assistance. See id. at 116-17.
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There is little doubt that the DOJ has initiated a full-scale
administrative effort to assist tribal self-determination.
Other federal agencies have also become involved in sup-
porting tribal self-determination. The Environmental Protection
Agency, for example, has established its own policy for dealing
with the Indian nations.498 This policy arises out of legislative
and administrative initiatives to treat the Indian nations as
states for purposes of enforcing the federal environmental
laws. 99 In addition, the Department of Health and Human
Services5" and the Energy and Commerce Departments 1 have
also initiated programs to support the Indian nations.
2. Why Current Administrative Initiatives May Have a
Damaging Effect-Despite the well-intentioned motives un-
derlying them, not all of the reform efforts taken by your
Administration have had the effect of supporting tribal self-
determination.
As a threshold matter, effectuating administrative reform
runs the risk that these changes will only last as long as the du-
ration of the current Administration. The Indian nations who
are now redeveloping themselves may be dependent upon a cer-
tain degree of administrative "friendliness." If this support is
withdrawn by future administrations, there could be serious
setbacks for the Indian nations, due to changes in funding
498. See Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (1994); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1377 (1994); see also Richard A. Monette, Treating Tribes as States Under
Federal Statutes in the Environmental Arena: Where Laws of Nature and Natural Law
Collide, 21 VT. L. REv. 111, 114 (1996) ("Congress amended the Safe Drinking Water
Act (SDWA) in 1986 and the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1987, providing the EPA with
the authority to treat 'Tribes as States' for certain programs.") (citations omitted).
499. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 US.C. § 300j-11 (1994); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (1994). See generally
Monette, supra note 498.
500. See O'BRIEN, supra note 2, at 270. O'Brien notes:
The [Indian Health Service] (IHS), a subagency of the [Department of Health
and Human Services'] Public Health Service ... provides medical services, hos-
pital care, preventive health care, medical training, and funds for improving
water supply and wastewater treatment systems to federally recognized tribes
and individual members of federally recognized tribes living on or near a reser-
vation.
Id.; see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 11, at 200; GETCHES ET AL., supra note 15,
at 276.
501. See id. at 271 ("The Energy and Commerce departments are directly involved
in programs to help reservations achieve greater economic development. Both provide
loans and other assistance to tribal governments so that they can explore for mineral
deposits and develop industrial parks, tribal businesses, and recreational and tourist
facilities.").
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priorities. It is unlikely that this kind of policy inconsistency
and the instability that it fosters can have any positive effect
on the Indian nations in the long run.
Perhaps the most damaging aspect of these Administrative
reform efforts, however, is the likelihood that the Indian na-
tions will become more fully incorporated into the federal
system and thus will become more colonized. For example,
while the DOJ's efforts to expand federal prosecutions by
deputizing tribal prosecutors to enforce federal law and mov-
ing federal courts closer to the reservations may have the
practical effect of increasing prosecutions against non-Indians
who commit crimes against Indians, these results will come at
the expense of tribal sovereignty. A significant reason why more
prosecutions are needed is because of misdemeanors being
committed by non-Indians with impunity.5 2 An enforcement
"gap" arises because federal prosecutors either focus only on
major crimes or are too far from the crime scene to prosecute
misdemeanants effectively5 3 and because the Indian nations
are not recognized as having criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians.5" The "right" answer to this problem-that is, the one
that is most consistent with tribal sovereignty-would be to
change federal law to recognize the power of the Indian na-
tions over misdemeanors committed by non-Indians within
tribal borders. This has already happened in the case of crimes
committed by non-member Indians.50 5 Simply "federalizing" the
tribal prosecutor and moving the federal court closer to the
reservation only infuses federal law and process more deeply
into the tribal community instead of strengthening tribal law
itself.
Similarly, treating the Indian nations as states for purposes
of environmental law enforcement5" is de jure colonization.
Perhaps more than any other federal activity besides national
defense, protecting the environment is a uniquely federal func-
tion. While it is undoubtedly true that Indian nations involved
in joint EPA projects may develop a certain technical profi-
ciency at implementing federal environmental law and
regulations, to what end? To perform at tribal expense a job
that belongs legitimately to the federal government, e.g., to
protect tribal lands and peoples from toxins emanating from
502. See Reno, supra note 489, at 115.
503. See id.
504. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195-212 (1978).
505. See Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, § 1, 105 Stat. 646, 646 (1991).
506. See Monette, supra note 498, at 114.
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off-reservation sources? To create a new generation of Indian
technocrats conversant in the jargon of federal environmental
laws and programs? Treating the Indian nations as states im-
poses a heavy burden on limited tribal treasuries that simply
is not justifiable in the face of a legitimate federal trust re-
sponsibility for protecting Indian lands. Moreover, minimizing
tribal sovereignty by treating the Indian nations as states ex-
plicitly furthers a colonizing function. It is hard to see how this
kind of administrative reform can result in genuine self-
determination for the Indian nations in the long run.
Overall, the problem with recent administrative efforts to
strengthen tribal sovereignty is that they seem founded upon a
faulty assumption-that the federal government can actually
make the Indian nations more sovereign. The reality, of course,
is that only the Indian nations can strengthen themselves.
Federal agencies that seek to support tribal self-government
are left with the choice of either providing support to the
tribes as they might determine or doing nothing. The problem
with federally sponsored programs-even those that originate
with tribal requests-is that the federal "solutions" can only be
conceived of in terms of activities in which the federal agency
already engages, e.g., enforcing federal laws, commandeering
the states, and providing funding for federally-defined priority
programs.
This lack of vision can and will have a dramatic effect on
tribal sovereignty. Rarely do federal priorities mesh with tribal
priorities,"° and it is unlikely that they ever will. It is also un-
likely that many federal agency staff members have ever
worked within tribal government. Moreover, few tribal officials
appear to conceive of the federal government's role as other
than a funding source or in terms of what the federal govern-
ment already does."'8 Thus, the inertia associated with the
federal government's priorities prevails in the face of less well-
defined tribal priorities, and the Indian nations simply carry
out whatever federal program happens to be funded at the
moment 5 ° At best, this process destabilizes long-term tribal
507. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
508. I observed this conception at the National American Indian Listening Con-
ference in Albuquerque in May, 1994, conducted by Secretary of the Interior Bruce
Babbitt and Attorney General Janet Reno with 300 tribal leaders from throughout
Indian Country. As indicated by the testimony of the tribal leaders in attendance, lack
of funding is a significant problem of tribal justice systems. See Reno, supra note 489,
at 114.
509. For years, tribal governments have engaged in governmental activities be-
cause the federal government defines these activities as priorities and funds them-
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planning; at worst, it is colonization by absorbing the Indian
nations into the dominant society's administrative infrastruc-
ture.51° In this process, it doesn't matter that the federal
agency or certain federal officials are well-intentioned or even
that the federal government acknowledges limitations on its
participation.511 The end result of federal government absorp-
tion of Indian nations through its administrative policy is the
further weakening of tribal self-determination by supplanting
a distinct tribal governmental and legal identity with that of
the federal government.1 2
V. A PROPOSAL TO IMPLEMENT A FEDERAL
INDIAN DECOLONIZATION POLICY
As the Indian nations and the United States enter the next
phase in their relationship, there is some reason to be opti-
mistic that the federal government is committed to
reestablishing a true government-to-government relationship
with the Indian nations. The Self-Governance Policy and re-
cent Administrative policies restore the fundamental
principle of mutual respect in government-to-government
relations. Despite these improvements, however, the founda-
tion of the federal-tribal relationship-the body of federal
not the other way around. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1264-66
(discussing the Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-184, 105 Stat. 1278 (1991)). This structure encourages a cycle where, once the
funding ends, the federally-funded tribal employees are laid off or reassigned to a new
program, and the tribe goes back to doing what it otherwise did.
510. For example, although the Attorney General acknowledges that "[tiribal
courts articulate tribal values," Reno, supra note 489, at 114, the Justice Department's
programs all appear to relate to the training of tribal judges and prosecutors to per-
form like their federal government counterparts. See id. ("The Tribal Courts
Project... will create technical assistance and training opportunities, primarily
through the local offices of U.S. Attorneys."); id. at 115-16 ("[The magistrate project] is
also an innovative vehicle for channeling technical assistance and training to tribal
courts.... The U.S. Attorney's Office will provide training, technical assistance, and
oversight to the tribal prosecutor when acting on behalf of the federal government.").
This is not surprising, since it is unlikely that there is any institutional source of
"tribal values" located within the DOJ.
511. See, e.g., Reno, supra note 489, at 114 ("[Tlribal justice systems are
ultimately the most appropriate institutions for maintaining order in tribal
communities.").
512. For example, this would be true with respect to federal government training
of tribal judges and prosecutors. See generally Porter, supra note 36'-, at 274-96
(discussing the destructive effect of Anglo-American legal practices on tribal govern-
ance).
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Indian control law-continues to promote a colonial
agenda,513 I believe this means that the United States, despite
recent policy initiatives, will continue to effectuate the gradual
assimilation and destruction of the Indian nations. If you are
genuinely concerned about the future of the Indian nations, I
propose that you adopt a federal Indian policy that is premised
upon the decolonization of federal Indian control law.
To assist you in conceptualizing how the United States
might decolonize its Indian control law, I would like to draw
upon the teaching of the Gus-Wen-Tah, or the Two Row Wam-
pum. 14 For hundreds of years prior to the establishment of the
United States, the Seneca People were governed by the Gay-
anashagowa, or Great Binding Law.515 The primary tenet of the
Great Law was the obligation that all peoples should live in
peace."' In the diplomatic interactions between my forefathers
and the first colonists, the principle of peace embodied in the
Gus-Wen-Tah guided the discourse."' While life was not with-
out conflict-those nations who refused to live in peace with
the Haudenosaunee were vanquished5 1 8-the guiding principle
of peace shaped the relationships among the Indian Nations
and allowed for these peoples to have a strong and stable co-
existence with their allies for many generations.
The Two Row Wampum is a treaty belt that symbolizes the
agreement between the Haudenosaunee and the early Ameri-
can colonists to live in peaceful coexistence:
When the Haudenosaunee first came into contact with the
European nations, treaties of peace and friendship were
made. Each was symbolized by the Gus-Wen-Tah, or Two
Row Wampum. There is a bed of white wampum which
symbolizes the purity of the agreement. There are two
rows of purple, and those two rows have the spirit of your
ancestors and mine. There are three beads of wampum
513. See discussion supra Parts I, II.A.
514. See Williams, Algebra, supra note 33, at 223, 291 (quoting SPECIAL COM-
MITTEE ON INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT, INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA back
cover (1983) (quoting HAUDENOSAUNEE CONFEDERACY, PRESENTATION TO THE SPECIAL
COMM. ON INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT, CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS; AREN AKWEKS
[TEHANETORENS], WAMPUM BELTS (1947))).
515. See PARKER, supra note 343, bk. 3, at 7.
516. See PAULA.W. WALLACE, THE WHITE ROOTS OF PEACE 6 (1946).
517. See Williams, Algebra, supra note 33, at 291.
518. See Abler & Tooker, supra note 2, at 505, 506 (noting that the Seneca Indians
dispersed the Huron Indians in 1649 and the Petun Indians in the winter of 1649-50).
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separating the two rows and they symbolize peace, friend-
ship, and respect.
These two rows will symbolize two paths or two vessels,
travelling down the same river together. One a birch bark
canoe, will be for the Indian people, their laws, their cus-
toms and their ways. The other, a ship, will be for the
white people and their laws, their customs and their
ways. We shall each travel the river together, side by side,
but in our own boat. Neither of us will try to steer the
other's vessel.519
If there is to be peaceful coexistence between the Indian na-
tions and the United States into the future, then the balance
in our relationship must be completely restored. For over 200
years, the United States has sought to "steer" our "vessel" and
control our way of life.520 The argument that such actions were
justified on the ground that they were for our own good is un-
acceptable. Our right to self-determination is one given to us
by our Creator, and it is the spirit of that right that has al-
lowed for our people to survive to the present day. If the
United States has any regard for its longstanding commit-
ments to our nations, it should commit to restoring the vision
of the Two Row Wampum.. in our future relations, and it
should decolonize its "Indian law" once and for all.
The remainder of this section will explain how I propose
how this objective can be accomplished.
A. Substantive Aspects of the Decolonization Policy
1. Define All Aspects of the Federal-Tribal Relationship by
Agreement-To effectuate the vision of the Two Row Wampum
as directly as possible, the United States should again adopt a
policy for dealing with the Indian nations that requires that
all aspects of our intergovernmental interaction be defined by
519. INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA, supra note 514, at back cover (quoting
HAUDENOSAUNEE CONFEDERACY, PRESENTATION TO THE SPECIAL COMM. ON INDIAN
SELF-GoVERNMENT, CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS; AREN AKWEKS [TEHANETORENS],
WAMPUM BELTS (1947)).
520. See discussion supra Part II.
521. See generally Williams, Algebra, supra note 33, at 291-97.
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the parties concerned pursuant to agreement.5 2 In this way,
the right of self-determination of both the United States and
the Indian nations can be protected and respected.
As a practical matter, this can be done by expanding the
Self-Governance Policy to include legal issues of concern to the
Indian nations and the federal government, as well as to the
financial and administrative issues covered by the current
Policy. Primarily, these issues would relate to questions of ju-
risdiction of the tribal, federal, state, and local governments. If
the approach taken under the Self-Governance Policy were ex-
panded, the federal, tribal, and state government relationship
would be defined by the parties concerned, rather than by a
static statutory scheme fine-tuned by Supreme Court deci-
sions. If adopted, this approach would demonstrate the
greatest respect for Indigenous self-determination and at the
same time allow for legitimate federal and state interests to be
respected.
Under such a scheme, the Indian nations could assert their
desire to assume greater responsibility over various jurisdic-
tional areas currently in the hands of the federal, state, and
local governments. The federal government would assume the
lead responsibility for handling the negotiations from its side,
consulting in advance with state and local officials about ap-
propriate negotiating strategy and about the politically and
practically acceptable parameters of tribal-federal-state
authority. Ultimately, negotiations would end with agreement
between the Indian nations and the United States as to where
jurisdictional lines could be drawn. If no agreement could be
reached, the default position would be the existing federal In-
dian control law.
Throughout such a process, the Indian nations would carry
the burden of demonstrating their ability to assume greater
responsibility over their own affairs. In effect, then, tribal ne-
gotiating positions would be tempered by realistic policy
considerations, such as each tribe's administrative capability,
financial resources, political viability, and ability to follow
through on long-term commitments. If these assessments are
objectively not realistic for a particular Indian nation, then the
Indian nation probably has no legitimate reason for seeking
522. See James A. Casey, Note, Sovereignty by Sufferance: The Illusion of Indian
Tribal Sovereignty, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 404, 405 (1994) (arguing that "the constant
erosion of the remnants of tribal sovereignty is the result of the lack of definition and
consent in the current tribal-federal-state relationship" and that "free association
agreements" should be the foundation of a new system).
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greater authority over such matters, and the United States
would be justified in refusing to accede to its requests. In the
negotiating process, the United States would have little incen-
tive to "let" the Indian nations do whatever they might want
because of the political, and possibly fiscal, risks of doing so.
Thus, looking at both sides of the process, there should be a
meaningful negotiation regarding the terms and conditions of
tribal reassumption of responsibility over matters that might
have long been administered by the federal and state govern-
ments.
If Indigenous self-determination is truly the federal gov-
ernment's express policy desire, 2' there seems little reason to
limit the existing compacting process to strictly financial mat-
ters. There are many other areas currently defined by federal
Indian control law that can and should be left to agreement
rather than being regulated by rigid and binding statutes,
regulations, and judicial decisions. For example, Indian na-
tions could negotiate for greater civil and criminal
jurisdictional authority over cases currently handled by fed-
eral or state officials.524 Taxation, regulation, environmental
controls, land leasing, and state and local social service deliv-
ery are other areas in which Indian nations could negotiate for
greater or more clearly defined authority. Indian nations could
even negotiate the legal limits of the federal government's
trust responsibility. In short, the United States should embark
upon a new era in federal-tribal relations in which anything
and everything that is of concern to the Indian nations and the
United States can be negotiated and memorialized by agree-
ment.
From the federal perspective, the United States has every
reason to encourage the Indian nations to assume more re-
sponsibility for their own affairs. Even if the federal
government's commitment to decolonization is weak, such a
policy is justified by fiscal reasons alone.5 2 Indeed, this combi-
nation of factors appears to be what allowed the Self-
Governance Policy to develop in the first place.1
6
523. See Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. § 458aa (enacting the Con-
gressional Declaration of Policy of Pub. L. 103-413).
524. State views would be addressed either through the federal negotiators or di-
rectly, depending upon the wishes of the parties. There is no reason to believe that
Indian nations might not want greater authority to work with the states.
525. See discussion supra Part III.D.
526. See discussion supra Part III.D.
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2. Implement BIA Reform-The decolonization of federal
Indian control law cannot occur unless the federal govern-
ment's colonial administrative infrastructure, the BIA, is
dismantled and a new institution for handling relations with
the Indian nations is established. Because of its central role in
the suppression of tribal self-determination,5 . 7 there is suffi-
cient independent reason to eliminate this anachronistic and
dysfunctional agency.528 But given the changes unleashed by
the Self-Governance Policy, it is absolutely necessary that
immediate action be taken to restructure the federal gov-
ernment's administrative mechanism for dealing with Indian
relations.
529
The Self-Governance Policy anticipates a transfer of
authority over critical aspects of governmental responsibility
from the BIA to the Indian nations and a commensurate re-
duction in the size and function of the BIA." ° Until Congress
implements central plans concerning the BIA's withdrawal
from the daily affairs of the Indian nations, however, there will
be conflict and confusion in the Self-Governance process. As
the Indian nations begin to reassume authority over their own
affairs, they are in essence "molting"-throwing off the shell of
their former selves. Unfortunately, they also wear another
shell, that of the BIA, which must be strategically thrown off
as well if the Indian nations are to achieve genuine self-
determination.
As long as the administrative and regulatory strictures of
the BIA remain intact, the capacity of the Indian nations to
achieve self-governance in the long run will be hampered, if
not halted altogether. Congress, in enacting this program, was
527. See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
528. See SPECIAL COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN
AFFAIRS, FINAL REPORT AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS, S. REP. No. 101-216, at
61 (1989).
529. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 134-41.
530. One of the architects of the Self-Governance Policy writes:
Downsizing due to Self-Governance is inevitable and irreversible. Pub. L. No.
103-413 requires the Central Office to determine how it will parcel itself out to
Self-Governance tribes. Currently in the BIA there are 12 Area Offices, 83
Agency Offices, 3 sub-agencies, 6 field stations, and 2 irrigation project offices.
At the end of fiscal year 1993, total employment at the BIA was 14,568 posi-
tions and 13,074 full time equivalents. The BIA administers 42 million acres of
tribally owned land and 10 million acres of individually owned trust land.
Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 233, at 1272 n.103.
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well aware of the BIAs intransigence in dealing with the
changes contemplated by Self-Governance:
The [Senate] Committee [on Indian Affairs] is troubled by
the continuing refusal of the Department of the Interior
for the past four years to negotiate, on a line-by-line basis
with participating Self-Governance Tribes, tribal shares
of [the] Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) central office funds
and resources despite clear directives to do so in various
appropriations and authorizing Committee Reports.53'
The Indian nations can ill afford to have the BIA as an en-
emy in their struggle for greater self-determination. Unless
Congress acts affirmatively, rather than passively, to deal with
the increasingly desperate acts of a crumbling administrative
regime, the promise of the Self-Governance Policy and the
hope of true Indian decolonization will be in jeopardy.
Some action has been taken in this regard in the drafting of
BIA reorganization legislation. In 1996, legislation was sub-
mitted in the Senate by Senator John McCain that would
require the BIA to reorganize significantly to accommodate
and support increasingly independent Indian nations, while
continuing to serve those Indian nations unable to self-govern.
The legislation did not pass, but was resubmitted in 1997.532
Representative Bill Richardson and Senator John McCain
were the primary sponsors of the legislation. Unfortunately,
Bill Richardson left the House and his seat on the Indian Af-
fairs Committee for an administration position and Senator
McCain, although still a member of the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs, gave up his chairmanship of the committee.533
Aside from some introductory remarks having been read con-
cerning it in September of 1997, no action has been taken on
the legislation since it was submitted, 4 and its fate is unclear.
If genuine decolonization and the maximum effect of the Self-
531. ESTABLISHING SELF-GOVERNANCE, S. REP. No. 103-205, at 9-10 (1993).
532. S. 545, 105th Cong. (1997), 143 CONG. REC. S3011-03, available in 1997 WL
168775, *S3012.
533. See Richardson Gets Energy Post/Holbrooke to Be Named to UN, NEWSDAY,
June 18, 1998, at A23, available in LEXIS, News Library, NEWSDY file (stating that
Bill Richardson will serve as Secretary of Energy); McCain Comes Out Swinging, J.
COM., Mar. 10, 1997, at 10A, available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, JOC file (reporting
that Senator McCain, no longer Chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs, has
become Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee).
534. See Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet (visited Nov. 2, 1998)
<http'//thomas.loc.gov/bss/d105query.html>.
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Governance Policy are to be achieved, the BIA must be re-
structured in a conscious deliberate manner instead of letting
time and decay undermine the possibility that it may one day
serve a productive role in assisting the Indian nations. Devel-
opment in the direction of a "Department of State-Indigenous
Relations" would better serve the long term interests of the
Indian nations and the United States.
3. Repeal Colonial Federal Indian Control Law-While
Congress has been determined by the Supreme Court to have
the "plenary power" over Indian affairs, all three branches of
government have contributed to the creation of the existing
body of federal Indian control law.535 The most direct and effec-
tive way in which this body of law can be decolonized is to
repeal, overrule, and withdraw it from having any future ef-
fect. While this sounds dramatic and radical, clear changes
should be made to expedite the self-governance of the Indian
nations. The following are a few specific examples of federal
laws that Congress should immediately consider repealing or
amending.536
a. Recognize the Authority of Indian Nations to Exercise
Jurisdiction over Crimes Committed by Non-Indians-In Ol-
iphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,3 7 the Supreme Court held
that the United States would not recognize the inherent sover-
eignty of the Indian nations to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians.53 This restriction limits the ability of Indian
nations to address crimes committed by non-Indians within
their territory-frequently White men assaulting Indian
women-and undermines tribal sovereignty. As it did when it
legislatively reversed Duro v. Reina,539 Congress should amend
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) ° or take other legislative
action to recognize inherent tribal sovereignty over crimes
committed by non-Indians within the Indian territory.
b. Recognize the Authority of Indian Nations to Exercise Ju-
risdiction over Civil Matters Involving Only Non-Indians-In
535. See discussion supra Parts I (judicial branch), II (legislative branch), II.A.8
(executive branch); supra note 488 (executive branch).
536. These recommendations are presented in the alternative, and I anticipate
that not all of them will be implemented at the same time.
537. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
538. See id. at 206-12.
539. See Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. 102-137, § 1, 105 Stat. 646, 646, overruling
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
540. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994).
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Strate v. A-1 Contractors,541 the Supreme Court held that the
United States would not recognize the inherent sovereignty of
the Indian nations to exercise civil adjudicatory jurisdiction in
Indian territory over cases involving only non-Indians."2 This
restriction undermines the credibility of tribal courts and
erodes the territorial component of tribal sovereignty. As was
the case with the legislative reversal of Duro v. Reina,"' Con-
gress should amend the Indian Civil Rights Act or take other
legislative action to recognize inherent tribal sovereignty over
civil actions involving only non-Indians arising within the In-
dian territory.
c. Recognize Tribal Sovereignty to Exercise Traditional Jus-
tice Methods-The Indian Civil Rights Act"4 strongly suggests
that Indian nations must exercise their jurisdiction over civil
and criminal matters arising within their territory in a man-
ner analogous to the Anglo-American legal system. 5 This
emphasis is driven by a fixation on individual rights.546 This
overemphasis is an assimilating force within tribal communi-
ties and continues to weaken traditional tribal existence.
547
Congress should amend the Indian Civil Rights Act to recog-
nize explicitly the right of Indian nations to address matters
involving the rights of individual members in a manner consis-
tent with tribal common law.
548
d. Recognize Concurrent Tribal Jurisdiction over Major
Crimes-Existing case law is unclear whether Indian nations
are recognized as having criminal jurisdiction over major
crimes committed by their members.5 49 Ambiguity in this re-
gard unnecessarily limits tribal sovereignty. Congress should
amend the Indian Major Crimes Act5 to recognize inherent
tribal sovereignty over major crimes committed by Indians
541. 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
542. See id. at 1407-08.
543. See Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. 102-137, § 1, 105 Stat. 646, 646.
544. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994).
545. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
546. See 25 US.C. §§ 1302-1303.
547. See Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 890-93 (2d
Cir. 1996) (sustaining an action filed against tribal government and its traditional
chiefs on the grounds that banishment of tribal member constitutes a "detention"
sufficient to invoke habeas corpus review by the federal courts pursuant to ICRA).
548. See generally Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes from It": Navajo Justice Concepts, 24
N.M. L. REV. 175, 180-87 (1994).
549. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at
339-41.
550. Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153, 3242 (1994)).
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and to establish clearly concurrent federal-tribal criminal
jurisdiction. Specifically, Congress should recognize exclusive
tribal jurisdiction over Indians punished in accordance with
the laws of the Indian nation in which the crime occurred. If
such a change is accomplished, for those Indian nations
having law-trained judges, the Indian Civil Rights Act should
be amended to repeal the sentencing limitations that it con-
tains.55" '
e. Recognize the Power of Indian Nations and States to En-
ter into Jurisdictional Compacts-Existing case law prohibits
the Indian nations and the states from entering into agree-
ments in which jurisdiction may be altered.552 Maximum tribal
sovereignty would allow Indian nations and states to enter
agreements covering a wide range of matters, including juris-
dictional transfers. Congress should enact legislation that
recognizes the power of Indian nations and states to enter into
wide-ranging compacts.553 To ensure that the states do not
overreach, such compacts should require the parties to re-visit
their agreements regularly, and these compacts should be void
if their duration is longer than three years. Congress already
resolved this policy issue in favor of allowing such tribal-state
agreements when it enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act
554
and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.555 It should expand
this process to allow all matters to be resolved by agreement.
f Repeal Public Law 280 and Equivalent Legislation-
Under Public Law No. 67-28056 (commonly called Public Law
280), Congress granted certain states criminal and civil adju-
dicatory jurisdiction over the Indian country located within
their borders.557 Since Public Law 280 was enacted, many
551. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1994) (prohibiting tribes from imposing jail sentences
longer than one year or fines of more than $5,000).
552. See Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 429 (1971) (per curiam). For an
introduction to this issue, see SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, TRIBAL-
STATE COMPACT ACT, S. REP. No. 95-1178, at 6 (1978) (committee report accompanying
the proposed Tribal-State Compact Act, S. 2502, 95th Cong. (1978)).
553. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT ACT,
S. REP. NO. 95-1178, at 7-8.
554. See 25 US.C. § 1919 (1994).
555. See 25 US.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C) (1994).
556. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, 589 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(criminal), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (civil) (1994)).
557. See Act of Sept. 13, 1950, ch. 947, 64 Stat. 845 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 233
(1994)) (civil jurisdiction in New York); Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 809, 62 Stat. 1224
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 232 (1994)) (criminal jurisdiction in New York); Act of June 30,
1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (criminal jurisdiction over the Sac and Fox Reservations
in Iowa); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 827 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3243
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Indian nations have developed their own criminal justice sys-
tems and are now addressing law enforcement concerns as an
exercise of their sovereignty.558 These tribal justice systems
would be strengthened, and others might be encouraged to do
the same, if state criminal justice systems did not have con-
current criminal jurisdiction. Similarly, tribal courts would be
strengthened by eliminating state civil adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion and not having to compete with the state courts over
matters involving reservation Indians or arising within Indian
country. I have seen firsthand how concurrent state court ju-
risdiction can undermine the tribal courts and can assure you
that access to the state courts undermines tribal sovereignty,
as one federal district court recently discovered in a case in-
volving my Nation.55
Congress should repeal Public Law 280 and all related stat-
utes in order to recognize (i) exclusive tribal jurisdiction over
civil actions arising within Indian country, and (ii) concurrent
federal-tribal jurisdiction over crimes occurring within Indian
country. This is not a novel idea; Congress previously resolved
this policy issue in favor of requiring tribal consent to state
jurisdiction when it amended the Indian Civil Rights Act in
1968.560
g. Repeal the Indian Reorganization Act and Equivalent
Legislation-If self-determination means anything, it means
that the Indian nations do not need the United States to con-
trol the manner in which they govern themselves. 6' The IRA
presupposes that the Indian nations should adopt a constitu-
tional government in accordance with its provisions if it were
unable to independently do SO.5"2 In recent years, a few Indian
(1994)) (criminal jurisdiction in Kansas); Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229
(criminal jurisdiction over the Devils Lake Reservation in North Dakota).
558. Report of the Executive Committee for Indian Country Law Enforcement Im-
provements: Final Report to the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Interior,
(visited Oct. 1997) <http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/icredact.htm> (indicating strong tribal
resistance to direct federal involvement in law enforcement).
559. See Bowen v. Doyle, 880 F. Supp. 99, 105 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting state ju-
risdiction over internal Seneca Nation political matters brought to state court by
tribal political officials).
560. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321 (requiring tribal consent for extension of state criminal
jurisdiction), 1322 (requiring tribal consent for extension of state civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction).
561. See Porter, Issues, supra note 357, at 77-78.
562. See 25 U.S.C. § 476 (allowing tribes to adopt "an appropriate constitution and
bylaws .... at a special election authorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior
under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe" and listing the rights and pow-
ers that this constitution "shall" vest in the tribe) (emphasis added); cf Porter, supra
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nations have significantly changed their IRA constitutions,
including the removal of Secretarial approval of tribal laws."
The only legitimate interest of the federal government in tribal
governance is the ability to determine the identity of the law-
ful tribal government. This requires a recognition process,
which already exists.56 Thus, the IRA should be repealed to
allow the Indian nations to adopt their own forms of govern-
ment. In addition, the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act5" and the
governance provisions of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act.6 should be repealed for the same reasons. In their place, a
new law should be adopted requiring the Administration to
recognize whatever form of government an Indigenous people
may choose.
h. Effectively Repeal the General Allotment Act-Congress
sought to eliminate the modern-day effects of the Indian Gen-
eral Allotment Act5 67 when it enacted the Indian Land
Consolidation Act of 1983 (ILCA).168 The ILCA established a
procedure to recognize the authority of tribal governments to
develop land consolidation plans and to undo the effect of the
Allotment Act by dividing up reservations into trust lands and
fee lands.569 In addition, to minimize the effect of highly frac-
tionated parcels of land, the ILCA provided for the escheat of
economically unproductive parcels to the tribe.57° This escheat
provision has been struck down by the Supreme Court,57" '
amended by Congress, 57 2 and struck down again. 573 Because
checkerboarded and fractionated reservation lands undermine
the ability of tribal governments to exercise their authority,
note 357, at 94-96 (arguing for tribal governments to look to their own historical
tribal governing traditions when drafting new constitutions rather than to the more
well-known American governing tradition).
563. See, e.g., CONST. AND BY-LAWS OF THE ROSEBUD SIOUx TRIBE OF SOUTH
DAKOTA amend. XVIII (1985); REVISED CONST. AND BY-LAWS OF THE MISSISSIPPI BAND
OF CHOCTAW INDIANS art. 8, § 1(r) (revised 1975).
564. See 25 C.F.R. § 1001.2(a) (1994) (relying on the definition of "federally recog-
nized" in P.L. No. 93-638).
565. 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-509 (1994).
566. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606-1607 (1994).
567. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 US.C. §§ 331-358
(1994)).
568. Pub. L. No. 97-459, tit. II, 96 Stat. 2517 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2201-2211 (1994)). '
569. See 25 US.C. §§ 2204, 2205.
570. See 25 US.C. § 2206.
571. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 US. 704, 718 (1987).
572. See 25 U.S.C. § 2206(a), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-644, § 301(a), 104 Stat.
4666 (1990).
573. See Babbitt v. Youpee, 117 S. Ct. 727, 728-29 (1997).
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Congress should fund the repurchase of fee lands within allot-
ted reservations.574
i. Repeal the Indian Civil Rights Act-The ICRA imposes
upon tribal government the individual rights protections of the
Bill of Rights.5 75 While it has been determined that any remedy
for a violation of the ICRA must derive from within the tribe,
76
the ICRA does impose substantive limitations on tribal gov-
ernment actions.5 7  These limitations perpetuate American
conceptions of justice;578 tribal sovereignty is thereby under-
mined and American colonial objectives are furthered. To the
extent that Indian nations desire to safeguard the rights of
individuals against government misconduct, a genuine respect
for sovereignty would dictate that the Indian nations them-
selves define their own substantive and procedural standards
and the remedies for the violations of those standards. Ac-
cordingly, Congress should repeal the ICRA.
j. Repeal the Citizenship Act of 1924-American citizenship
was imposed upon Indian people to further assimilation into
the American polity.5 79 Since this statute was opposed by many
Indian people,5'8 full decolonization of federal Indian control
law would dictate that mandatory American citizenship should
be withdrawn. American citizenship, if it is desired by Indian
people, should be left as a matter of personal choice.
574. See H.R. 2743, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997), available in LEXIS, Lexis Library, BLT
105 File (suggesting amendments to the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2201-2220 (1994), including authorization, in proposed § 213, for the Secretary of
the Interior "to acquire ... any fractional interest in trust or restricted land").
575. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302-1303 (1994); discussion
supra Part V3.C.
576. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1978).
577. Compare 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1303 (limiting Indian tribes' powers to make any
laws or commit any acts that would violate most protections guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights) with U.S. CONST. amend. I-K
578. See Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 881-901 (2d
Cir. 1996) (allowing Indians banished from their tribe to apply for writs of habeas
corpus).
579. See Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253, 254 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b) (1994)); GETCHES ET AL. supra note 15, at 738-39 (noting how the United
States citizenship that was extended piecemeal by various treaties and statutes before
the 1924 Act was conditioned "upon Indians conforming their individual behavior to
the dominant society's norms and renouncing tribal culture and traditions").
580. See, e.g., Vine Deloria, Jr., "Congress in its Wisdom": The Course of Indian
Legislation, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE
1880S, supra note 92, at 117 (noting that upon passage of the Citizenship Act of 1924,
"the Iroquois ... promptly sent the President notice of their rejection of American
citizenship). But see, e.g., DIPPIE, supra note 351, at 194 (noting that Red Fox Skiu-
hushu, a Blackfoot minister, urged Congress to grant citizenship to Indians).
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4. Abandon the Colonial Foundation of Federal Indian Con-
trol Law Doctrine-To truly decolonize federal Indian control
law, its colonial doctrinal foundation must be abandoned. This
includes abandoning the "doctrine of discovery," 81 the Indian
"right of occupancy" doctrine, 82 the Plenary Power Doctrine,"'
and federal approval requirements;"' rejecting member-based
conceptions of tribal sovereignty;... no longer imposing remedies
for tribal injustices based upon the exclusiveness of federal
court litigation;58 6 and no longer treating money as the equiva-
lent of land.87  In addition, while the federal trust
responsibility588 should not be discarded entirely, it should be
significantly modified to eliminate federal inference in internal
tribal matters.589
B. Implementation of the Decolonization Policy
The effectiveness of the proposed federal Indian Decoloniza-
tion Policy will depend upon the process utilized to implement
it. Any efforts to work significant changes in federal Indian
policy are likely to bring out the following special interests: (1)
those Indian nations who seek greater self-determination; (2)
those Indian nations who wish to maintain the status quo; (3)
the BIA, which seeks to perpetuate itself; (4) the anti-Indian
lobby, which seeks to weaken tribal sovereignty; (5) the gov-
ernmental reformists, who wish to make government more
efficient; and, (6) the fiscal conservatives, who want to save
money by cutting back on budgets regardless of the impact or
source of the cuts. Given that these competing interests can
grossly manipulate and contort any comprehensive policy pro-
posal, successful implementation of the Self-Governance Policy
looks like a Herculean task. More importantly, however, the
implementation of that policy is evidence that change can be
effectuated if there is a genuine desire and commitment to do
SO.
581. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
582. See id.
583. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
584. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 125-29.
585. See id. at 141-53.
586. See Williams, Algebra, supra note 33, at 293-97.
587. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 153-58.
588. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
589. See Clinton, supra note 24, at 134.
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Much of the difficulty in implementing a federal Indian De-
colonization Policy will arise because many Indian nations will
resist it. Having spent such a long time in a dependent
relationship, many Indian nations will exercise their sovereign
prerogative to resist any change in the status quo. If the
United States chooses to recognize an Indian nation's choice to
remain dependent upon it, there will likely never be any
mechanism to effectuate the decolonization of that Indian na-
tion in the future.
In my view, the federal government need not engage in an
endless debate with the Indian nations over whether it should
implement a Decolonization Policy. Instead, the United States
should engage in one final colonial act: it should unilaterally
adopt a Decolonization Policy and force the Indian nations
either to choose the path of independence or to preserve the
status quo of dependence.
As a practical matter, then, Congress should simply repeal a
number of its colonial enactments, such as those set forth
above,5 90 and give the Indian nations one year before the repeal
becomes effective. If an Indian nation chooses to preserve the
status quo and maintain a more dependent relationship, then
there would be no change in the legal relationship between the
United States and that nation. If, on the other hand, an Indian
nation is looking to expand its self-determination, the one-year
time period would spur the development of the necessary infra-
structure to reassume the aspect of government responsibility
at issue. In this way, the Indian nations could make strategic
multi-year decisions about which areas to develop, and could
maintain the application of the federal Indian control law up
until the time is right for them to apply their own law. Maybe,
for the first time ever, they would have to take a deep, hard
look at whether they are really able to assume responsibilities
previously exercised by the federal government or the states.
It is unlikely that any but the handful of independently
wealthy Indian nations would be able to afford to displace fed-
eral and state authority immediately. Indeed, it may be
imprudent to eliminate all restrictive federal legislation, case
law, and executive orders. The bigger problem, however, is that
in many instances, the anticipated trauma of assuming govern-
mental responsibility over matters that may not have been
handled in generations would be so great that some Indian na-
tions would likely resist the proposed change, either because
590. See discussion supra Part VA.3-4.
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they could not administratively or financially assume such new
responsibility, or because they may have grown accustomed to
being dependent upon the federal or state governments.
This dependence is a critical defect in any modern effort to
decolonize federal Indian control law. Given the changes forced
upon Indian people during the last 200 years, there has been a
commensurate change in the native conception of sover-
eignty.591 While many Indian nations today may embrace a
firm and clear conception of their own sovereignty, others may
not.5" For the latter, sovereignty may not even have any
meaning in the face of overwhelming pressures to satisfy indi-
vidual-rather than tribal-needs and desires. Unfortunately,
some Indian nations may be such in name only. In short, colo-
nization has transformed tribal conceptions of self-government
so dramatically that some Indian nations may simply have no
idea what it means to assume greater authority over their own
affairs.
If the trust responsibility is to have any modern utility, it
should be used to force the Indian nations to face up to their
self-governing capabilities and weaknesses. That this act itself
might violate tribal sovereignty is not a valid reason for not
doing it. After all, the federal government takes unilateral ac-
tions to control Indian lives every day. Because the United
States is unilaterally responsible for destroying tribal self-
government and establishing a widespread psychology of de-
pendence,59 it should take similarly bold action to revitalize it.
While it may seem painful, and maybe even harsh, to imple-
ment, it pales in comparison to what has previously been done
to destroy our nations by confiscating our land base5' and ex-
tinguishing our unique way of life.595
The revitalization of the Indian nations requires that
drastic and painful action be taken now to restore the
psychology of self-determination. The United States should
move gradually toward eliminating its colonial legacy by
adopting a policy that requires the Indian nations to make
meaningful choices as to whether they will assume greater
responsibility over their own affairs. Just as Indigenous
assimilation is the direct result of the affirmative exercise of
591. See Porter, Issues, supra note 357, at 81-83 (detailing changing conceptions
of sovereignty in the Seneca Nation and the Cherokee Nation).
592. See generally id.
593. See discussion supra Part II.
594. See discussion supra Part II.A.2, 5.
595. See discussion supra Part II.A.7.
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federal power, Indigenous revitalization can also be
encouraged by the affirmative exercise of this power. My
proposal is that the United States unilaterally repeal its
colonial federal Indian control laws and force the Indian
nations to consider assuming greater governmental
responsibility over areas that were once within their exclusive
authority.
C. Likely Effects of the Decolonization Policy
A federal Indian Decolonization Policy would have several
significant effects. First, it would put as much power in the
hands of Indian people as they could handle responsibly. This
is the essence of self-determination and the key to Indigenous
survival.
Second, such a policy would more efficiently allocate scarce
federal and tribal resources.596 Unlike the current arrange-
ment, in which federal officials in the BIA provide direct
services to Indian nations,597 the most efficient allocation of
resources may be for tribal government or coalitions of tribal
governments.. to deliver such services. In addition, the possi-
bility also exists for Indian nations to form their own service
delivery consortiums, as is anticipated in the proposed BIA
reorganization plan.599 Either way, the possibility of resource
maximization is one step closer.
Third, the Decolonization Policy would eliminate even more
administrative bureaucracy within the federal and state gov-
ernments as the Indian nations assume greater responsibility
for their own affairs. To be sure, the federal government's role
would not disappear. Rather than providing direct services, the
federal government's role in Indian affairs would be limited to
two simple functions: negotiating federal-tribal compacts and
enforcing the federal government's remaining trust responsi-
bility. In this way, the BIA would be transformed into a kind of
tribal Department of State. And because the trust responsibil-
ity would be defined by the terms of the compacts, there would
still need to be an enforcement and oversight mechanism
596. See discussion supra Part III.
597. See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
598. See S. REP. NO. 105-545, at 5-29 (1997) (discussing §§ 101-103 o: a bill to re-
organize the BIA (1997)).
599. See generally id.
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within the federal bureaucracy. In all other ways, the federal
government's role would be significantly reduced.
I do not mean to suggest that there would not be barriers to
adopting such a Decolonization Policy in full. The primary
limitations will be those imposed by economic, political, and
practical reality. Should an Indian nation seek to obtain
authority over an area that it could not objectively and respon-
sibly assume, the negotiation process would be a limiting
factor. In such an event, the federal negotiators could refuse to
acquiesce.
Indeed, with some Indian nations, the problem may come
from precisely the opposite direction. Despite the willingness
of federal officials for an Indian nation to assume more re-
sponsibility in a particular area, some Indian nations may be
unwilling to do so. After generations of dependence, some
tribal officials may simply have no conception of their own
self-governing capacity, or if they do, no political desire to place
demands upon a complacent and perhaps incapable citizenry.
Ultimately, the right answer will depend upon the priorities
established for the negotiations by both sides and the re-
sources available to achieve various self-governing objectives.
Despite the apparent novelty of the proposed Federal Indian
Decolonization Policy, it would actually require only a minor
change in existing federal Indian control law and policy. In ad-
dition to the current Self-Governance Policy, existing federal
Indian control law provides for a number of areas in which the
Indian nations can negotiate for or otherwise assume greater
authority over their own affairs, including gaming regula-
tion,6 ° environmental regulation,6 ' child welfare jurisdiction,"'
mineral development, 03 forest and wildlife management,6 and
certain aspects of criminal jurisdiction.0 5 Thus, expanding the
Self-Governance Policy into a Decolonization Policy would
simply allow for a comprehensive mechanism for dealing with
a multitude of tribal governing decisions that are all interre-
lated in the first place. This, it would seem, would be helpful to
the planning functions of both the United States and the In-
dian nations.
600. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
601. See Indian Lands Open Dump Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3908 (1994).
602. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
603. See Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (1994).
604. See National Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101-
3120 (1994).
605. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994).
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Pursuing a Decolonization Policy will ensure that the Indian
nations, perhaps for the first time, will have to make difficult
political choices about what governmental responsibilities they
will assume; the downside is the same. Given the limits facing
tribal government-economic, political, and practical-there is
little incentive for a tribal government to negotiate for
authority that it has neither the wherewithal nor means to
handle. After generations of conditioned weakness and
dependency, however, there is unlikely to be a magical
transformation of tribal self-government overnight. Indeed,
there will likely only be growing pains that would give ample
room for the critics of self-determination to scuttle the
initiative.' In any event, if decolonization and the survival of
606. Critics of self-determination can cite the recent U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) Indian housing scandal, which the Seattle Times re-
ported in a series of articles in December, 1996. See Eric Nalder et al., A National
Disgrace: HUD's Indian-Housing Program, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, at A16,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File; Eric Nalder et al., From Deregulation
to Disgrace-The House that HUD Built: 5,300 Square Feet for One Family-Despite
Their $92,000 Income, Tulalip Couple Got Housing Aid, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996,
at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File [hereinafter Nalder, Deregula-
tion]; Eric Nalder et al., How a Few Got Best Part of HUD Pie, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 3,
1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File; Eric Nalder et al., HUD
Program Changing-For Better or Worse, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, at Al, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File [hereinafter Nalder, HUD]; Eric Nalder et
al., Key to HUD's Cashbox, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 2, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Seattm File; Eric Nalder et al., Playing Favorites-Rules Applied Un-
evenly, Says Critics [sic] at HUD, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 3, 1996, at A10, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File; Eric Nalder et al., Quinault Tribe--Minding the
Rules Making Them Work, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Seattm File; Eric Nalder et al., Safety Funds Spent on Frills and
Friends, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 3, 1996, at All, available in LEXIS, News Library, Se-
attm File; Eric Nalder et al., Sending Good Money After Bad-HUD Missed Signs of
Waste, Then Gave Tribe More Money, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 4, 1996, at All, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File; Eric Nalder et al., South Dakota-Vicious" Politics
Gets Blame for Nepotism, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 3, 1996, at All, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Seattm File; Eric Nalder et al., The Muckleshoots: HUD Program Un-
dermined, While Many Remain in Shacks, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, at A15,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File; Eric Nalder et al., The Otoes: One
Tribe Divided-Leaders Replace Needy on Waiting List for Homes, SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1996, at A17, available in LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File [hereinafter Nal-
der, The Otoes]; Eric Nalder et al., [The Pequots], SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 4, 1996, at Al,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File [hereinafter Nalder, The Pequots]; Eric
Nalder et al., Tribal Housing, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Seattm File; Eric Nalder et al., What a Time for the Boss to Leave
Town, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Seattm
File; Eric Nalder et al., Yakima Tribe-Hired aRescuer" Ends Up in Prison, SEATTLE
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1996, at A9, available in LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File.
In reporting that the HUD was riddled with fraud, abuse, and mismanagement, the
Seattle Times reported that "many tribal leaders have taken advantage of relaxed
oversight by HUD to benefit themselves, their friends, and their relatives at the ex-
pense of more needy Indians." Nalder, HUD, supra. Examples include: the building of
A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas
the Indian nations is a real priority for the United States, then
the federal government must fully restore the right of the
Indian nations to take this kind of step forward.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, Congress has made great strides in devel-
oping new policy initiatives to revitalize the self-determination
of the Indian nations. Unfortunately, these efforts are unlikely
to have their intended effect because little has been done to
eliminate the colonial legal and administrative foundation
that has been developed during the first 200 years of the
United States' history. While the roots of these colonizing laws
and policies run deep into the fabric of the American way of
life, there is much associated with American values that sup-
ports the rights of all peoples to exercise the right of self-
determination.
Mr. President, I believe that you can, and should, participate
in the process of ensuring the survival of the Indigenous peo-
ples located in the United States. By embracing a visionary
legislative agenda designed to eliminate the federal law that
continues to colonize the Indian nations and inhibit Indige-
nous self-determination, you can make a dramatic change in
the course of our history together. Unless some drastic action
is taken soon, I fear that the Indian nations are in grave jeop-
ardy. The United States is responsible for this state of affairs.





luxury houses on big lots using a $2.5 million HUD grant for low-income housing
(including a 5,296 square-foot house for the housing authority's executive director and
her husband, who make $92,319 a year), see Nalder, Deregulation, supra; the replace-
ment of families on a housing waitlist by housing-authority stafl board members and
their families, see Nalder., The Otoes, supra; and the financing of 15 large homes
through a $1.5 million low-income housing grant for a tribe with no low-income fami-
lies and a casino reputed to clear $1 million a day, see Nalder, The Pequots, supra.
607. "It is said."
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